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This thesis considers the role of the mainstream South African print media in perpetuating 
discrimination during the years of legalised racial discrimination – commonly known as 
apartheid – from when the Herenigde Nationale Party took power in May 1948 with an 
unprecedented 28-seat swing under the leadership of 74-year-old Dr Daniel F. Malan until it 
was replaced by the African National Congress, black-dominated unity government in April, 
1994. Against an historical background, it focuses on the agenda and efforts of the 
mainstream metropolitan print media during the apartheid era, the build-up to the first non-
racial elections, and the media’s role in the immediate post-apartheid era. 
Race and class-based inequalities have always been a feature of South African life 
since settlement when the Dutch arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The era of racial 
segregation can broadly be categorised as starting from 1910 to 1948, the Immigrant 
Regulation Act of 1913 that prevented the free movement of Indians across the provincial 
borders of Natal, which also placed restrictions on Indians owning land outside Natal 
province. Black land ownership was subjected to similar regulations with the Scheduled 
Areas of the Native Lands Act of 1913 and later the Native (Urban Areas) Act.  
But it was from 1948 that the era of apartheid started under the National Party leader 
Dr Malan, known as the father of apartheid, a racially discriminatory and evil practice based 
entirely on racial superiority and aimed at keeping the minority white tribe of Africa in 
control over the indigenous people. This “separate development” policy was already 
entrenched in South African society by the time the National Party took control after the 1948 
elections, but Malan legislated oppression by introducing various Acts of Parliament and in 
1953 disenfranchised the “Coloured” people by removing them from the voters’ role. 
Instead of opposing this blatant racism and discrimination that lasted nearly half a 
century, the South African mainstream print media – both the English and Afrikaans language 
press –  embraced the new direction in the early years with an enthusiasm that reflected 
poorly on the role of the press. During the early reign of the National Party, from 1949 to the 
mid-50s, the English-language newspapers were weak and fearful, lacked integrity and 
honesty, and failed in their duty as public watchdog. While the Afrikaans-language 
newspapers were developing to support government policies, the English press shared similar 
views. Both the English and Afrikaans press failed in their duties as the Fourth Estate in 
keeping a watchful eye on government. They never opposed the status quo and offered little 
or no support for a system of equality for all the peoples of South Africa. Although, in many 
ways the press was severely restricted in performing its proper role, ultimately it was a white-




This thesis argues that despite its efforts, fundamental political change was never the 
agenda of the press, nor was equality of the various races. Definitely not the Afrikaans press 
and certainly not the English press despite the role that it seeks to claim in the post-apartheid 
era as a de facto opposition and a constant nagging thorn in the side of government. 
At times the English press wore the mantle of the opposition press and chided the 
government on various excesses but at the same time remained a conservative institution that 
practised much the same discriminatory policies of apartheid. Now, as South Africa continues 
along a new path of democracy, it is not a question of whether there is need for a reappraisal 
of the media in the post-apartheid era, but what shape or form it should take.  
This thesis aims to redirect the functions and role of the national print media and 
suggests that while the owners and the gatekeepers remain the same, on their past record, 
there is a justifiable cause for concern in a country struggling to come to terms with 
democracy and concludes that fundamental change is needed. 
By way of conclusion, I attempt to show that the South African print media, despite 
being hindered by a variety of laws to suppress criticism of the government, was at best 
hypocritical, at worst inherently racist and secular, tacitly supportive of the apartheid regime 
during the rule of the Nationalists and is now in need of reorganisation and fundamental 
structural change to meet the future challenges in a redeveloping nation. 
It is not a case of whether that change is effected but how it will be done that is at 
issue. How that change will be effected depends both on a willingness for change on the part 
of the major publishers, full integration and a more balanced racially-representative staff, as 
well as a commitment to open government on the part of the ruling establishment. 
With the demise of the National Party government and the introduction of the first 
non-racial parliament, it is my contention that it is now timely to forge a new media order, 
incorporating the best of what is good in the rest of the world and shedding that which is 
cumbersome while at the same time being sensitive to the development of an emerging 
democracy. This does not mean that the new media order should be of a restrictive nature, nor 
is it a call for the media to be less vigorous in its role of keeping Government honest.  
The press must be free to criticise, investigate and chide the government. However, in 
the early years of nation building the role of the press should in some ways be more 
supportive rather than fiercely antagonistic, defiantly critical or adversarial. In short, the new 
media order should work towards reconciling the need for openness and the right to speak 
one’s mind with the necessity for healing the wounds created by racism. In the words of 




We must remember that the objective is to open doors that are at present 
closed, not to create more blockages to the free circulation of ideas and 
information. We would have gained little if we were to replace the present 
media controls with new ones that simply switch the propaganda and 
biases around; if one realm of banality takes over from another. Truth has 
always favoured the democratic cause, and our people are tired of forever 
being protected in the name of what others think is good for them.1 
The press in South Africa does not exist in a vacuum. Large sections of the South 
African print media grew fat on the machinery of apartheid. Racism was rife in many 
newsrooms and evidence given to both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Racism in the Media inquiry amply illustrates this. At the very least there is now a moral 
obligation on the part of the media to participate constructively in the transformation just as 
there is an obligation on all sectors of South African industries and trades to adopt Black 








1. Sachs, Albie, Protecting human rights in a new South Africa, Oxford University 
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Job reservation and discrimination in the workplace were features of the South African 
political landscape as far back as the 1920s. Many jobs were reserved for whites with no skills 
and only the very menial jobs were reserved for blacks. By blacks I mean the coloured, Indian 
and Bantu population. It was intended to provide unskilled and poorly educated whites with 
what was described as “European living standards”. 
This colour-based job reservation was “legitimised” with amendments to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (job reservations) introduced in 1956 and 1959. Under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, categories of work were reserved for particular races. For example, 
trades such as electricians, plumbers, motor mechanics were reserved for whites while black 
people were restricted to manual labour, servants and mineworkers. The small white 
community was given the best and highest paying jobs to reinforce the beliefs of white 
superiority. Coloureds were given second best and black people were largely restricted to 
menial work. 
The apartheid government’s Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 can be 
regarded as another attempt to provide a measure of insurance for white 
labour against unemployment. The Act enforced job reservation and racial 
separation in trade unions and was designed to afford the white group 
another legal barrier against non-white encroachment.1 
The system of apartheid has left a legacy of inequality in the labour market and this 
inequality reveals itself in the distribution of jobs, occupations and incomes according to race, 
gender and disability. 
However, job reservation did not apply to journalism. It was unnecessary because there 
were no training facilities for black journalists and universities that offered journalism/media 
studies as a career option were reserved exclusively for whites. In addition, publishers of the 
major newspapers steadfastly refused to employ black and coloured journalists. 
There was no place for them. The focus of the news was directed towards whites, the 
content of the papers was geared towards whites, the advertisers were chasing the high 
spending power of the whites and black people did not fit into the equation. The first black 
journalists only started trickling into the profession in the early 1970s and then only on 
specific, racially targeted newspapers. 
It is this history of oppression and exclusivity during the apartheid years that sowed the 
seeds of discontent between the ANC-led government and the national press. By the time the 
apartheid system collapsed in the early 1990s and the election of the Government of National 




The national media were expected to be a part of this transformation. More than that, 
government expectations were that the media would be supportive in the early years of nation 
building. Instead, the government faced a critical media which it considered antagonistic and 
hostile. Instead of the developmental approach which the government desired, it faced the full 
scrutiny of a Western libertarian media which operates in much stronger and older 
democracies. 
This was illustrated in a presidential address by Nelson Mandela at the 50th ANC 
conference held in Mafeking on December 16, 1997.  
We have to confront the fact that during the last three years, the matter has 
become perfectly clear that the bulk of the mass media in our country has 
set itself up as force opposed to the ANC. 
In a manner akin to what the National Party is doing in its sphere, this 
media exploits the dominant positions it achieved as a result of the 
apartheid system,  
to campaign against both real change and the real agents of change, as 
represented by our movement, led by the ANC. 
In this context, it also takes advantage of the fact that, thanks to decades of 
repression and prohibition of a mass media genuinely representative of the 
voice of the majority of the people of South Africa, this majority has no 
choice but to rely for information and communication on a media 
representing the privileged minority. 
To protect its own privileged positions, which are a continuation of the 
apartheid legacy, it does not hesitate to denounce all efforts to ensure its 
own transformation, consistent with the objectives of a non-racial 
democracy, as an attack on press freedom. When it speaks against us, this 
represents freedom of thought, speech and the press − which the world 
must applaud! 
When we exercise our own right to freedom of thought and speech to 
criticise it for its failings, this represents an attempt to suppress the 
freedom of the press − for which the world must punish us! 
Thus the media uses the democratic order, brought about by the enormous 
sacrifices of our own people, as an instrument to protect the legacy of 
racism, graphically described by its own patterns of ownership, editorial 




many respects, it has shown a stubborn refusal to discharge its 
responsibility to inform the public.2 
Accusations of bias and threats of prior restraint and censorship further muddied the 
waters. Black journalists were accused of being manipulated by their white masters; the media 
was accused of being slow to change in a way that reflects the new South Africa. And then 
there were complaints that the government was trying to nobble the press. 
From my research, it is clear that there is no quick fix for this complex problem. 
Demands for racial transformation of the press, simply replacing white staff with black, is not 
the solution. Not every black journalist is an Uncle Tom and not every white journalist is a 
racist. 
The problem of transforming the media now transcends racial inequalities and it 
includes factors such as improving journalistic standards, better pay to attract better 
journalists, improved training facilities, even reshuffling the decks so that the gatekeepers of 
information reflect more broadly the markets in which they operate. 
Since the historic democratic elections in April, 1994, South Africa has undergone 
swift and varied changes. In the 10 years since the election of a Government of National 
Unity, the country has had two presidents. Nelson Mandela was president from 1994 until 
1999 when he was succeeded by the ANC’s heir apparent and Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki. 
The bulk of my research was done while Mandela was president. However, the 
problems faced by the national press under Mandela continue under Mbeki.  
During the period of Mandela’s government, many black journalists were promoted 
to the executive levels of the country’s major newspapers. In the fast changing world of South 
African journalism, there have also been many editorial changes. Newly promoted editors 
have changed newspapers, some were sacked and others switched camp to work for rival 
organizations. 
Under Mbeki’s leadership, changes are evident in the way that the government and 
the national press are working towards settling their differences as each becomes more 
relaxed about its role in society. However, my PhD studies, which began in1996, are based on 
research on the South African press conducted from 1990 to 1999 while I was working as a 
journalist with The Canberra Times. I have tried to indicate in this thesis where I know of 





This thesis is written from the perspective of a black former South African journalist 
who worked on South African newspapers during the 1970s. It should be read within the 
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As South Africa undergoes radical social and political transformation, the question is how 
should the media respond to the very difficult problems that the new government encounters 
as it struggles to cope with the AIDS crisis, extreme poverty, high illiteracy, poor housing and 
a lack of basic facilities such as running water and electricity. 
In a climate of change, there is a need for the national media to change in a way to 
broadly reflect concerns in the wider community. The press has been accused of being “too 
white” and faces increasing demands for change from various quarters including veiled 
threats from President Thabo Mbeki for a more accountable media. 
Against a background of statements made to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into racism in the media, there 
emerges a polarisation of ideas. Essentially, the national press remains a microcosm of the 
apartheid era with black journalists demanding a more prominent role as the gatekeepers of 
information. White editors are contending they were at the forefront in the fight against 
apartheid and have no axe to grind with the new government and the African National 
Congress. One view is put by ANC Women's League president Winnie Madikizela-Mandela 
when she addressed the Johannesburg Press Club in Braamfontein in 1998. Madikizela-
Mandela accused the media of being wedded to the old order of Western racist supremacy, 
and out of kilter with the new social order. 
They (the media) use the conventions and values of a small section of our 
society to define what constitutes a standard free press. They use their 
freedom to push an agenda that is totally out of touch with African society. 
The media would continue to be perceived to be loaded with the agenda of 
racism and white superiority as long as editors remain loyal to parties' 
political ideologies and are controlled by a business sector that is aligned 
to (those parties') paradigms.1 
Madikizela-Mandela accused the media of becoming an impediment to the idea of an 
African renaissance, that it lacked sensitivity and was out of step with the majority of South 
Africa’s people. 
The media is in a dilemma, caught between two major cultures a dying, 
fossilized European, conservative liberalism, and an assertive emerging, 
African renaissance … If it is to play a meaningful role, it needs an urgent 




It is a view that is by no means unique and finds favour with a large section of the 
former oppressed as well as advocates within the white community. 
In some ways it is a view shared by the former Rand Daily Mail editor Allister Sparks 
(1995) of the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism: 
After a political revolution that astonished the world, we are now entering 
an even more profound second phase of socio-economic change. The 
transformation of the media is part of it. Like all revolutions, the outcome 
is uncertain. All we know is that it will be important for the quality of our 
emerging democracy, for the media to provide the vocal system through 
which public debate takes place. If they are defective, the democracy will 
be defective. Hopefully, there will be change but that will require a change 
of attitude and commitment of resources by those who control the media.3  
It is the way in which the media should change that poses a dilemma. The thesis asks 
the questions:  Did the national press do enough in the fight against apartheid? Can the liberal 
English press rightfully claim the mantle of de facto opposition in the fight against apartheid 
or was it more often than not in collusion with the racist regime and little more than an 
irritation when it opposed National Party policy? And, what is the future of the national press, 
how will it meet new demands it faces in the democratic new South Africa? 
Gordon Jackson [1993] also concedes there is necessity to rewrite the map but is 
unsure whether a developmental media system could prevail. Jackson finds that a 
developmental media system “is highly unlikely to become preeminent” in South Africa 
mainly because “the traditions of an already established mainstream press put these papers at 
odds with many elements of developmental media”. There are also fears the ANC-dominated 
government would promote developmental journalism “seeking to use the press with some 
level of compulsion to advance government policies”. And he arrives at the conclusion that: 
As a whole the press is likely to cling to the social responsibility approach 
and First World standards for as long as possible, as indeed it should. 
Should the society as a whole move towards liberal democracy, it will be 
easier for the press to maintain its allegiance to and practice of First World 
standards. By contrast, should the country move further from liberal 
democracy, maintaining its present orientation would be difficult.4  
Jackson concedes elements of developmental journalism will be incorporated into the 
evolving South African media and it should be welcomed but he suggests that despite the 
ample shortcomings of the press, “developmental journalism as a whole offers little to redress 




Transformation of the media is already underway following the fall of apartheid in 
1994 and the changing relationship between the press and the new Government of National 
Unity, South African media analyst and academic Eric Louw [1996] notes. Louw describes 
the new political order’s relationship with the press: 
A new hegemonic order has been born and is forcing the press to radically 
change the ways which, to a large extent, mirror the wider reform process. 
Essentially, the Government of National Unity-times represents an altered 
political and socio-economic context to which all institutions in society 
(including the press) are having to adjust.5  
One of the aspects focused in this thesis is the commitment to and the speed of 
transformation in the press.  
Chapter One offers a broad historical overview of the development of the South 
African print media. It identifies four main strands of the South African print media during 
the period commonly known as the apartheid era. These are the Afrikaans press, the English 
language press, the “Black” press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own 
agenda. They all operated under the same severely oppressive and restrictive laws but each 
reacted in a different way. 
The chapter aims to show the complexities of the media in the political spectrum and 
the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of the government’s racist policy, the 
Afrikaans press evolving from a government propaganda machine at conception to grow into 
a disobedient and defiant appendage towards the end of the apartheid era.  
Set against this background, there was the marginal role of the “black” press and the 
defiance of the alternative papers of the late 1970s and 1980s that caused much trouble for the 
government trying to crush rising civil unrest and anti-apartheid riots across the country. The 
alternative papers were often accused of fanning the flames of unrest in the townships. 
The structure and foundations of the South African press is discussed in Chapter Two 
including the early days of the press, the struggles against authoritarian controls and the move 
towards greater accountability in the 1950s. Chapter Two also considers the role of the 
Afrikaans press in National Party politics, the effect of apartheid on the development of the 
national media leading eventually to the establishment of the alternative press in 1980 and its 
eventual decline and demise 10 years later.  
Chapter Three continues with the legacy of government oppression and focuses on 
the early struggle for press freedoms against this background friction, the emergence of a 
pioneer press and later the impact of the “Magna Carta” in 1829 and briefly looks at the 




Chapter Four considers post-apartheid paradoxes. The end of apartheid brought with 
it additional and new pressures on the press. Just as the English language press was accused 
of being unsupportive and biased against the National Party government, so too did the non-
racial Government of National Unity stir up old conflicts by accusing the media of being 
fundamentally racist and unsupportive of change. The new masters ushered in old fears of 
repression and censorship while repeating the common appeal for greater support and 
consideration in the face of overwhelming social disunity. The Truth and Reconciliation 
hearings into the role of the media during the apartheid era are also considered in Chapter 
Four as well as considerations from former Argus company editors who defended their 
stewardship of the English press as antagonists of the government and proponents of change. 
Chapter Five focuses on new directions and options for change. Among the new 
directions considered are options from the government-directed Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP), as well as the ANC media policy before it came to power in 
1994, options from a reformed National Party as well as warnings from then President Nelson 
Mandela urging the media to adapt and change in the spirit of the national and social 
transformation and similar threats from his successor Thabo Mbeki who put the national press 
on notice. 
Chapter Six considers the effects of racism in the media and looks at efforts by the 
South African Human Rights Commission to facilitate a free and open press. It focuses 
mainly on two major submissions to the SAHRC, Cultural Bloodstains by Claudia Braude 
and a report by Media Monitoring Project that looked at racial stereotyping in the media, as 
well as individual submissions by interested parties including a loosely formed group of 
“black” editors, a response from a group of “white” journalists. It concludes with an 
assessment of the recommendations of the human rights commission. 
Chapter Seven considers options for change in the South African press against a 
background of various theoretical academic studies. 
Chapter Eight concludes that real changes within the South African press will only 
become a reality when there are corresponding meaningful changes in South African society. 
It also offers modest options for a new media order in the emerging democracy and promotes 






Issues considered in this thesis include a scope for a meaningful journalism Code of Conduct, 
aspects of a developmental media approach despite its shortcomings, a review of ownership 
and monopolies, levels of overseas ownership, improved prospects and training for black 
journalists at the highest levels to provide a more equitable balance of opinion, options for 
self-regulation, and the impact of constitutional guarantees of press freedom amid government 
calls for a more sympathetic and supportive national press. 
The image of South Africa making a smooth and trouble-free transition from 
oppression looks rather tarnished, especially with rising crime, poor housing, rampant poverty 
and a host of other problems threatening the very fabric of democracy and offering soft and 
easy targets for a critical press. Here the national media must take much of the blame as it 
pursues an adversarial role against the government. That is a role demanded and expected of 
the press in a strong democracy. But in South Africa the bonds of democracy are strained and 
still fragile.  
Mandela puts the government’s case: 
 I know that these comments will be received with a tirade of 
denunciation, with claims that what we are calling for is a media that acts 
as a lapdog rather than a watchdog. We must reiterate the positions of our 
movement that we ask for no favours from the media and we expect none. 
We make no apology for making the demand that the media has a 
responsibility to society to inform. Neither do we doubt the correctness of 
our assessment of the role the media has played in the last three years. All 
of us know too much about what happens in the newsrooms …. 
Conference will have to consider what measures we have to take …. At 
the same time as we consider these matters, we must also reaffirm our 
commitment to the freedom of the press and demonstrate this in all our 
practical activities.6 
There are many arguments against the media adopting a developmental role in society 
as opposed to the more traditional Western model but it is clear that in developing countries, 
the arguments against the traditional Western model of the press has validity in that it has 
been less than successful. 
This thesis does not propose some form of censorship for the South African press but 
rather that the gatekeepers of information need to seriously re-assess their role in society. Are 
newspapers going to remain inactive and passive yet critical bystanders in a changing 




of nation building? This thesis suggests there is an urgent need for the national media to adopt 
a more positive and proactive role, yet it is one that they may be reluctant to embrace. 
The thesis suggests that while the fundamental make-up, ownership and staffing, 
especially at senior management and editorial decision-making levels remain the same, the 
impetus for change will be slow and the political agenda tinged with the mistakes of the past. 
Staffing needs to reflect the diversity of a nation in transition and a definitive press policy 
needs to be spelt out − even if this is by way of legislation as in a Press Act within the 
boundaries of the constitutional guarantees on freedom of speech. 
By and large the executive roles in South African mainstream print media are 
dominated by white people who remain stunted by a lack of basic knowledge of the lifestyle 
and affairs of the vast majority of South Africans. Proper journalism education for a new 
generation of South African journalists, especially black journalists, and participation at 
senior decision-making levels is an important and necessary start even before political or 
legislative considerations for the evolution of a dynamic press in South Africa are considered. 
This is not to say that with affirmative action, by employing more black journalists or 
promoting more black journalists to positions of influence on South African newspapers, 
changes will necessarily follow. Thabo Mbkei, the South African president, and his 
predecessor, Nelson Mandela, have already levelled serious allegations of bias against senior 
black journalists whom they accuse of unbalanced comment on policy matters of national 
importance and of carrying out the hidden agendas of their white masters. 
This complaint is not peculiar to South African journalists where the government is 
often at odds with the press. However, the South African society is in the process of major 
transition socially and politically and the media has also to transform in a way that it will be 
meaningful to the broader community, not just the wealthier influential whites that have been 
served so well. 
Mathatha Tsedu, deputy editor at The Star in 1997 and one of the few senior black 
journalists appointed to a management position, explains the dilemma in a report Journalism 
in transition in South Africa to the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University: 
In actual fact, the threat to journalists, unlike in the heyday of apartheid 
repression is their [black journalists’] conscience. The challenge is to 
decide  what is right and wrong and sometimes national priorities might 
interfere with what would ordinarily be good journalism … Exposing 
corruption is another area in which black journalists have excelled, 
debunking the myth that because they are black and the government is 




The thesis methodology is largely descriptive and based on empirical observations, 
drawing on historical analysis and earlier research by South African media academics 
including Keyan Tomaselli, Eric Louw, Guy Berger, Arrie de Beer, and Gordon Jackson and 
is assisted by the works of William Hachten, Anthony Giffard and John Phelan. South African 
newspaper editors, among them Raymond Louw, Harvey Tyson, Moegsien Williams, Ryland 
Fisher, and Thami Mazwai among many have contributed significantly to the ever evolving 
media debate and substantial use is made of their observations. It covers opinions from the 
extreme views offered by Mazwai, a former political prisoner and now programming 
chairman of the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, who 
dismisses objectivity in journalism as an illusion to Keyan Tomaselli who sees the need for 
improved research skills as essential for the improvement of journalism and Ryland Fisher 
who argues for the radical reform of South Africa’s predominantly white newsrooms in the 
hope that more racially balanced newsrooms will provide a broader scope of  news coverage. 
My own experience as a South African journalist during the turbulent 1970s on the 
“coloured newspaper” The Cape Herald and later The Cape Times in Cape Town also 
provided some useful observations and impetus. Submissions and interviews to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s inquiry into the role of the media during the apartheid era as 
well as submissions to the South African Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into Racism in 
the Media offered varied perspectives on the way the South African press operated. This 
research is limited somewhat by personal interpretation and subjective standards of what is 
being represented in the news.  
There is no shortage of theories suggesting means and ways in which the press needs 
to change in what is described as “the new South Africa”. This thesis does not aim to add to 
the plethora of theories canvassed. However, it hopes to determine an urgent need for greater 
participation of “black” journalists at the executive and gatekeeper levels of the media to 
influence the national agenda, to facilitate a broader spectrum of opinion and media coverage 
and to ensure full participation to the widest levels of a segmented society. It also looks at 
ways in which this change can be achieved. 
This thesis hopes to draw attention to the continuing difficulties faced by “black” journalists 
in the post-apartheid South African press. By highlighting a need to change the direction and 
focus of the national press, it also suggests an expanded role for the previously disadvantaged 
journalists and an opportunity to reshape the national agenda. This needs to be reflected at 
senior editorial or executive levels rather than at the lower and entry levels of journalism. This 
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SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS FREEDOMS − AN   HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Introduction 
Chapter One offers a broad historical overview of the development of the South African print 
media. It identifies four main strands of the South African print media during the period 
commonly known as the apartheid era. These are the Afrikaans press, the English language 
press, the “Black” press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own agenda. They 
all operated under the same severely oppressive and restrictive laws but each reacted in a 
different way. The chapter aims to show the complexities of the media in the political 
spectrum and the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of the government’s 
racist policy, the Afrikaans press evolving from a government propaganda machine at 
conception to grow into a disobedient and defiant appendage towards the end of the apartheid 
era.  
Legacy of oppression  
The fight for press freedom in South Africa has been a record of struggle, oppression, 
political interference and racial bias in a deeply divided country. Its roots lie in the 
complexities of a colonial dispensation extraordinary even in the eventful annals of European 
imperialism. From the mid-16th Century two great colonial powers, the British and the Dutch, 
vied for supremacy in South Africa. This ensured an inheritance that was bilingual and bi-
cultural, akin  in some ways to the later  settlement of Canada. For more than 150 years, the 
Dutch were predominant in the Cape, until the early 19th Century when the British out-
maneuvered them by an adroit combination of political strategy and militarism. 
 The Dutch trekked from the Cape inland and north from the 1830s, recreating their 
imperialism in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The inevitable result was a see-
sawing military struggle, culminating in British sovereignty following the successful South 
African (Boer) War of 1899-1901 and the inauguration of the Union of South Africa in 1911. 
 Through much of the 20th Century, the Union simmered under an uneasy alliance 
between British institutions and the traditions and culture of the thrusting Afrikaners. 
Gradually, the Afrikaners asserted a political ascendancy which enabled them to fulfil by 
ostensibly democratic means their political, racial and cultural aspirations in South Africa. 
The fulcrum of this hegemony was a rigorously controlled separation of black and white 
South Africans, a policy known generically as apartheid. South Africans of British origin and 
culture lacked the numbers, the political will and the strategical dexterity to withstand the 




from the chasm between black and white, the British and Afrikaners were often uneasy 
bedfellows, the British inclined towards moderation but mostly compliant with the political 
majority. 
 The labyrinthine twists and turns of imperial history, and apartheid, ensured that two 
contending white cultures, the British and the Afrikaners, emerged in South Africa, each 
producing its own distinctive newspaper press. White supremacy flourished in the enduring 
presence of a vast, tribal-based black majority, ruthlessly controlled and oppressed but never 
subjugated or marginalised. Heterogeneous in composition, the black majority reflected 
traditions of protracted resistance, even spasmodic military glory in the combative Zulu 
nation.  
 The size and distribution of the overwhelming black population ensured that from the 
mid-19th Century it would also produce a diverse press. Thus, the colonial press traditions of 
the British and Afrikaners were augmented by a rich and politically potent press whose primal 
impulses were racial. 
 Stimulated by political forces, particularly apartheid, an alternative press tradition 
emerged in South Africa during the second half of the 20th Century. In short, the emergent 
framework of the South African press was anchored in three powerful traditions: colonial 
with enduring British and Afrikaner press systems; racial, with a black population and press 
much coerced but never subdued; and a lesser, though still influential, political press 
influenced by alternative attitudes and stances. 
 The following account does not analyse in any conceptual sense the origins and 
institutional development of South Africa. It aims, firstly, to account for the emergence of 
print news technology and print newspapers in the country since its foundations in the mid-
17th century. On the basis of this analysis, it proceeds to define, describe and conceptualise 
the four quintessential press systems identified above:  British, Afrikaner, Black and 
Alternative. 
Beginnings 
It took nearly 175 years after settlement for the first newspaper to appear in South Africa, and 
at that, a strictly-controlled government gazette. The Dutch, who first settled in 1652, 
discouraged the establishment of a free press. For most of the first 150 years after Jan van 
Riebeeck arrived at the Cape Colony, there was no print technology there. Monetary policy 
dictated the procuring of crude print technology to provide currency. In 1782, the Dutch East 
India Company allowed Governor van Plettenberg some printing type to produce emergency 
currency when war with England disrupted normal consignments of specie from Holland.  All 




 The arrival of the first printing press in 1794 was the reluctant product of constant 
representation by burghers at the Cape to the colonial government which transmitted them to 
Holland, but Amsterdam rejected pleas for presses in 1783 and 1786. The colonial 
administration urgently needed a press for printing proclamations, government orders and 
other state documents.  
 It was a pattern not dissimilar to early settlement in the United States, and Australia 
where a printing press was dispatched in 1788 with the First Fleet. In many respects, the 
printing press legitimised first settlement. In Australia, government decrees were printed and 
distributed from the early 1790s, and the first newspaper, a government gazette, appeared in 
1803. In the United States, where early settlement was broadly contemporaneous with South 
Africa, newspaper production began virtually from the early 18th Century. 
 In 1793, the Council of Policy at the Cape established a printing plant. It appointed 
Johan Christian Ritter as superintendent, but he lost the position in 1795 when the British took 
over the colony. Ritter and another master printer, Harry Harwood Smith, scrounged some 
basic printing equipment and lobbied the British Governor, Sir George Younge, for the 
government printing licence. Ignoring Ritter and Smith, on July 15, 1800, Younge issued a 
proclamation appointing Alexander Walker and John Robertson as government printers. 
 They were established Cape merchants who had imported a printing press, type, three 
printers and a Dutch translator. Walker and Robertson began printing on February 1, 1800 but 
the decision to grant them government sanction was challenged by Ritter and Smith. The 
Governor proclaimed a heavy fine and confiscation of plant if other printers entered the field, 
and sole right of printing was vested in the colonial government. The government offered to 
buy a press on order from Ritter, but Smith was ordered to hand over all his printing 
equipment.  
 Walker and Robertson were also given permission to start a weekly paper and so 
began publication of the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, on August 16, 1800. 
Some historians regard this publication as South Africa’s first newspaper. But it was not a 
newspaper in the traditional sense as material was restricted to government proclamations and 
public notices. This initiated what Cutten described as the start of a romantic era in South 
African journalism, lasting until 1828. These were epic, landmark years for the South African 
press.1 
 Essentially, the Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser was a government gazette 
but it contained small news stories and a modicum of commercial advertising. Its staple fare, 
however, was the constitutional, legal and administrative documentation of colonial 




Advertiser and the Kaapsche Stads Courant en Afrikaanse Berigte [Cape City News and 
Afrikaans Reports].  With a return of Dutch hegemony, the newspaper was known only as the 
Kaapsche Courant from 1803 to 1806, but resumed its original name when the British 
occupied the Cape again in 1806. 
 This name it retained until July 7, 1826 when it appeared as The Cape of Good Hope 
Government Gazette.  Changing nomenclature reflected alternating periods of Dutch and 
British rule. The first British occupation of the Cape lasted from 1795-1802. Constitutionally, 
the Cape colony reverted to the Dutch rule in 1803 when it was handed back to the Batavian 
Republic to comply with the Treaty of Amiens.  This was signed by Britain, France, Spain, 
and the Batavian Republic (Holland) in March 1802, marking the end of the French 
Revolutionary Wars. The second British occupation of the Cape started in 1806, when 
Anglicisation of the Cape Colony began in earnest. 
Towards a free press 
The first commercial newspaper was published 170 years after the first Dutch settlement in 
the 1660s. Almost a quarter of a century after the first British settlers arrived, the 
fundamentals of a free press were initiated. Following a sequence of campaigns and petitions, 
the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, reluctantly, in December 1822, permitted a non-
government newspaper.  Thomas Pringle, a poet and writer of some note, and a fiery Dutch 
clergyman, Dr Abraham Fourie, inaugurated the South African Journal and the Nederduitsch 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Tijdschrift [loosely translated as Netherlands South African Magazine]. 
 These publications appeared in English and Dutch in alternate months from March 5, 
1823, signalling the emergence of a privately-owned newspaper press in the colony. The 
South African Journal published only two issues after an article critical of Governor Somerset 
led to its closure. Pringle was bluntly warned to cease publication or face the consequences.  
 The Dutch edition, though, lasted for nearly 20 years, steering well away from official 
business, politics and social controversy to focus largely on ecclesiastical matters until its 
demise in 1843. From it stemmed the official mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church, Die 
Kerkbode [Church News]. Thus, the foundation press of the Afrikaners owed its emergence 
and survival  largely to a religious audience. 
 Meanwhile, the more venturesome Pringle also persuaded his close friend John 
Fairbairn, an experienced writer and journalist, to join him at the Cape and embark on a new 
venture, The South African Commercial Advertiser. A printer, George Greig was foundation 
proprietor of the Advertiser which first appeared on January 7, 1824. It is generally 
considered to have been the first independent South African newspaper. Greig edited the first 




 The authoritarian Somerset opposed the publication with a vehemence that prompted 
its early closure. Pringle refused to continue publication unless the press was protected in 
accordance with well-established British traditions of press freedom. In a battle that lasted 
five years and closed the Advertiser on two occasions, Pringle asserted his right to “petition 
the King for the extension of freedom of the press in the Colony”. He pressed his case in 
London and in 1828 was allowed to publish again. On May 8, 1829, the press was freed from 
the control of the governor and his council with the proclamation of Ordinance 60 of 1829, 
(Ordinance for Preventing the Mischiefs arising from Printing and Publishing Newspapers 
Ordinance 60 of 1829) the “Magna Carta" of the South African Press.2  
 It was introduced by General Bourke and it provided among others libel laws as 
remedies for abuses of the liberty of the press. De Kock describes it as the cornerstone for a 
free press and its proclamation "a time of vigour remarkable in any country's annals". 
Twenty-one of the 23 sections of the charter spelt out rules and regulations which newsmen 
had to abide by, but with a guarantee that only proven libellous and irresponsible statements 
could in future  prompt government   intervention.3  Governor Sir George Younge’s 
proclamation of  1800  restricting all public printing to his nominated appointees was also 
repealed.4 
A pioneer press 
In another strand of rapid growth, other newspapers had followed in the tracks blazed by the 
pioneers. On August 18, 1824, The South African Chronicle and Mercantile Advertiser 
appeared and was published until 1826. It was perceived as a government mouthpiece that 
reflected the views of Governor Somerset and deflected any criticism of the colonial 
government at the Cape. Apart from the religiously-inclined Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Tijdschrift, the father of Dutch journalism was a Portuguese-Dutch Jew, Joseph Suasso de 
Lima, a lawyer who started his newspaper, De Veerzamelaar [The Gleaner] in 1826. Meurant 
described De Lima’s newspaper as “a Dutch version of [London] Punch”, indulgent of society 
gossip.5 
 The New Organ, edited and owned by Fairbairn and Greig, (see above) also emerged 
in 1826.  As with De Veerzamelaar, it too was launched without the necessary licences and 
De Lima soon encountered financial difficulties from the contentious content of De 
Veerzamelaar. Neither lasted long, folding in the face of levies and stamp duties on published 
newspapers and periodicals. Under Ordinance 26 of 1826, Governor Somerset levied stamp 
duties on publications, not so much to raise revenue as to hinder their development. The 




developing press by fiscal means. The small newspapers were mostly unable to pay but 
struggled through as a philanthropic press until the stamp duty impost was repealed in 1848.  
 De Lima followed the model of the press pioneers but steered wide of politics in his 
weekly publication. It was always going to be a struggle for his small newspaper to survive 
and after just two editions it became clear there was little demand for it. Other newspapers 
starting in mid-1828 included the Zuid-Afrikaan [South African] which arose out of the 
demise of De Veerzamelaar. It was edited by De Lima and C. E. Boniface, a Frenchman who 
later produced the first newspaper in Natal. The Colonist, a weekly English publication, lasted 
from November 22, 1828 until September the following year. The Zuid-Afrikaan was the first 
newspaper to embrace Afrikaner nationalism and was intended to counter the efforts of 
Fairbairn which were mainly aimed at the English settlers. Thus, the dichotomy between 
newspapers directed to English and Afrikaans emerged early in the press history of South 
Africa, although some semblance of a joint approach occurred with alternating bilingual 
issues.   
In the wake of Magna Carta 
Several newspapers appeared in the wake of the “Magna Carta”, Ordinance 60 of 1829.  The 
most important included The Cape of Good Hope Literary Gazette (June, 1830), The 
Graham’s Town Journal (December, 1831), a religious four-page weekly De Kaapsche 
Cyclopedie (February, 1833), a missionary monthly The South African Christian Recorder 
(1835), a bilingual journal The Moderator and Mediator (1837), Leesvrugten, a religious 
journal (1837), The Eastern Province Government Gazette (1838), The Price Current (1838), 
De Ware Afrikaan (1838), The Cape Times (1840, not the present Cape Times which was 
established in 1876), The Colonial Times (in Grahamstown 1840) and the Cape of Good Hope 
Shipping Lists, in Cape Town (1840).  
This diversity of newspapers reflected a number of well-established press traditions, 
most emphatically the religious press. The introduction of a dedicated literary journal and a 
commercial shipping list were also typical of patterns followed in other colonies.  
  The practice of bilingual publication continued but does not appear to have insinuated 
itself into the common practice. 
Contentious had been the spread of John Fairbairn’s South African Commercial 
Advertiser into the Eastern Province which angered Dutch trekkers in December 1830 as 
settlers prepared for war with the indigenous people.  
 The Graham’s Town Journal was established under Louis Henry Meurant, as a voice 




off criticisms of the Afrikaners from Fairbairn’s more liberal newspaper in Cape Town. 
Fairbairn, a missionary’s son and a libertarian, was regarded as representing a clique of 
fanatics obsessed with outrages on defenceless natives. The Graham’s Town Journal was 
troubled by what it perceived as an attack by Fairbairn’s paper on the frontiersmen of the 
Eastern Province. In response, the Afrikaners launched De Zuid Afrikaan to “defend the good 
name of the Dutch residents against the libels of a hostile English party at the Cape and in 
England”. It opposed what the settlers viewed as the “radicalism of the negrophilist 
philanthropists”.6 
 By 1840, the South African press had grown to seven newspapers and nine printing 
houses from the origins of the four small newspapers publishing in Cape Town in 1826.   By 
1881 the Colonial Office in Cape Town had registered more than 125 assorted journals and 
newspapers. The rights of a free press had been established with control of the press shifting 
away from the Governor. Further church newspapers and magazines also appeared in the late 
1840s, including The South African Christian Watchman printed by the Wesley Mission, 
launched in January, 1846 and the Natal Witness (1846). In January 1851, the South African 
Church Magazine and the Ecclesiastical Review were first published. The last newspaper 
published at the Cape before mid-Century was The Cape Monitor, October 15, 1850, at Cape 
Town.7  
 It would be futile listing new publication between 1850 and 1900 because many 
newspapers were started with the discovery of gold in the Transvaal and it would assume an 
intolerable magnitude.8  
 Some of the more notable publications of this period of development included The 
Friend (1850), Natal Mercury (1852), Cape Argus (1857), The Star (1871), De Volksstem 
(1873), The Cape Times (1876), Diamond Fields Advertiser (1878), and South African News 
(1899). As the nomenclature indicates, the trend was firmly in the direction of general 
newspapers, perhaps with a slight orientation towards an English-language press. 
 Appearing in the early 1900s, the dwindling days of colonial South Africa, were the 
influential Rand Daily Mail (1902), Sunday Times (1906), and Die Burger (1915). These 
landmark publications evolved into major metropolitan newspapers of South Africa, and 
several of them were still publishing in the late 1990s. The Cape Argus and the Cape Times 
remain the major English newspapers in the Western Cape and Die Burger is one of the most 
popular Afrikaans newspapers. The Rand Daily Mail went under in 1985, perhaps due to 
mismanagement and financial difficulties but it also might be argued that it finally succumbed 
to government pressures. Thus, there is a sustained and enduring tradition of significant press 




 The South African Catholic Magazine, a monthly review of ecclesiastical news and 
opinion, was launched in 1891 with a prominent intellectual and Catholic priest Dr Friedrich 
Carl Kolbe as founding editor. For more than a decade Kolbe wrote much of its copy and 
gained a reputation as a fierce anti-war campaigner and a feeble voice against British 
imperialism. His opposition to the second Anglo-Boer war was not well received in many 
quarters. The editor of the Cape Mercury castigated the cleric’s logic, chided him for 
meddling in secular affairs, and by 1899 Kolbe had to relinquish editorship of the magazine 
temporarily to spare the Catholic church embarrassment over this public feud. 
 However, he continued his anti-war stance and opposition to martial law in the 
editing of Albert Cartwright’s anti-war newspaper the South African News, first published in 
Cape Town in 1899. In it, Kolbe’s editorials and viewpoints clashed frequently with the 
editorials advanced in pro-war newspapers such as the Cape Times and the Argus.  
He seriously underestimated the magnitude of the ecclesiastical opposition to his anti-war 
stance and by March 1900 it was clear that his continued role at the South African Catholic 
Magazine could not continue and he resigned as editor. 9 
Founding fathers 
This overview of how the South African press evolved has emphasised the paramount role of 
the intertwining colonial struggles between English and Dutch that brought colonial 
settlement to South Africa. The role of the black press and, particularly, idiosyncratic 
publications outside mainstream journalism, do not blend readily into this account of press 
evolution. Before taking them up in detail, a brief summary of the British and Afrikaner press 
is necessary. 
 The English-language press as it had emerged by the end of the colonial period was  
showing clear signs of settling into two main publishing groups predominant in English-
language press and, over time, a formidable presence in the national press structure.  These 
were the Argus Printing and Publishing company and its smaller rival South African 
Associated Newspapers (SAAN). The traditions and heritage of the English-language press 
were steeped in the British experience and tradition, particularly adherence to conventional 
Western models of freedom of the press. They can be traced in large part to the arrival of the 
British settlers in the early 1820s. However, the influence of the early Dutch rulers cannot be 
ignored, even though they showed great reluctance to accept the conventions of a free press at 
the Cape for more than 150 years. The Dutch masters, despite their opposition in the Cape, 
also derived from a free-press tradition in Holland extending back to the spread of the printing 




 The Afrikaans-language press had its roots in the Afrikaner language, religion, 
politics and nationalism. The Afrikaners created it largely to further their national and cultural 
aspirations. Unlike the English-language press, the Afrikaans press strove through much of 
the 20th Century to get the dogmatic, racist National Party into power, and then to keep it 
there. 
 Remarkably, at the time of Union in 1910, there were no Afrikaans [language] 
newspapers in South Africa. The structure of Afrikaans publication outlined above was 
extinguished in practical terms by the brief triumphs of English imperialism and patriotism in 
the late 19th Century. 
 Accordingly, newspapers in the Afrikaans language targeted at a national and cultural 
Afrikaner audience did not survive the Boer War (1899-1901). The traditions of an Afrikaans 
press were deeply imbued, however. A resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism led in 1912, 
shortly after the promulgation of the union, to the establishment of Die Week [The Week] 
founded by editor Harm Oost. This patriotic Afrikaner newspaper lasted two years before 
foundering financially. 
 It focused on Afrikaner politics, culture and economic efforts to assist and uplift the 
Afrikaner people. Hachten suggests that this resurgence in Afrikaner nationalism and the 
launch of Die Week spawned the Afrikaans press as it exists today.10 
Black and alternative   
According to Rosenthal, Bantu journalism in South Africa had its foundations in missionary 
journals about the mid-18th Century, and developed with the proselytising British and 
Foreign Bible Society which aimed at providing the Scriptures in every language.11  The 
scope of this evangelical journalism is unclear, although it must of necessity have been 
largely oral or hand-written in character.  
 The first printing equipment was brought by a group of American missionaries who 
came to Natal in the Voortrekker era of the late 1830s and used it to publish the first 
periodicals in the Natal region of eastern South Africa. 
 Thus, the first tentative steps of the black press lay in providing religious pamphlets 
and sermons, creating a system of writing and the spelling of African words never recorded 
before. It helped to prescribe basic rules of typography, led to the training of printers and 
compositors, and the consequential start of the first authentic Bantu presses in South Africa. 
The Bantu press made its first modest appearance at Esidumbini Mission Station in Natal with 




followed in 1862 by Indaba [The News] edited by the Rt Rev Bryce Ross. Circulation was 
around 600 copies with two-thirds of the content in Xhosa and the rest in English.12 
 Indaba had a rival when the Wesleyan Mission Press at Kingwilliamstown launched 
Isitunywa Senyanga [The Monthly Messenger] in the late 1860s. Both publications were 
devoted to spreading the Christian message. The religious affiliation of Indaba was 
transferred in 1870 to the head of the Presbyterian Mission College at Lovedale, in the Cape, 
and the paper was renamed The Kaffir Express. It was published in both English and Xhosa 
for six years then split into The Christian Express, all in English, and Isigidimi Sama Xosa 
[The Xhosa Messenger] all in the Xhosa language. In the Transvaal, one of the earliest Black 
publications was The Native Eye, started in Pietersburg in the decade between the Boer War 
and unification by Simon Majakatheta Phamotse. It enjoyed some prestige under Phamotse as 
editor because of his close association with the administrator of Basutoland, Sir Godfrey 
Lagden. The Native Eye folded when Phamotse returned to Basutoland and became secretary 
to Paramount Chief Jonathan. Among other publications, Daniel Simon Letanka started the 
Motsoalle [Friend] in 1910 but, not satisfied with the name, he changed it to Moromioa 
[Messenger].  
 The first real newspaper for Bantu people was the Sechuana publication Molekudi ua 
Bechuana which first appeared from 1856 to 1857, published at the Wesleyan Mission at Tha 
‘Nchu, edited by Rev Mr Ludorf. This newspaper included religious matter, a section on 
current politics, illustrations and photographs of social occasions. A monthly publication, it 
was followed by the Mahoko a Becwana [The Bechuana News] printed in the town of 
Kuruman at the Moffat Institute under the auspices of the London Bible Society. Again, the 
focus of news was religious, social and political. Following the London Mission Society 
example, the Lutheran Mission later supported a newspaper in the Transvaal, Moshupa-Tsela 
[The Guide]. 
 The turbulent development of a black press, largely independent of religious and 
other influences, began in 1884 with the establishment by Jo Tengu Jabavu of an African 
language newspaper in the Ciskei called Imvo Zabantsundu [African Opinions]. 
By the late 19th Century, several newspapers under Bantu control were publishing. Most 
lasted only briefly and are hard to trace. In 1901, Solomon Plaatjie published the Koranta ea 
Becoana [The Bechuana Gazette] in English and Tswana, and the Rev Walter Rebusana 
launched Izwi la Bantu. Rabusana later became the vice-president of the South African Native 
National Congress.  
 Other minor independent Black publications started around 1900, including Ikwezi le 




the Ilangai and Lase Natal [The Natal Sun] in the Zulu language. Dr Dube, a minister 
educated in the United States, is considered a pioneer of black journalism in South Africa 
along with Solomon Plaatjie, Tengo Jabavu, and Mark Radebe. Radebe aimed to start a 
national newspaper, Ipepa lo Hlanga [The National Paper] as a national platform for his 
people. Radebe’s enterprise was unrewarded. He lost money and was forced out of 
newspapers into the law and private enterprise 
 Under the editorship of its founder, Alfred Mangena, The Native Advocate launched 
in 1912 was the first African newspaper published in the national capital, Pretoria.  It 
foundered financially and closed after a year of publication. 
The Alternative press 
The Alternative press was a much later development. It emerged in the 1970s, and so was 
indisputably a post-colonial phenomenon. Perhaps more importantly, it was a post-apartheid 
phenomenon. The genesis of the Alternative press can be traced to the wave of national unrest 
that swept South Africa in 1976, starting with the Soweto riots of June 16, 1976 and the 
subsequent banning of four newspapers. Unrest spread to Natal, East London, Port Elizabeth 
and the Western Cape where the resistance movement gathered momentum. 
 Appropriately, the first South African grassroots press was established in Cape Town, 
where the seeds of both English and Afrikaans press systems had also been sown.  Coloured 
activists were largely responsible for mostly improvised, ad hoc journals initiating an 
alternative system. A fortnightly tabloid called Grassroots was launched in 1976 against a 
background of protest and resistance to apartheid. The community paper was a response to the 
privately-owned liberal press that was seen as being white-orientated and pro-establishment. 
It was against this background that Grassroots and the papers that followed were called 
collectively the Alternative press by their founders.13 
 Johnson [1991] links the importance of Grassroots to the growth of democratic 
organisation in the community, with the newspaper acting as the epicentre for that growth. 
No longer was the newspaper a mere chronicler and herald of resistance. It 
became part of that very process, influencing the direction it took.14 
 Staffed largely by unpaid volunteers and anti-apartheid political activists, the 
Alternative press struggled against police harassment and limited resources. By 1983, the first 
wave of community-based Alternative press publications had begun to falter. It was given a 
renewed surge of life by several professional journalists who joined grassroots papers and 
gradually shaped them into professional weekly products. The Weekly Mail, in 1985, was the 




African. Several smaller magazines such as Work in Progress and the SA Labour Bulletin, 
which dated from the 1970s, were given renewed vitality by the new press movement.15 
 The concept of “alternative” newspapers in South Africa found a niche market in the 
political upheavals of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but its foundations can be traced back 
much earlier. In 1952, Prime Minister Danie Malan moved to silence the voices of criticism 
and dissent by banning South Africa’s Communist Party-controlled newspaper, The 
Guardian. 
  From it developed the Advance, which was also banned two years later, and then 
reappeared in various forms as New Age which was outlawed in 1962. Other minor 
newspapers that could loosely be defined as the alternative press in the 1960s all met the same 
government resistance. Some were banned, and all of them were constantly harassed. 
The main players  
By 1994, more than 5000 newspapers and magazines were registered with the Department of 
Home Affairs. Another 66 new publications had been approved for publication. Registration 
of newspapers and other publications was no longer required after November 1994. (See 
Appendix A for a list of national newspapers and circulation figures.)  
 In the early 1990s, the Argus company produced more than 60 per cent of the 1.5 
million newspapers sold daily in South Africa and, with Times Media Ltd (TML) commanded 
almost total national coverage. South African newspapers and magazines, however, were still 
dominated by four organised press groups. The major group was Argus Newspapers, owned 
by Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Newspapers PLC, based in Great Britain and Ireland. It 
published The Star, in Johannesburg, Cape Times and Argus as morning and evening dailies 
in Cape Town, Natal Mercury and Daily News as morning and evening dailies in Durban, 
Diamond Fields Advertiser, a morning daily in Kimberley, Pretoria News, a 24-hour daily in 
Pretoria, Sunday Tribune in Durban on Sundays, and several weekly newspapers. It was also a 
controlling shareholder in the Newspaper Printing Company, which printed Argus and TML 
newspapers throughout South Africa, and of Allied Publishing, which distributed Argus and 
TML newspapers nationally. TML had shares in both companies. Times Media Ltd was 
owned by Omnimedia Corporation, controlled by Anglo American. TML published The 
Sunday Times, in Johannesburg, Business Day, a morning daily newspaper, and the weekly 
Financial Mail, in Johannesburg, The Eastern Province Herald, a morning daily in Port 
Elizabeth, and the Evening Post, an evening daily in Port Elizabeth. TML also owned several 
weekly and monthly newspapers, newsletters and magazines and information services. 
 The Anglo American mining group enjoyed large cross-media ownership and moved 




Independent Newspaper group. This further reduced the players in the small newspaper 
market in South Africa. This media monopoly was a worry for the ANC which considered 
compulsory steps to dilute the effects of the concentrated media ownership and to give access 
to the media to those excluded. In its media charter, in 1992, the ANC stressed as one of the 
cornerstones of its policy that the media should be open and that it should be absolutely 
accessible to anybody, either in print or the broadcast media.  
 The Irish media group, Independent Newspapers, bought a 31 per cent controlling 
interest. It lifted its stake to 34.98 per cent shortly afterwards and in February 1995 
announced it planned to raise its stake in Argus Newspapers by R150 million ($A58.11 
million) to nearly 70 per cent of the group. 
 By the end of 2002, Independent Newspapers was the leading newspaper group in 
South Africa, publishing a total of 14 daily and weekly newspapers in three major 
metropolitan areas of South Africa. Independent Newspapers has aggregate weekly sales of 
2.8 million copies in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The group currently 
attracts 48 per cent of the total advertising revenue spent in the paid newspaper market and 
reaches 63 per cent of English newspaper readers in those three areas. Independent 
Newspapers also publishes 13 free weekly community newspapers in Cape Town and holds a 
number of profitable commercial printing and distribution centres in South Africa. In 
addition, the group also has interests in magazines, book publishing, radio and broadcasting 
and television. 
 Times Media Ltd was acquired by the black empowerment group, Johnnic 
Communications which has diverse media and telecommunications interests. It is chaired by 
Cyril Ramaphosa, a presidential contender and trade union leader. Johnnic shares 50 per cent 
ownership of Times Media Ltd with the Pearson Group of the UK, owners of the Financial 
Times. Johnnic Communications was incorporated on June 11, 1988 as The Argus Printing and 
Publishing Company Ltd. The name changed to Argus Holdings Ltd on August 17, 1988 and 
to Omnimedia Corporation on September 26, 1994. On May 10, 2000 shareholders approved a 
further name change to Johnnic Communications to reflect the restructuring of the company.16 
 Nasionale Pers was owned by its directors with a large percentage of shares held by 
Servgro, which in turn was owned by the Sanlam insurance group. Nasionale Pers published 
Beeld, the Afrikaans morning daily in Johannesburg, Die Burger, the Afrikaans morning daily 
in Cape Town, Die Volksblad, an Afrikaans evening daily in Bloemfontein, City Press, a 
Johannesburg-based Sunday newspaper, Finansies en Tegnies, a weekly business magazine in 
Johannesburg, plus several weekly and monthly Afrikaans magazines. Nasionale Pers was 




Afrikaner publisher, was owned by Dagbreek Trust, the Rembrandt tobacco and liquor giant, 
and Nasionale Pers. Perskor published the Johannesburg morning daily, The Citizen, 
Transvaler, the evening daily in Pretoria and numerous magazines, several small weekly and 
monthly newspapers and was also involved in book publishing. By 2003, Naspers rationalised 
its operations as Media24 to embrace all aspects of its publishing empire. Wholly-owned by 
Naspers, its operations include newspapers, magazines, internet ventures, distribution 
companies and printing works. The group owns four dailies, two weeklies and three Sunday 
newspapers as well as 37 community newspapers countrywide. The magazine division 
includes over 33 magazines in every sector of the market. 
 Other important publishing houses were Caxton, Thompson’s Publications, 
Republikeinse Pers, Publico and Penrose. Independent Newspapers took up 31 per cent of 
The Argus Newspapers in February 1994 (see above).  
 It also transferred control of the Sowetan newspaper to the black-owned New Africa 
Investments group in response to growing criticism of a concentration of media ownership of 
South Africa’s English-language press. Except for the two Sunday newspapers which were 
variously printed in regional centres, Rapport and the Sunday Times, there was no national 
daily newspaper in South Africa. This was caused by the large areas to be served, a changing 
market place and distances to be covered, as well as a perceived lack of support for a 
nationally-circulating daily newspaper. 
There were 33 daily and weekly newspapers and more than 100 country or provincial 
newspapers operating in South Africa in 1994. Most were small bilingual publications 
avoiding politics. There were also hundreds of small community newspapers or “free sheets” 
that circulated in the suburbs and townships, reflecting mainly suburban issues and 
advertising or promotional material. Politics in the community newspapers was by and large 
ignored.17 
By 2001, a number of publications with varying degrees of success have extended their 
coverage to the majority black community, away from the traditional white media audience. 
Conglomerates still own all the newspapers in South Africa. Independent Newspapers 
controls 75 per cent of the English language newspapers. Among the major conglomerates, 
New Africa Investments Limited is a black-owned consortium that controls the country’s 
major black-orientated newspaper, the Sowetan, along with Times Media Ltd. Despite post-
apartheid improvements, the print media in South Africa remain dominated by the white 
minority, and reach only about 20 per cent of the population due to illiteracy, the lack of 




 By the end of 2002, nearly 10 years after the end of apartheid in South Africa, race 
continues to affect the media in the country despite other improvements in freedom of speech 
and the press.18 
A comparative model  
Although I have outlined four basic strands of the South African print media, others have 
suggested the group could be further stratified to reflect narrower interests. Although the four 
major divisions are considered adequate here, a further segmentation into nine categories by 
Tomaselli and Louw is useful for comparative purposes. These were: 
(a.) the conservative pro-apartheid Afrikaans press linked to the National Party 
(since the 1930s); 
(b.) the anti-apartheid conservative-liberal press linked to monopoly “English” 
capital since 1850); 
(c.) the anti-apartheid press aimed at black readers owned by either monopoly 
“English” capital or paradoxically, by pro-apartheid “Afrikaner” capital (since 
the 1970s). This press functioned within the state’s strategy of creating a black 
bourgeoisie; 
 (d.) regional and/or free sheets, tied to the English liberal and conservative Afrikaans 
presses, offering “apolitical” local interest items. A rapidly-growing press in both 
black and white areas, government, and the economic pressures of advanced 
capitalism are increasingly steering print media into this uncontroversial 
direction; 
(e.)    the social-democratic independent press (since 1985); 
(f.)    the left alternative press (since 1980); 
(g.) the neo-fascist pro-apartheid press serving factions which broke from the 
National Party in the 1980s; 
(h.)   newspapers linked to the Bantustan infrastructures, for example Mafiking Mail 
and Illanga, and; 
(i.)    government propaganda sheets produced by state news agencies, the largest of 
which was the Bureau of Information (since 1986).19 
 Switzer [1997]  further complicates the media landscape, claiming the alternative 
press in South Africa constituted a unique political, social and literary archive  the oldest, 
most extensive and varied collection of indigenous serial publications of its kind in sub-




1. The African mission press (1830s-1880s) represented by the pioneering 
missionary societies and their converts. The earliest African protest 
literature can be traced to the last three decades or so of this era. 
2. The independent protest press (1880s-1930s) represented primarily by 
the black petty bourgeoisie with African nationalist newspapers the 
dominant organs of news and opinion. 
3. The early resistance press (1930s-1960s) which gradually embraced a 
popular, non-racial, non-sectarian and more militant alliance of left-
wing working- and middle-class interests. During this period, 
traditional protest publications were brought out, closed down or 
depoliticized and merged with a new captive black commercial press 
controlled by white entrepreneurs. 
4. The later resistance press (1970s-1980s) which represented primarily 
the Black Consciousness movement and its press (1970s) and the so-
called progressive community press (1980s). 20 
Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the historical development of the South African 
press and its struggle for legitimacy in the early days of settlement. It traces the struggle 
towards a free press against the background of an intertwining colonial struggle between the 
English and the Dutch. 
 It also identifies four basic strands during the apartheid years: the Afrikaner press, the 
English language press, the Black press, and the so-called alternative press, each with its own 
agenda. 
 The aim has been to show the complexities of the media as it operated within the 
political spectrum, particularly that the role of the mainstream English press as opponents of 
the government’s racist policy and apartheid cannot be down-played. Reviewed in the context 
of African politics and black liberation aspirations, the English language press was clearly 
deficient in content and insufficiently defiant. This was as much the result of legislative 
restrictions and police harassment as from a reluctance to confront the status quo. It also 
struggled under repressive legislation and faced constant government threats, banning orders 
and censorship. Chapter Two will look at authoritarian controls on the media during apartheid 





Notes for Chapter One 
 
1. Cutten, Theo, A History of the Press in South Africa, Cape Town, 1935, abridged 
version of MA thesis University of Cape Town,  pp. 6-7. 
2.  Ibid. 
3.  De Kock, Wessel, A Manner of Speaking − the origins of the Press in South Africa,  
Saayman & Weber, Cape Town, 1982, p. 6. 
4.  Ibid, p. 65. 
5.  Meurant, Louis, Henri, Sixty Years Ago, or Reminiscences of the struggle for freedom 
of the press in South Africa. (Facsimile reproduction, Connoisseurs Press, 1963) 
originally published by Saul Solomon & Co, Cape Town, 1885. Chapter 1. 
6.  Hachten, William and Giffard C. Anthony, The Press and Apartheid, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987, p. 26. 
7.  De Kock, op. cit., p. 98. 
8. Ibid p. 7; also Cutten, op. cit, pp. 9-20. 
9.          Hale, Frederick, A Catholic Voice against British imperialism: F.C. Kolbe’s opposition 
to the Second Anglo-Boer War, p. 12, Unisa Online, publication date unknown. 
10. Hachten and Giffard, op.cit. p. 43. 
11. Rosenthal, Eric, South African Affairs pamphlet, The Bantu Press, Johannesburg, 1947. 
12. Ibid, Rosenthal. 
13. Berger, Guy, The role of grassroots democratic movements in South Africa − Lessons 
for Africa?, Communication for Democratic Change workshop, Institute for the 
Advancement of Journalism, p. 7.  [Date unknown] 
14. Johnson, Sean, Resistance in Print 1: Grassroots and alternative publishing, 1980-
1984, in The Alternative Press in South Africa, Keyan Tomaselli and P Eric Louw, 
Anthropos, 1991, chapter 9, p. 192. 
15. Berger, op. cit., p. 10. 
16. www.johnnic.com/johncomgroup, company history on Johnnic Holdings. 
17. South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Chapter 16, The Media, p. 8. 




19. Tomaselli Keyan G. and Louw P. Eric, Alternative Press and Political Practice: The 
South African Struggle, a study undertaken by the Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit 
of the University of Natal, under the auspices of the Alternative Media Project in 
Communication For and Against Democracy, eds. Raboy, Marc and Bruck Peter A. 
Black Rose Books, New York, 1989, pp 203-218. 
20. Switzer, Les, editor, South Africa’s Alternative Press: Voices of Protest and Resistance, 


























THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS: STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE 
Introduction 
The structure and foundations of the South African press is discussed in Chapter Two 
including the early days of the press, the struggles against authoritarian controls and the move 
towards greater accountability in the 1950s. This chapter also considers the role of the 
Afrikaans press in National Party politics, the effect of apartheid on the development of the 
national media leading eventually to the establishment of the alternative press in 1980 and its 
eventual decline and demise 10 years later. This chapter details the complexities of the 
national press against the backdrop of apartheid and the way the political system of separate 
development shaped the development and focus of the press. 
 Foundations 
A legacy of the Afrikaner press is that it dedicated itself to the preservation, interests and 
advancement of the Volk, the hereditary Afrikaners. It was a news media born in response to 
perceived ideological differences with the so-called “enlightened”, or verlig, English press 
and the transcending objective of promoting Afrikaner nationalism. The first newspaper to 
propagate the interests of Afrikaners and the Dutch, De Zuid-Afrikaan, was started in 1830 by 
Christoffel Joseph Brand, an advocate who was unpopular with the British colonial 
authorities. In its third year its subscription base rose to 3,000 when Afrikaners from the other 
British-annexed parts of South Africa embraced it. It folded in 1904. 
 In the early years of apartheid there was no argument that the Afrikaans press was 
dedicated to Afrikaner nationalism, especially in 1948 when the Nationalists took office. The 
battle for survival between conflicting interests which started out as a colonialist’s struggle 
against authoritarian controls continued through the history of South Africa, polarising the 
society. It created a rift not only between burgeoning black African nationalism and Afrikaner 
domination in the early 1900s, but also spawned a growing animosity between the white 
English settlers and the Afrikaner nationalists. This was especially so during the Boer War 
and 40 years later during World War II when the National Party and its leaders were 
sympathetic to Hitler and the Nazis. Consequently, the Afrikaans press was consumed with a 
strong nationalistic fervour having clear racist overtones.1 
  South African newspapers observing the British traditions of a free press while 
operating within a framework of racial oppression faced an extraordinary dilemma. They 
juggled between the case for apartheid and the role of the media as public watchdog. This 




from the Afrikaner print publishers, who regarded it as a virtual enemy. The English language 
press was perceived as supporting the Opposition parties, mainly English, and soft on 
supporting apartheid. The Afrikaans press was overwhelmingly staunch, loyal National Party 
stock, unstintingly committed to apartheid. In the eyes of the Afrikaans press, the English 
press fell short of maximising support for the national policy. Paradoxically, the English press 
was vexed by blacks who claimed that, fundamentally, it was a white press for white people. 
 A watershed in this deeply-ingrained antipathy as it affected South African news 
media history can be discerned in the period preceding the election of the Nationalist    
Government in 1948. After World War Two, and the reconstruction period, widespread 
international demands emerged for an extension of democratic institutions in South Africa. 
 A closer look at the mechanics of the press, its freedoms, role and influence, was an 
inevitable part of this phenomenon, following the processes of self-scrutiny of the press in 
leading Western countries. In the United States, a privately-financed Commission on the 
Freedom of the Press was established in 1942 and suggested “reforms from within” the 
industry. In 1946, the Labour Government in Great Britain established a Royal Commission 
to “inquire into the financial control, management, and ownership of the Press”. The 
precedents were there for the South African government to establish its own inquiry.2 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
The initiative was taken in the House of Assembly by United Party MP Dr Bernard Friedman. 
He moved on February 24, 1948 that a select committee be established with the following 
objectives: 
. . . to ascertain whether the financial and technical control of the press in 
South Africa is such as to prevent a completely free expression of editorial 
opinion and expression of news; whether the conditions of employment 
are        such as to ensure to the reading public an adequate supply of 
journalistic talent capable of free and competent reporting of the wide field 
of social and economic activities in South Africa; and whether there exists 
any restraints on honest news through censorship, loaded transmission 
rates, economic sanctions and other devices.3 
 The Argus company interpreted this as an attempt to curb its growth and perceived 
dominance in the South African print media industry. Parliament was dissolved in 1948 for 
general elections and the motion was still in committee. The United Party was defeated at the 
polls, General Jan Smuts resigned as leader, and it was assumed that the print inquiry would 




 Instead, the incoming National Party quickly revived it. On January 31, 1950, Dr A. J. 
R. van Rhijn, a National Party parliamentarian, moved in the House of Assembly that the 
government consider the “advisability of a commission to inquire into the existence of 
monopolistic tendencies, press combines, and group interests in this country and their 
influence on the press, and the advisability or otherwise of controlling internal and external 
reporting”. On October 23, 1950 a Press Commission was announced with Justice J. W. van 
Zyl as chairman. The first sittings were held in January, 1951. 
 The English-language press saw the Commission as an attempt to muzzle the press in 
general and, in particular, to restrict the growth and financial success of the English language 
newspapers. It was an ironic consummation that a measure conceived as liberalising South 
Africa’s press should actually open the way for greater repression. It enabled the English 
press to be painted as the voice of opposition to the Nationalists, driven by financial and 
corporate interests rather than politics.4 
 During the apartheid era, the English-language press was perceived by the Nationalist 
government as the “hostile and foreign press”. Perhaps this had some justification because the 
mainstream English press was a constant thorn in the side of the Afrikaners. It took much 
credit for what was depicted as its persistent opposition to government policy. But over the 
years of apartheid rule and the constant overwhelming electoral successes of the National 
Party at elections, it was incongruous that this dominant “white” press was consistently out of 
step with the white voters who resolutely supported the National Party.  
 In its opposition to the Nationalists, the English press certainly were not promoting a 
radical change in the political status quo, the concept of equality or black majority rule. The 
two major black revolutionary groups, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan 
African Congress (PAC)  were still referred to as “terrorist groups” in the major “white” 
newspapers even in the lead-up to their final “unbanning”. For the black majority, it was 
difficult to determine the agenda of the “white” press. 
  Certainly they were not working in the interest of the blacks as their recruitment 
policies made clear. Staff ratios, both for the Argus group and South African Associated 
Newspapers, from 1949 to even the late 1990s, showed only small numbers of black or 
coloured staff journalists, and even lower percentages at managerial levels. These were the 
two dominant newspaper groups in South Africa. 
Apartheid and the Afrikaans press 
The greatest ambition of the Afrikaans press had been achieved in 1948 with its government 




with merely being the vehicle for pro-apartheid government policy, the Afrikaans press took 
more positive steps to highlight factional differences within the Nationalists. 
 Any opposition to the National Party by an Afrikaans paper, however, revolved 
around how apartheid policy was applied rather than the principles involved.5 
   As noted above, the ideological rift between the Afrikaner and English press was 
already clearly defined. Ultimately, it widened to a gulf linked only by the slender thread of 
“white man’s superiority”. The Afrikaner-dominated Nationalists were in power and its 
sharply-distinguished Afrikaans press stoked the fires of the Afrikaner nationalist movement.  
 The English language press was regarded as the “enemy” of the government and a 
supporter of its enemies, the black majority. The Afrikaans press, without any pretence, 
aligned itself over the apartheid years to government aims and aspirations.  
  Robert Sobukwe, the leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress, described the freedom of 
the press as a white freedom: 
Not only the vehicles of communication but also the laws that they [the 
newspapers] obey are white men’s law for white men’s purposes.6  
The former editor of Die Burger, Professor P. J. Cillie, succinctly stated the newspaper’s 
ethos and its dominance in the Cape Province:   
Die Burger, of course, is an example of a newspaper that was published 
not primarily as a commercial proposition, but quite frankly as the 
pioneering opinion-forming journal with a very definite political message, 
that of the then still small Nationalist Party. The first shareholders did not 
expect early dividends, and for very many years did not get them.7 
 More subtly but with equal determination, the English press segregated its 
newspapers along racial lines and  stifled the development of its black staff both in terms of 
hiring staff and providing separate newspapers staffed exclusively by “black”, “coloured” or 
Indian staff for black, coloured or Indian newspapers. Examples of these were the World 
aimed at blacks around Soweto and greater Johannesburg, The Cape Herald aimed at 
“coloured” markets around the townships of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, the Johannesburg 
edition of Post and the Durban edition of Post aimed at the Indian market in the two major 
cities. 
 By contrast, the Argus in Cape Town was almost entirely white staffed with token 
non-white appointments only made mid-1970 when Sharkey Isaacs was appointed and later 
Rashied Seria was transferred from the Cape Herald. At the Star, in Johannesburg, the pattern 




Seria was later to quit the Argus in disgust and was a foundation member of the alternative 
newspaper Grassroots. While “coloureds” were an invisible minority on the reporting and 
editing staff of the white English press, not a single “black’ journalist was employed on an 
English newspaper in the entire country.  
Even so, the English press managed to cultivate and to preserve this image of a 
protagonist for change, antagonistic to the excesses of apartheid, a fearless and strident anti-
apartheid campaigner in the face of adversity. In retrospect, this perception can be seen to 
have been invalid when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1997 inquired into the 
workings of the press in South Africa during the apartheid years. 
 But it is only partly correct to conclude that the Afrikaans press was solely an 
instrument of oppression and a government propaganda machine. In the complexity of South 
African politics and changing loyalties, the thrust of the Afrikaans press was different both in 
tone and direction. For example, the progressive Dr Willem de Klerk was editor of Die 
Transvaler [1973-87] and editor of the mass circulating national Sunday newspaper Rapport 
[1987-92]. In both editorships, De Klerk did not share the extreme views of Nationalists such 
as Hendrik Verwoerd. During the 1980s, political change sparked nationwide political unrest 
and riots. The Afrikaners were split into two rival publishing groups loyal to different 
regional factions of the National Party. These were Perskor, the more conservative faction in 
the Transvaal, and Nasionale Pers in the Cape Province. The Cape’s citizens generally were 
perceived to be wealthier and more liberal in terms of Nationalist policy than the Transvalers. 
Political policy division even in National Party circles was not unusual. 
Die Burger and the Afrikaans press 
The role of Die Burger in National Party politics is well documented, especially its 
relationship with the government post-1948. It began in 1915 as the National Party’s official 
newspaper.  
As the oldest and most successful of the Afrikaans newspapers, Die Burger was always 
closely linked with the party, and had a decisive role in charting policy and direction. Daniel 
Malan was appointed its first editor in September 1915 when he   became leader of the 
National Party in the Cape. Malan was a Dutch Reformed minister from 1905 to 1915 but 
became a hardliner who abandoned the ministry to edit Die Burger. Malan led Die Burger 
until 1924. He became Prime Minister in 1948, having held senior party positions in 
Opposition from 1924. Malan resigned as Prime Minister in 1954, but never wavered from his 
uncompromising belief in white supremacy. He was not an editor in the traditional mould and 




mainly political. During his Prime Ministership, Die Burger maintained close relations with 
the power structure.  
 This close relationship with government had diminished by the time Dr Hendrik 
Verwoerd took over as Prime Minister in 1958. Verwoerd, a former Stellenbosch University 
sociology professor, edited the fiercely Afrikaner newspaper Die Transvaler from 1937 to 
1948. He became vice-president of the National Party in the Transvaal in 1946 and, in 1958, 
party leader and South Africa’s sixth Prime Minister. But earlier he was embroiled in 
controversy for his anti-Semitic outbursts. In 1941 The Star, in Johannesburg, accused the 
ultra-conservative nationalist of promoting Nazi sentiments in the editorial comments of Die 
Transvaler.8 
Verwoerd sued the newspaper, published by the English-language Argus Group but the 
court ruled against him, declaring his newspaper, Die Transvaler, a “very useful addition to 
the German propaganda service”. In finding for The Star, Justice Millin of the Transvaal 
Supreme Court ruled that Verwoerd’s “right to publish what he did was not in question”. 
 The Star defended on the grounds of justification, while Verwoerd pleaded his right to free 
speech. Justice Millin said that on the evidence, Verwoerd was not entitled to complain 
because "he supported Nazi propaganda, made his paper a tool of Nazis in South Africaand he 
knew it".9 
 Verwoerd’s political strictures were aimed not only at blacks but also on South 
Africa’s other minority groups, especially the Jews: 
From the very first editorial in October 1937, in which Verwoerd 
lambasted Jewish meddling in Afrikaner financial affairs, and advocated 
deporting all the Jews, Verwoerd’s outspoken views antagonised not only 
[Jan] Hofmeyr [later deputy prime minister to Dr Malan] but also English 
[largely Jewish] financial and mining capital in the Transvaal.10 
De Klerk described the Vorster era from 1966 to 1978 as a time of renewal and change 
of media policy direction:  
 During the Vorster era 1966-1978, in the face of considerable opposition 
from the government and its own readers, the Afrikaans newspapers 
initiated several enlightened schools of social thought. Against the inborn 
resistance of many readers, these newspapers persisted in their motivations 
for change and renewal. As a result of this, a process of change has begun 
in the National Party. This eventually led to the splitting off, rifts and new 




The Afrikaans newspapers were, and are in the vanguard of the Afrikaner 
(r)evolution which is breaking through.11 
De Klerk accused the English press of often stretching press freedom “to the extent that 
the patriotism of the press is questioned”. The Afrikaans press, on the other hand, had a 
commitment to Afrikanerdom, and thus was vulnerable to criticism for undermining the 
freedom to know, to inform, to differ, and to resist. 
  Harvey Tyson, editor of The Star, recalled a loose arrangement of editors, both 
English and Afrikaans, who met occasionally to discuss the role and direction of the media in 
South Africa. English-language editors “listened wide-eyed while Afrikaans editors lashed 
out, in secret, at their government or argued with each other”.12 
Out of these meetings a sense of professionalism was enhanced and many socio-
political issues were scrutinised effectively by Afrikaans editors. As a consequence, some 
Afrikaner editors later consulted privately with trusted cabinet ministers to seek a broader 
understanding of the role expected of the print media. This had some similarity to the way in 
which the House of Commons would lobby correspondents in the UK who are given “off-the-
record” briefings by senior party officials. The UK practice, however, was more regular and 
formalised. 
Press freedom and apartheid 
Despite the acknowledgment of standard professional values and standards, commitment to 
traditional journalistic practice was hardly the benchmark for Afrikaans newspaper editors. It 
was their commitment to apartheid that mattered most. Status in the Nederduits 
Gereformeerde Kerk [the Dutch Reformed Church] was another major factor, as might have 
been expected from the emphatic role of the church in the colonial development of Afrikaans 
journalism. (See above) 
 Political advancement through newspaper editorship and the church was a familiar 
path to party success for senior National Party members. 
 Andries Treurnicht, another Dutch Reformed minister and ultra-conservative National 
Party cabinet minister, edited the official Dutch Reformed Church newspaper Die Kerkbode, 
an influential conservative publication in Afrikaner circles, and later edited Hoofstad an 
equally conservative newspaper in Pretoria. His ultra-conservative views later led him to 
abandon the National Party in 1982 to start the ultra right-wing Conservative Party.  
 Prime Minister John Vorster had also been chairman of Perskor, the Transvaal 
publishing arm of the Nationalists. He was Prime Minister after the assassination of Verwoerd 




Cape-based Nationale Pers. In 1978 irregularities surfaced in the Information Department 
which used government funds to launch a pro-government newspaper, The Citizen. Vorster 
was implicated in this embarrassing scandal that led ultimately to his resignation. He was 
succeeded as Prime Minister by P.W. Botha who insisted that Cabinet members should not 
hold newspaper directorships. Restrictions were placed on who held directorships of the 
major Afrikaner publishing houses, the source of major party funds through lucrative 
government printing contracts. The companies, however, remained in the hands of the party 
faithful, dominated by the senior members of the secretive and powerful Broederbond 
organisation, an exclusive, secretive Afrikaner “brotherhood” that determined apartheid 
policies and direction. 
  It was a sinister organisation with secret membership contacts and influence that 
extended into every aspect of South African society. 
 Potter [1975] concludes that the Afrikaans press “saw itself and was seen by the 
Government as the communications arm of a political party which claimed to represent an 
entire people”. 
The Government’s messages were directed primarily and often exclusively 
to the ‘Volk’. Ideologically, the Government did not recognise the rights 
of the independent press to information, for the English press did not 
represent the ‘Volk’ nor could it be trusted to communicate the political 
message.13 
 In summary, press freedom as espoused by Afrikaans newspapers differed from the 
robust English language papers which regarded press freedom as a basic human right. From 
the Afrikaans point of view, however, press freedom could not be elevated to where the 
stability of the state might be endangered.14  
For Afrikaners eager to foster the unity concept of volk en staat (people and state), press 
freedom was linked to national development and perception of the common good. 
Apartheid and the black press 
In a context where power and control lay with the white press, particularly the politically-
dominant Afrikaners, it was always a hard road for black journalists to carve any niche, 
whether as journalists or in newspaper management. Employment opportunities were few, 
black ownership was extremely limited, and the potential market largely poor and semi-
literate. 
 The ingredients for development, and ultimate economic success of an independent, 




 The high illiteracy rate among the target audience was a formidable obstacle for any 
emerging black press. Except for a few small grassroots publications in the townships and 
other minor publications of various churches or community groups, a vibrant black press did 
not emerge in South Africa. Turning back to its professional evolution, the Bantu press was 
defined by Rosenthal in 1949 as falling into three categories − produced by Europeans for Africans, 
produced by Africans for Africans, and a joint effort of both Europeans and Africans. 
 Its evolution can best be described as extending  through four distinct stages of 
development − the missionary era from 1837, the emerging independent period from the 1880s to 
the 1920s, the white-owned period of the early 1930s, and the multi-racial period post-1976.15  The 
colonial development of the Bantu newspapers was  outlined through its colonial origins in 
Chapter 1.  The story is picked up here from the early 20th Century.  
 Among the more influential and vigorous early Black papers was Abantu-Batho [The 
People] founded in 1912 as the mouthpiece of the Native National Congress, a forerunner of 
the African National Congress. Like all the independent small black papers, it lacked capital, 
newsprint, staff and distribution agents. Above all, it was pitched at a readership that was 
largely illiterate and poor. It was a publication that changed hands repeatedly and with some 
unusual owners. In 1931, it was briefly acquired by a consortium with Asian financial backing 
that called itself the African and Indian Trading Association. In 1920, white business and 
financial backers started taking an interest in the independent black press. The Transvaal 
Chamber of Mines launched Umteteli wa Bantu [Mouthpiece of the Bantu] in May 1920. 
Supervised by the Native Recruiting Corporation, it was staffed and produced by Africans in 
English, Sesotho, and Xhosa languages.16 
 The paper established a large circulation on the goldfields of the Witwatersrand and 
further afield into the native territories and reserves. There were suggestions that the entry of 
the Chamber of Mines into the independent black press market and its establishment of 
Umteteli wa Bantu set the stage for the white takeover of the black press by the early 1930s. 
All of the early black papers succumbed to political pressure and financial disaster. 
 In April, 1932, Bantu Press Ltd was established by Bertram Paver a white South 
African farmer motivated by commercial gain as well as a desire “to provide the Native 
people with a platform for fair comment and presentation of their needs and aspirations”.17 
Bantu Press controlled six publications including its flagship The Bantu World with a weekly 
circulation of 14,600. The newspapers of Bantu Press circulated throughout South Africa, 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia.18 Paver's foray into black journalism was short-lived, and 14 




the Argus Group. Argus remained the major stockholder in Bantu Press from 1933 and by 
1945 had increased the number of newspapers in its stable to ten. 
 In 1959 Bantu World had a circulation of some 11,000. By 1968, it was around 
90,000 and by 1976 it rivalled the 145,000 copies daily sold in the Johannesburg region by the 
Rand Daily Mail. In 1962, the Argus took full control of Bantu Press and its main paper 
Bantu World which became simply World, a lively tabloid newspaper styled in the mould of 
London's Daily Mirror. 
 In the 1940s and early 1950s, the second generation of black newspapers emerged. Also 
mainly political by nature, these included Inkundla la Bantu [The Bantu Leader] in 1946, 
established by the African National Congress, Torch, and Spark. All were banned following 
the Sharpeville massacre of March, 1960 when 69 people died after white police opened fire 
on black protesters. By 1963 Anglo American, as the major stock holder in Argus and the 
Chamber of Mines, had full control of Bantu Press and acquired a thriving and profitable 
stable of black newspapers. Independently owned black newspapers, however, did not have 
similar success, as Potter points out: 
It was impossible for any independent African newspaper to survive the 
competitive power of the white-controlled Bantu Press, and indeed, this 
was the intention.19  
        After the World was banned in 1976, it emerged again as a bi-weekly named Post with 
similar editorial content emphasising sex, sport and crime. Both newspapers ignored political 
comment.20 Some exceptions to the populist World concept of black newspapers emerged 
with the publication of Drum, a monthly magazine flourishing in the 1950s and 60s. It was 
owned by Jim Bailey, son of Sir Abe Bailey of South African Associated Press, and focused 
on contentious issues such as brutality to black prisoners, prison labour on farms, and the 
evils of apartheid for blacks. Jim Bailey also launched Golden City Post in 1955, a successful 
and racy tabloid with some political comment. It was bought by the Argus group in 1972.21 
News vacuum  
In a country with three million whites, the other 25 million people lived in a news vacuum. 
Throughout the 1950s, the news media was directed more to the educated whites and largely 
ignored the mainly poor and poorly-educated black masses. There was no particular economic 
or commercial enthusiasm to embrace a newspaper market of mainly poor and semi-literate 




 Middle-class readers underpinned the advertising market so crucial to the success of 
any newspaper. Simply expressed, it was a case of no funds, no newspaper. No place for 
black journalists. 
 The development and progress of a meaningful black press was restricted by a 
complex variety of hurdles. The problem of illiteracy, though not a defence for an imbalanced 
media, also presented problems for black African publications such as the magazine, Drum. 
This was launched in the 1950s to secure an untapped market of more than nine million 
readers stretching from Johannesburg to central Africa. But Drum struggled in the 1950s. 
Efforts to boost circulation involved a variety of promotions that included reader 
participation. The results were hilarious at times but disturbing because of basic 
communication problems. Readers could not even distinguish between advertising and 
editorial material. Amusement came first and education second for Drum readers.22 
 During the 1960s, editorial vacancies for black and coloured persons had still been 
scarce with most black journalists employed as stringers or casuals, or paid a “tip off” fee for 
news opportunities. In 1963, the Rand Daily Mail moved to redress the imbalance by 
launching a news “Extra” for the black market. Two black journalists were employed and 
Township Mail was launched as one page of “black” news, replacing the sharemarket page. 
Otherwise, the edition remained the same. By 1970, circulation of the “township” edition had 
grown to around 20,000 copies a day and was renamed the Rand Daily Mail Extra. Not only 
was the Extra offensive to black people, but it questioned the sincerity of the “liberal” or anti-
government English press. Even the Nationalists and the pro-Government newspapers were 
scathing in condemnation of this apparent hypocrisy. 
 The Citizen relished the opportunity to denigrate the Rand Daily Mail, then 
considered one of the most outspoken newspapers against apartheid policies. “What is 
happening is that the Mail is already too black for white readers but not black enough for 
black readers,” The Citizen commented.   
It was a view reflected on both sides of the racial divide. The black-consciousness 
movement condemned the practice as condescending and discriminatory, suggesting that what 
was printed in the Mail Extra was not necessarily good enough to be read by the Mail’s white 
readers. Percy Qoboza, the first black editor of a major metropolitan paper and the editor of 
the World, described the Extras as a monumental insult to blacks. His own paper, owned by 
the Argus company and directed to the huge Soweto market, had a firm white hand on policy, 




 Like the World, the Mail Extra was started as a financial rather than a political 
exercise but with the perverted nature of South African politics, it became ultimately a 
political exercise with an economic twist. 
Black press late century 
The buy-out of independent black newspapers was the precursor to the black press of the 
1970s and 1980s black-orientated newspapers owned either by South African Associated 
Newspapers or the Argus group. Among these “secular”, racially-orientated English-language 
newspapers were The Cape Herald, an Argus publication aimed at coloureds in Cape Town 
and Port Elizabeth; Imvo, a Xhosa language newspaper; and Ilanga, a Zulu language 
newspaper in the Natal region. Controlled by the major white-owned publishing houses under 
black or coloured editors, these newspapers faced legislative pressures and also, to some 
degree, white editorial policies. 
  At the Argus-controlled World, the content was decided by its white editorial director 
in consultation with its black editor. It mainly reflected, however, the establishment view that 
black readers preferred “crime and funeral news to political or international news”.23 Other 
racially segmented newspaper markets emerged apart from the blacks, for example,  Post, 
aimed at the Indian population in Durban and Johannesburg. 
Another business ploy adopted by both English and Afrikaans newspapers was to serve 
black readers with “Extra” editions. These were appendages to the main newspaper as a wrap-
around or 12-page supplements inserted into the main newspaper targeting   specific racial 
groups. “Extra” editions such as The Sunday Times Extra and Rapport Extra, although good 
money spinners, did almost nothing for black political aspirations. Nor did they scrutinise 
government in the public interest, offering instead a mix of sport, sex and township crime, 
with “social scene” coverage by extensive photographic presentation of community dances, 
sports awards and school reunion dinners. 
In a misguided concession to black politics, under the separate tiers of government of 
the late 1970s, the “Extras” also devoted increasing space to the Coloured Representative 
Council [CRC] in the Cape Province, a much-scorned political institution created by the 
Nationalists to offer limited political development to coloured people. 
This major failing of the English-language press to criticise and oppose the 
establishment of the CRC and its concept of separate development left an indelible mark on 
its integrity and severely challenged the credibility of the white press. 
Rather than opposing such a blatant discriminatory practice by the Government, it 




develop their newspapers along parallel pro-apartheid lines. Apart from giving credibility to 
the CRC, an essentially meaningless political institution which had no real executive powers, 
the English-language press provided the mainstay of political reporting for the “Extras”. 
 Thus, the four main media groups developed their metropolitan newspapers in a way 
that easily excluded “non-white” newsmakers and journalists. For example, it was considered 
unnecessary for the Sunday Times to focus on news as it affected coloureds in the Cape 
because the Sunday Times Extra did this. It was unnecessary for Rapport to employ black or 
coloured journalists to gather news in coloured and black areas because the Rapport Extra did 
this. Admonishing and censuring the racist policies of the government on the front pages, 
while relegating more than 90 per cent of the nation to an appendage was a juggling act of 
huge magnitude, particularly for the English newspapers. It was not easy to reconcile with the 
public interest role of the press in a democratic society.  
This paradox was further complicated by a lop-sided editorial staff ratio that included 
usually a few coloured staff and virtually no black Africans. These contradictions were 
highlighted by Chimutengwende in 1978:  
The South African Government is also keen not to damage continually its 
international image; this partly explains why the English-language 
newspapers have been tolerated up to the present. The other reason is that 
these media do not in fact advocate fundamental changes to the present 
system, but campaign for social reforms which will help bring non-
Europeans into the economic life of the country for the betterment of the 
present economic system.24 
 According to Hachten [1971] the inability of the press to influence national politics 
deepened into helplessness and ignorance where the disenfranchised masses were concerned.  
Given the proper conditions of political and economic equality, the non-
white Press might have become the most vigorous and effective of any 
indigenous press system on the African continent. But this the white 
minority government did not permit. 25 
 Chimutengwende’s judgment and Hachten’s findings would hold largely true for the 
next two decades, until the 1980s. Hachten and Giffard [1984] concluded: 
Journalism is one of the most dangerous occupations for blacks in South 
Africa today. Furthermore, a black press hardly exists in South Africa. If 
asked to describe the black press, a Johannesburg black journalist is likely 




Editorial appointments for black and coloured people on major South African 
newspapers before 1963 were virtually unknown. The editorial direction and news focus of 
both English and Afrikaans language newspapers were oriented to the prosperous whites and 
their advertising preferences in terms of maintaining the political status quo.  
The media was undoubtedly for the whites, staffed by whites and setting a political and 
social agenda that reflected not necessarily the National Party’s racist line, but certainly the 
overwhelmingly pro-Nationalist line of the whites. When the role of the national press is 
dissected against this backdrop of white politics, white superiority and baaskap, it is clear 
why there was no place for black or coloured people on the editorial staffs of the metropolitan 
newspapers and why separate or Extra editions were produced. 
Thus, the major newspapers reported issues relating to the two major black political 
organisations, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. Both these 
organisations, which held overwhelming support among the black majority, were regularly 
depicted as “the terrorists” almost up to the fall of apartheid and the first non-racial elections 
in 1994. Even the most superficial review of South African newspapers between the 1940s 
and 1960s indicates a serious imbalance in the editorial content and direction of the national 
press. It was only towards the mid 1970s, and in the wake of growing social unrest that it 
became imperative for South Africa’s press to address this imbalance. 
The alternative press 
For a decade from 1982, the alternative press enjoyed status as the voice of opposition. It was 
born out of disillusionment with mainstream English print media in a context of Afrikaner 
nationalist thrust resonating through the Afrikaans press, coupled with oppressive legislation 
and restrictions on free speech. Thus, the alternative media aimed to provide a representation 
of sorts for the majority of the politically unrepresented people of South Africa. It was always 
faced with financial problems, was understaffed and lacked resources.  Its achievement can in 
some ways be measured by the efforts of the Government to suppress these publications with 
banning orders, legal restrictions and constant harassment. 
Ameen Akhalwaya, a pioneer in alternative press publication, concluded that the 
alternative press in South Africa developed because “black journalists were thoroughly 
disenchanted with apartheid in the news rooms, even at newspapers which espoused a non-
racial society”.27 This fundamental ideological bias diminished an English language press   
fundamental to any independent or alternative political and social expression in South Africa.  
More directly, there were imperative needs to set an alternative political agenda for those 
excluded from the alignment of the English and Afrikaans mainstream press, and to respond 




The mainstream newspapers by and large believe in either supporting the 
government’s political structures or wanting these structures to be 
modified to include blacks. All of them believe in the free enterprise 
system. The emerging newspapers believe that the political and economic 
structures must be radically altered in a society based on universal 
franchise irrespective of racial or other considerations. 28 
 This was a radical departure from the commercial mainstream press and it is 
debatable how well the alternative media (established and subsidised in many cases by 
overseas aid funds) measured up to this challenge. 
 For the fledgling independent newspapers of the 1980s, it was a constant battle for 
survival   because aid funds could be impeded by government intervention, or just dry up.  If 
these independent newspapers became too troublesome, the government would not hesitate to 
impose hefty fines or simply shut the newspaper. 
The alternative press’s efforts to set a news agenda different from the mainstream press 
meant that it was constantly at risk. It operated under a veneer of tolerance from an 
authoritarian government keen to portray itself as non-interventionist yet having a vast web of 
complex laws limiting press freedom. Other problems were inadequate journalism training, 
ill-equipped and under-staffed newsrooms, and an inability to match metropolitan pay rates. 
Constant police harassment, legal threats, advertiser reluctance and distribution problems 
created further difficulties that frustrated struggling independent newspapers. 
In shifting away from traditional commercial structures and adopting a crusading 
approach, the alternative press was vulnerable to the same criticism of bias, selectivity and 
lack of objectivity prevalent in the Afrikaans press at the other extreme of the political 
spectrum. 
  The editorial objectives for the proposed alternative newspaper South, for example 
included much similarity with the mainstream press but its manifesto went further. Among the 
tasks included in its manifesto was a desire to articulate the needs and aspirations of the 
oppressed and exploited, to supporting and promoting media, political, community and 
worker campaigns, and challenging the monopolistic control of newspapers. 
 These, of course, are worthy social aspirations, but neglect equally important issues 
about the role of the newspaper in society: fair reporting, propaganda and agenda setting. It is 
not, however, an unusual concept. In the United States, black journalism also had its genesis 
as a crusader in a time of adversity, political struggle and social and cultural prejudice that 




black newspaper in the United States, established in 1827 and published by John Russworm 
in New York City, stated its aspirations: 
We wish to plead our cause. Too long have others spoken for us. Too long 
has the public been deceived by misrepresentation in the things that 
concern us dearly.29  
 Nearly a century after the establishment of America’s first black newspaper, a group 
of Nieman Fellows, at Harvard University, in 1947 accused the US media of being 
“consistently cruel to the coloured man, patronising him, keeping him in his place, 
thoughtlessly crucifying him in a thousand big and little ways”.30 
  This is similar to the development of the alternative media in South Africa where the 
fringes of society wanted to establish a presence and work for social and political change. 
The white-dominated press in South Africa excluded the black people, mirroring the 
historical attitudes of the mainstream American press towards black people, and also 
demonstrating the need for an alternative. 
 Charles Loeb, a senior officer of the Negro Publishers Association in the US, 
observed in 1948 that the metropolitan newspapers “continue to play down Negro 
achievements while playing up Negro crime,” with only “passing thought to the Negro citizen 
as an American citizen”. This is comparable with South Africa’s English and Afrikaans 
newspapers during the apartheid era in their highlighting of black crime and general portrayal 
of black people in news stories. 
 The alternative black press in South Africa, like the alternative press in the United 
States, developed in response to restrictive access and attitudes in the conventional press. It 
established a new market place of its own making, opposing discrimination and prejudice, and 
offering a more accessible forum.31 
Grassroots 
By 1987, more than 200 alternative newspapers had been established in South Africa. Mainly 
comprising small and struggling publications, the burgeoning alternative press was often 
subjected to brutal harassment and attacks by the Nationalists. As a descriptive term, the 
alternative label did not sit comfortably with these independent publications. The assumption 
was that alternative suggested something inferior to the established mainstream media when 
in fact it aimed to challenge the established newspapers while reflecting the changing face of 
South African politics.32 
One of the first alternative publications Grassroots, a non-commercial community 




and Afrikaans press. In its first issue, the objectives were outlined in an editorial headlined “A 
paper for you that fills the void”. It clearly spelled out the pioneering role intended for what 
was hardly a traditional newspaper but more a community newsletter with wide community 
input:  
The newsletter has been born out of a tremendous need for a 
communications medium for community organisations in the Western 
Cape. Civil and community news (items) are increasingly being kept out 
of newspapers ... (and) we know that these newspapers have never really 
shown an interest or concern for civic and community matters, especially 
in the areas where the disenfranchised live. When civic and community 
news items are highlighted, these are in most cases restricted to separate 
‘extra’ editions. Even then, preference is shown for sensational news or 
the development of ethnic bodies working within separate development 
institutions … we, therefore, believe that a vacuum exists in the 
publication of community news and hope that Grassroots will to a certain 
extent fill that void.33  
As an innovative media communicator, the success of Grassroots can be measured in a 
rapid increase in circulation, which reached 20,000 copies a week in two years focused on 
basic community affairs and a direct approach to politics, industrial affairs and health related 
issues. The organisers of Grassroots claimed the support of 80 community-based 
organisations by 1984, including church groups, youth groups, civic organisations, unions, 
and women’s groups working closely with it. When the Government cracked down on 
Grassroots in 1984, the reaction increased its distribution to 40,000 copies a week. This 
modest community effort served as a catalyst for similar community newsletters in various 
regions of South Africa. Among the first was The Eye in 1981 in Pretoria and Ukasa, in 
Durban in 1982. Despite several attempts, Grassroots failed to penetrate the black townships, 
its organisers forced to admit that “it cannot be denied that Grassroots is seen as a “coloured” 
newspaper in [African townships].34 Grassroots identified one of the main reasons for this 
failure as the low level of community organisation, but there were other complex reasons for 
this. 
According to author and media analyst Sean Johnson, a major factor was that the 
majority of the people behind Grassroots were “coloured”. 
Thus a problem endemic to resistance in South Africa was played out at 
the level of the alternate press: how to achieve unity amongst the 




change. In the case of Grassroots, there were a number of complex 
reasons for the existence of such divisions, not least of which was that the 
majority of the people behind the newspaper were coloured. Although the 
policy of non-racialism was vociferously espoused and practised, it faced 
prejudice and fear entrenched by decades of rule by coercion and division. 
Grassroots itself identified the core reason for the failure in the African 
townships as the low level of community organisation there.35 
 By 1984, the continued general community support of Grassroots encouraged the 
formation of Saamstaan [Unity], another community newsletter established in the small rural 
town of Swellendam in the Cape Province. It soon moved base to Oudtshoorn, a larger, 
mainly rural town, also in the Cape. From the start, Saamstaan faced enormous hurdles 
financially, in part because of the large rural area that it covered. It encountered constant 
police harassment in an area where police vigilance was high compared with Cape Town, a 
major city. 
 The 1985 declaration of a state of emergency seriously affected the development of 
Saamstaan, as did the crackdown on Grassroots. Key people in both organisations were 
banned. This constant disruption and harassment proved costly for the Grassroots board 
which by 1985 numbered around 400. By 1989, it had dwindled to nine still with the paper.36 
The intensity of the restrictions finally took its toll on Grassroots. The distribution of 
the paper collapsed in 1989, sales income dropped sharply and financial problems developed. 
Papers were secretly dropped off outside mosques, churches and shops but it was an 
unsuccessful experiment as the publication still lost touch with its readership. Even a doubling 
of the print run from 20,000 to 40,000 copies while battling for survival and compensating for 
copies lost or confiscated by police barely managed to keep the project alive. The last edition 
of Grassroots appeared in 1989 during the defiance campaign. 
Grassroots published six editions in 1980, its inception year, increasing to nine in 
1981. Between 1982 and 1989, it appeared 10 times a year. The project developed a basic 
learning program in 1985, launched New Era magazine in 1986, and initiated an education 
and trading program, a rural organising division to train “media activists”, and developed 
Saamstaan newsletter as an offshoot of its activities. 
 Johnson described the Grassroots strategy as playing the game of producing a 
newspaper that appropriated the appearance and style of the capitalist press, but subverted its 
purposes. Grassroots aimed to present news “differently” and it went further than merely 
covering “different issues”, it also demanded coverage of the same issues as the capitalist 




liberal papers was one of emphasis and angle. In pursuit of these aspirations, Johnson 
summarised the questions posed by Grassroots: 
•  How can this article make a contribution to initiating organisation or 
strengthening it? 
•  Does it expose injustices in our society? 
• How can it best be written from the peoples’ point of view, at a level 
where it relates to their experiences? 
• Will it inform, educate … and raise a critical awareness among the 
oppressed? 37 
Other Alternatives 
A later commercial independent newspaper, South, reflected similar disenchantment with the 
mainstream media, and extended the pioneering work done by Grassroots. With the rapid 
proliferation of new anti-apartheid organisations such as the United Democratic Front, and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with its links to the African National 
Congress, alternative newspapers such as New Nation, Weekly Mail, South, Grassroots, and 
Saamstaan gave a growing platform to what were described as “progressive democratic 
organisations”. A group of journalists and students established the Concord News Agency 
which operated for three years, then launched the New African newspaper. 
 The initial aim was to offer an alternative to the white middle-class mainstream press 
in the Durban region and opposition to the Zulu-language bi-weekly, Ilanga, later controlled 
by the media network of Gatsha Buthelezi’s Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha. Natal 
Newspapers, a subsidiary of the Argus company sold off Ilanga to an Inkatha-controlled 
company, Mandla Matla, on April 15, 1987. 
 From a fairly independent newspaper it was transformed into a mouthpiece for 
Buthelezi’s political ambitions and the Inkatha nationalist movement. In opposition, the New 
African published its first edition on March 20, 1989. 
 Ilanga was formed in 1903 by Dr John Dube, the first president of what became the 
ANC. During the 1950s, the paper was acquired by white business interests and remained in 
white hands until 1987 when it was taken over by the Zulu-dominated Inkatha political party,   
becoming the first major African newspaper wholly owned by black South Africans.  
 The board of directors was headed by Dr Oscar Dhlomo, a former secretary-general 
of Inkatha.  All the other directors had close links with the Inkatha movement or the KwaZulu 




Freedom Party, removed from the board of Ilanga all the directors who had links to the 
KwaZulu government. 
 In its policy guidelines, Ilanga stated it would adhere to independent and honest 
standards of journalism that did not pander to personal and sectional interests but were 
concerned solely with the public interest. While these newspapers were alternative in the 
sense that they offered black readers a different perspective to what was available in the 
mainstream press, the fundamental objectives were far removed from an alternative press 
targeted at social and political reform. 
 Ilanga faced many serious problems including efforts to disrupt distribution and 
threats to shut down the newspaper. This came largely from opponents and critics of the Zulu 
political party, reflecting less   the disruptions that the alternative press faced during the late 
1970s and throughout the 1980s. A particular bane was the Home Affairs Minister, Stoffel 
Botha, who in 1987 initiated a torrid campaign to stifle the alternative press. The government 
sought to eliminate these alternative publications which Stoffel Botha accused of brewing 
revolution. Having silenced two of the biggest alternative newspapers, the attack covered a 
wide spectrum from the working-class and openly partisan Saamstaan in a remote Cape 
Province to the more professional New Nation, an alternative preserving detachment from 
political partisanship. 
Alternatives in Decline 
Manoim [1989] concluded that the South African alternative press was born partly to fill the 
gap left by the closure of the Rand Daily Mail and partly with frustration at the blinkered 
mainstream South African press. The mainstream press, Manoim suggested, was like any 
other commercial press. It was aimed at the readers most attractive to advertisers: 
 In South Africa, inevitably, these readers are predominantly white and 
middle class and their values shape the newspapers they read. It would be 
unfair to say that the mainstream South African newspapers ignored events 
in the black townships and rural areas. They are conscious of injustice and 
have spoken out strongly often enough in the past. But they tend to cover 
the townships as if they were foreign lands: exotic, remote, of sporadic 
interest.38 
  Thus, the alternative press developed with the aim of redressing these “blind-spots”, 
but with indifferent results. As journalism, many alternative newspapers probably did not 
match the technical standards of established newspapers. Some lacked substance, objectivity 
and balance while others were hampered by mismanagement, surviving by dependency on 




newspapers, one thread linked them a concentration on political news, (primarily news of 
township unrest and labour issues), activist groups, community organisations, security 
crackdowns and detentions. At their worst these papers were turgid and monotonously 
“preachy”. At their best they pushed back the edges of what could be published, exposing 
issues that the mainstream press ignored. 
 The growth of the independent newspapers, up until the mid-1980s, though prolific, 
tended towards community-based newsletters reliant on overseas funding. The New African 
depended on overseas funding for 93 per cent of its running costs with advertising generating 
4 per cent and sales just 3 per cent. Despite its public policy of independence from party 
political affiliations or bias, the New African was attacked by critics as the African National 
Congress’ leaflet. By 1990, the New African was in serious financial trouble flowing from 
distribution costs, mismanagement, consumer resistance and threatened loss of essential 
overseas aid. 
 It called in foreign consultants to assess its viability. After constant attacks by the 
government, New Nation folded after nine years including a three-month shutdown and at 
least seven bannings. Its demise was little mourned by white public opinion. South 
encountered a similar fate. According to Manoim: 
These were never larger or highly successful newspapers. But they were 
brave reflections of a particular South African reality which the 
government would prefer to wish away.  Today New Nation and South. 
Tomorrow perhaps the more widely known Weekly Mail. And the next 
day? 39 
 The demise of the alternative media was swift as political change in South Africa 
gained momentum. The new media that was so important during the liberation struggle was 
seriously affected when the mainstream media started muscling in on the traditional territory 
of the independents. As the apartheid system crumbled, foreign funding for the alternatives 
dissolved.  The choice of switching to a viable commercial newspaper was politically 
unacceptable and unaffordable for many. Smaller publications that had ably served the cause 
of change, such as South, Work in Progress and Speak were among the casualties.  
 Sparks says that the alternatives folded mainly because they failed to establish 
commercial viability, partly because their readers lacked spending power and therefore 
advertiser appeal: “...also, to be frank, because they were badly managed and slumbered in a 
culture of dependency. When their life-support systems were switched off, they expired”.40 
Berger concedes the alternative press collapsed in conjunction with the apartheid 




politics and labour issues, was compelled to improve their coverage of issues dealt with in the 
alternative papers. 
And with new democratic freedoms evolving in the 1980s, the alternative newspapers 
had to find new niche markets or face rejection as repetitive, sounding what Berger described 
as “campaigning vehicles sounding the same old drum”.41 By the time President De Klerk 
lifted the ban on the ANC in 1990, the old white mainstream press had already started to 
encroach by reporting issues including black politics, human rights abuses, even investigative 
and educational journalism. The alternative press survived the revolution in South Africa but 
succumbed after liberation to the commercial realities of South Africa’s subsequently skewed 
media market-place. This was compounded when overseas aid for the establishment of many 
of the alternative newspapers either ceased or was drastically reduced.  
Alternatives − another view 
Tyson departs from the established view that the alternative press evolved from a need to 
redefine the national media because the “liberal English media” failed in its duty to confront 
apartheid despite its repression of the media.42  
Following the collapse of the Rand Daily Mail in the mid-1980s, Tyson suggests 
change was so rapid that The Star (edited by him), had to shift focus and respond more 
aggressively to cope with President Botha’s Total Strategy-Total Onslaught policy.  Change 
was not forced upon The Star because of the burgeoning crop of alternative newspapers with 
a radical new approach. Although not as technically efficient, adequately staffed, or 
economically strong as the leading national daily, the alternatives impeded the expansion of 
The Star as Tyson admits:  
... The new vigorous, aggressive approach was accelerated to some extent 
by the death of the Mail in 1985. Its demise left a gap in the national 
debate which The Star expanded its role to fill.43 
But it was a dangerous balancing act for the conservative daily. Traditional readers 
responded that The Star was “giving too much exposure to allegations against the police and 
to people with grievances”. Tyson admits many readers felt he was allowing The Star to lose 
its “balance”, and this placed it at odds with the vast majority of oppressed South Africans. 
The consequent “imbalance” of the mainstream English language press provided impetus for 
the alternative press:   
All [alternative newspapers] made themselves instantly felt. They ranged 
from that most interesting and unheralded experiment in co-operative 




Weekly Mail ... These and other ‘alternative’ journals such as Grassroots, 
played a vital role in the final battle for press freedom under the National 
Party even though their combined circulation hardly matched a single 
small mainstream newspaper. Their influence went far beyond their size. It 
reached deep into all communities.44 
Tyson criticised the viewpoint of the subsidised alternatives that the commercially 
independent newspapers were all part of “the system” and therefore allies of the Government. 
The alternative press actively attacked the opposition press for failing to bring down the 
National Party and to express the “view of the people”, but their critique had been eroded by a 
lowering of their journalistic standards. 
According to Tyson, most alternative newspapers believed “that things like balance, 
objectivity and all those other old-fashioned values” were not only irrelevant, but a hindrance 
in the war against a total onslaught on freedom. While sincere, they felt they had to denigrate 
the mainstream opposition English language newspapers to justify their own existence and 
garner overseas funding. 
Under the new Government of National Unity, this assertion of the liberal English press 
as de facto opposition during the apartheid struggle was severely challenged. Black journalists 
suggested that the Truth and Reconciliation hearings should also investigate racism in both 
the national press and liberal English language newspapers during the struggle against 
apartheid. Merrett viewed the emergence of the alternative press as “a quest for unbannable 
media”. It focused on increased news about the ANC, trade unions, and democratic 
organisations committed to overthrowing the apartheid government, and favoured a “shift in 
popular communication practices from mere propaganda to cultural struggle”:  
The alternative media became a vanguard in anti-apartheid politics, 
eliciting a response from the authorities that reached its apotheosis in the 
States of Emergency declared from 1985 onwards.45 
In the period of national reconciliation, post-1994, the unfairness of apartheid was 
readily admitted by the displaced whites.  While it prevailed, the English press in content, 
direction and, most importantly, in staffing, showed that black people had little place in the 
mainstream print media. The English press was often reactionary, and offered too little and 
usually too late. To the more acerbic critics of the national press, the difference between the 
English press and the Afrikaans press was merely that one went further in supporting 
government policies. 
The Afrikaans press was always an extension of the government, although in varying 




in the Cape Province organ of the National Party (Die Burger), and the mouthpieces of the 
Transvaal Nationalists (Die Transvaler, Die Beeld and Die Vaderland). Fundamentally, 
however, there was little difference between “grand apartheid” and the major cornerstones of 
separate development policy. Tinkering at the edges of “petty apartheid”, the offensive 
offshoots of the system may have caused some rifts over the years between the verlig 
(enlightened) and verkramp (right-wing conservative) camps.  
Commenting on the role of the national press as outlined to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in 1997, Guy Berger, professor of journalism and media studies 
at Rhodes University and a former editor of the alternative weekly South, said the media was 
less than honest in their statements to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see below). 
The liberal press operated in, and took its cues from, the prevailing white landscape. A 
handful of white editors rose above the conventional wisdom of the day. Berger states: 
They “opened an account” and they paid a price: exile for Donald Woods, 
loss of their jobs in the cases of Raymond Louw, Allister Sparks and Tony 
Heard. White journalists like these, who tried to lead the white readership 
market, rather than follow its prejudices and its interests, also ran into 
falling circulations. The decline was not compensated for by black readers 
who failed to attract advertising revenue. If it wasn't such a context that    
constrained the role of the liberal press, it was the confined outlook of 
most white journalists.46 
And Berger chides the liberal English press for lack of vision and selective opposition 
to the apartheid system. 
Many of these journalists did campaign against “petty” apartheid. But 
macro-apartheid – especially after Bantustan independence – got less 
critical attention. Coverage sometimes pilloried the pass laws; it routinely 
neglected the wages paid to migrant workers. The problem with the liberal 
press is not only that its opposition did not go far enough. Nor even that its 
champions like Tyson did not realise that there was a lot further to go. 
What was worse was the day-to-day reflection of what South Africa was 
about. Black people were invisible in most newspapers. If you were 
Desmond Tutu, you got coverage – usually negative – in The Star. If you 
were a golf caddie featured in a Daily Dispatch picture, you'd be lucky to 
have even been photographed in the rain standing next to white men 






Chapter Two highlights the complexities and changing loyalties of the South African press 
against a background of race discrimination, separate development policies and oppression. 
In the decade after 1948 and prompted by factional wrangling within the National 
Party, the Afrikaans press underwent some sort of metamorphosis that changed it from a loyal 
servant and mouthpiece of the government to a more critical press. That is not to say the 
Afrikaans press shifted from an apartheid supporting press to a critic of apartheid. It was more 
a struggle for identity and independence. 
During the 1980s, as the alternative press moved into previously unexplored territories 
as the voice of the oppressed, the Afrikaans press again had to make substantial and far 
reaching policy changes as the apartheid regime struggled to maintain its grip and ultimately 
lost power. 
For the English press, maintaining a profitable balance between white readership who 
felt that the papers were leaning too far towards the Left and agitated blacks demanding a 
more critical focus against apartheid, it was always a difficult balancing act. Black readers 
mainly reject the efforts of the English press in opposing the apartheid policies of the time as 
being usually too little and too late, most white readers felt otherwise. But it would be harsh 
and unfair to demean the efforts of the English press. It worked within the scope and 
limitations of strict authoritarian controls, faced constant government scrutiny and police 
harassment, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. And with a predominantly white 
readership, the English press could not afford to alienate its advertisers by pandering to black 
social and political aspirations. The English press was a white press with advertisers drawn to 
the economically powerful white readership. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the alternative newspapers struggled for survival on 
many fronts. Small circulation figures, unattractive to advertisers, mainly local content news 
and distribution problems hampered all of the alternative newspapers. Driven by a desire to 
change the status quo but hindered by a lack of experienced journalistic staff and financial 
constraints, the alternative news papers struggled from first edition until they folded. Chapter 
Three will focus on apartheid and press repression. The thrust of Chapter Three is on the 
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APARTHEID AND PRESS REPRESSION 
Introduction 
After the Second World War, before the apartheid era, the South African press resembled the 
contemporary British press in its functioning. It was subject to legislative enactment, but 
retained the commitment to free and independent expression and the lack of government 
interference characteristic of British press traditions. After the Nationalists came to power in 
1948 and committed to racist apartheid policies, this ethos rapidly dissolved. The national 
print media was drawn inexorably into a constant battle against drastic authoritarian controls 
designed to ruthlessly restrict press freedoms, despite lip-service to the truths. 
  By 1990, when apartheid disintegrated, more than 100 different legislative provisions 
moulded the character of press freedom operating in South Africa. Even in 1996, with a black 
majority, an ANC-dominated government and a commitment to a free press under the South 
African constitution, the iniquitous and restrictive laws and conditions remained on the statute 
books. However, by 2002, positive changes were noted. In an annual international survey on 
freedom in the world, Freedom House found that South Africa continued to provide a 
remarkable, powerful example of a positive democratic transition in an extremely diverse 
country but some doubts remain. 
   The South African press remained one of the most restrictive in the world. 
Overwhelming political and constitutional transformation was not reflected in any equivalent 
transformation of the news media. This paradox is examined in this chapter which considers 
the design and implementation of government coercion and media censorship under apartheid. 
This chapter takes up the theme of retained controls and consequent repression in the post-
apartheid era under a new constitutional dispensation. 
Bound by legislation 
The apartheid years saw the introduction of many Acts of Parliament and related statutes, for 
example the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, and amendments that made it a 
punishable offence to further the aims of communism and the Communist Party. The Defence 
Act 1957 was one of the first laws that had serious implications for restricting press freedom 
in South Africa. The wide-ranging view of what constituted “communism” meant that the 
government, the Defence Minister and the State President could effectively decide what 
constituted a “communist”. In reality, the Act was used extensively against non-communists, 




Under the legislation it was an offence to advise, support or encourage the aims of 
communism and provisions for the banning of newspapers considered to be supporting or 
advocating change. Under its wide net, several newspapers were banned or shut down during 
the 1950s and 1960s. It was also a costly burden for media owners. Under the Suppression of 
Communism Act, newspaper owners had to put up a deposit of R20,000 when a new 
newspaper was started if there was any possibility that it could be banned. This was later 
increased to R40,000 when the Internal Security Act was reviewed in April 1982. The deposit 
was forfeited to the state if the newspaper was banned by the government. The government 
also reserved the right to censor the post, telephone, telegraph or radio services and any other 
form of communication including written or printed material. 
The Unlawful Organisations Act (No 34 of 1960) and amendments leading to the 
Internal Security Act enabled the State President to declare “any body, organisation, group or 
association of persons, institution, society or movement” as an unlawful organisation.2  
The consequence of this action had the effect of a banning order on publications. Under 
the Internal Security Act, it became an offence to publish the names or anything written or 
said by a person or persons banned under the provisions of the Act. This included opinions or 
statements made by banned persons prior to their banning orders and also included 
organisations that had been declared unlawful. 
Among other restrictions on publication were the Official Secrets Act (No 16 of 1956) 
and the Riotous Assembly Act (No 17 of 1956 and amendments). These restrictive laws 
operated in combination with a variety of other equally repressive measures. In total, these 
curtailed freedom of speech and the way in which the press was allowed to report on 
prohibited gatherings, recording or reproducing speeches of prohibited people and reporting 
in ways that might incite public violence. For example, the Native Administration Act and the 
General Law Amendment Act also made news reporting restrictive, difficult and a minefield 
for an unwary publisher.  
 Under declared states of emergency, additional restrictive measures came into force.3 
These further restrictions outlawed filming, photographing or reporting on any matter 
involving the security forces in action. Prohibitions also covered reporting on any public 
disturbance, riotous behaviour, destruction of public property, killings or assault or any of a 
broad-ranging number of events that could loosely be construed as “subversive”. Under a 
declared state of emergency, coverage of any disturbances or unrest was restricted to vetted 
information from the Bureau of Information in Pretoria. Not complying with the regulations 




emergency were additional to the 100 or so different pieces of legislation that already affected 
the freedom of the press in South Africa. 
Legal hazards 
Even with the lifting of the state of emergency regulations, continued restrictions on press 
freedoms placed a South African journalist in constant legal jeopardy, and facing a constant 
threat of imprisonment and detention.5 Seemingly innocuous laws such as the Post Office Act 
(No 44 of 1958, amended in 1972 and 1974) gave the post office administration the power to 
intercept postal articles, telegrams, telephone messages, telexes and news reports.6 The 
Publications and Entertainment Act (No 26 of 1963) was enacted among other things to keep 
“undesirable” material out of the country. Under section 5 (2) of the Act, “undesirable” was 
applicable to material “if it, or any part of it is indecent, obscene, offensive, blasphemous, 
offensive to the religious convictions of any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic of 
South Africa, brought any section of the inhabitants into ridicule or contempt, was harmful to 
the relations between any sections of the inhabitants, or was prejudicial to the safety of the 
state, the general welfare, peace, or good order”. 
 This Act was superseded by the Publications Act of 1974 to include films, records, 
stage shows, artworks, amateur photography etc.7 The Customs and Excise Act (No 91 of 
1964) placed restrictive controls on the importation and distribution of foreign publications or 
goods deemed to be “indecent or obscene or on any ground whatsoever objectionable” by the 
Publications Control Board. The offending material could be seized or banned at the 
discretion of the Publications Control Board. The Extension of University Education Act (No 
45 of 1959) not only provided for the establishment of separate and independent universities 
and colleges of the various racial groups.8 It also placed restrictions on publications by the 
student representative councils at these institutions. 
Under the Act it was an offence to publish or produce magazines, newspapers or 
pamphlets without the permission of the rector of the university. No student was allowed to 
make a statement to the press by or on behalf of the students without the permission of the 
rector. 
In addition, provincial laws were passed in the Provincial Councils of the Transvaal, 
Natal, Orange Free State and the Cape to restrict publications on the grounds of profanity, 
indecency, offensiveness and material generally considered objectionable. 
Under the Prisons Act it became a punishable offence to photograph or sketch any 
prison or prisoner without permission from the Police Commissioner, or to attempt to portray 




The need for such a profusion of laws to restrict and stifle the press suggests there were 
vigorous and powerful news instruments at work for meaningful political change in South 
Africa, and that the Government felt threatened. But this was not so. It would be wrong to 
suggest that the South African media did not at times campaign harshly against the National 
Party policies. Opposition varied in degrees. The Afrikaans press more muted, the English 
press more critical. Fundamentally, the government’s policy of separate development was 
overwhelmingly acceptable to the whites though at times the ugly face of racism and 
differences of opinion caused diversion in the press which basically served the needs of the 
white community.  
The role of the media as critic of the government had limits making it inadequate to 
appease the aspirations of more than 95 per cent of the population. Black people in the main 
saw no hope in the campaigns of the mainstream “white press”. Also, with the majority of 
black people being illiterate and newspaper readership low, the impact of newspapers 
criticizing the government was minimal. Even so, the need for oppressive media restrictions 
formed only part of a bigger system to entrench and support the racist legislation in place.9 
The cumulative effect of these restrictive laws was a form of censorship. But not only 
censorship in a way to prevent or restrict the individual’s “right to know” but also to enhance 
the repressive machinery of the state. Thus, censorship in South Africa was part of the 
apartheid system, aimed specifically at imposing this ideology on the public.10 
Oosthuizen argued that the Publications Act of 1974 was not the only censorship law 
but that censorship was also exercised in terms of such statutes as the Internal Security Act of 
1982, the Prisons Act of 1959, the Riotous Assemblies Act (1956) and the Official Secrets Act 
(1956).11 Oosthuizen traced this interdependence of censorship legislation to an incident in 
1987 when, after the Appeal Board had given the film Cry Freedom unconditional clearance, 
the South African police nevertheless seized it. According to a report in the Sunday Times   
(March 27, 1988) certain cabinet ministers were not happy that the film was released. Die 
Beeld (January 6, 1989) said the ministers had the film summarily removed.12 
  Chimutengwende interpreted South African legal censorship in this way:  
Law is used as an instrument of policy. Its purpose is to protect the state 
apparatus and the power of the ruling class … In South Africa, the white 
minority has power. It controls the state machinery and intends to keep it 
by force and persuasion, forever if possible. The legal system, controlled 
by the ruling minority, is there to ensure as far as it can that no other forms 
of power opposed to the present set-up are exercised freely. The legal 




endeavour to see that individuals and institutions facilitate the smooth 
functioning of the social, political and economic system. They are not to 
be given sufficient freedom to cause difficulties to or destroy the system.13 
Allister Sparks, a former editor of the Rand Daily Mail, observed of press censorship in 
South Africa that it created an information vacuum on black nationalist politics which the 
government moved to fill with its own tainted version: 
 Thus, through a combination of censorship and propaganda, the 
alternative of a negotiated settlement has been effectively closed to the 
white South Africans and they have been locked into the confrontation 
option.14 
Benjamin Pogrund, a South African print journalist, media commentator and former 
deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail, divided South Africa’s pre-emergency press regulations 
into three categories. The first were laws that curtailed individual freedoms in such a manner 
as to harm press freedom as well. The laws of the second type forbade publication of certain 
information without permission on topics such as atomic energy, oil supplies and the defence 
forces. The third category of laws included those that did not ban sensitive topics outright, but 
created legal hazards for publishers who might choose to cover them. 
 Total Onslaught 
The culture of vigorously-policed censorship reached its peak during the so-called period of 
Total Onslaught in the mid-1980s, continuing through the State of Emergency from 1985 to 
1990. The Total Onslaught theory was coined by President P.W. Botha as a term for what he 
perceived as a communist-driven attempt by anti-apartheid forces to overthrow his 
government. South Africa descended into more violence as the government hardened its 
opposition to the Total Onslaught of anti-apartheid forces who aimed to create an 
ungovernable country 
The repression originated in the early 1950s, starting with the Suppression of 
Communism Act and the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Acts to the First State of Emergency 
(1960), Van Zyl Commission Reports (1962), until the Steyn Commission of inquiry into the 
mass media (1982) to nearly the end of the apartheid era in 1993. Merrett saw the history of 
South Africa after 1950 as “characterised by an avalanche of security legislation which 
among other effects, created a massive structure of censorship and self-censorship”.15 
One reason [for censorship] was the suppression, so far as possible, of 
information about the repressive tactics required to maintain the politico-
economic status quo in South Africa for so long in the face of international 




the different racial groups into which the country had been divided, so as 
to perpetuate the myth that the differences between people are greater than 
their common humanity ... Censorship was a device used to maintain the 
illusion that the fine-sounding ideas of apartheid were not only desirable 
and moral, but realisable. A third reason was the need to suppress the post-
war history of non-racial opposition to the political order.16 
The resort to censorship cannot be attributed wholly to apartheid. The roots had been 
sown even before World War Two.  In 1935, for example, John Gomas was convicted and 
jailed for six months with hard labour for publishing an article under the banner of the 
Communist Party of South Africa entitled King George’s Jubilee: 25 years reign of luxury, 
pomp, and waste!  
Thus, government intervention in freedom of expression was evident well before 1950 
when the Van Zyl Press Commission was established to investigate media concentration and 
monopoly tendencies.  
In a massive agenda, it also scrutinised the activities of foreign correspondents and 
stringers, the accuracy, responsibility and patriotism of the South African journalists, 
restraints on the establishment of new newspapers, the incidence of triviality, and the general 
condition of the national press. With the Suppression of Communism Act already in place, 
reinforcing, government policy to ban newspapers or publications perceived as communist, 
some of the Press Commission’s terms of reference were already irrelevant. Some were later 
amended and others dropped.  It was more than a decade before the Van Zyl Commission 
finally completed its work and handed down its findings. By then, the horse had bolted 
several years before. 
In September 1957, the Commission of Enquiry in Regard to Undesirable Publications 
reported about the undesirability of the propagation of communism, which in effect, was 
broadly based, whatever the government found contrary to its separate development policy. 
By this time two newspapers were banned. In 1952, the Guardian was banned and its 
successor the Advance was banned in 1954, while Torch was charged in 1954 over an 
editorial that questioned and criticised the Government’s education policy. The case was 
ultimately dismissed in court. This was a time of consolidation of political power for the 
National Party and included a steep rise in the number of publications banned as undesirable 
by the Board of Censors. By 1956, this arbitrary Board had a list of 4,000 titles that were 





 In the late-1950s, the State Information Office was revamped as the South African 
Foundation, a propaganda machine. It offered a largely uncritical view of the National Party 
government moving rapidly to implement the major building blocks of the apartheid system. 
This was the time of the Defiance Campaign, reported extensively in the press. The 
introduction of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Suppression of Communism Act 
provided the legal basis to curtail press activity in delicate policy and administrative areas. 
 Foreign correspondents, among them Doris Lessing, Basil Davidson and John Hatch 
were expelled from South Africa. The Minister for External Affairs at the time argued that a 
great deal of South Africa’s internal trouble was due to the political articles in the English 
press. But the English press, although not favouring the National Party, were not unbiased, 
nor pro-African, non-racial institutions. It engaged in heavy self-censorship, and policy 
differences between it and the racist National Party aims was largely a matter of degree to the 
non-white majority. 
Van Zyl Commission reports 
In February 1962, the Commission completed its first report, a mammoth document of 2,376 
typewritten folio pages. Yet it dealt with only two of the seven terms of reference. The second 
report was tabled in parliament on May 11, 1964, another 1,400 pages plus 3,000 pages of 
annexes. It focused on news collection and distribution, particularly the work of overseas 
correspondents and “stringers” and news agencies. The main brief, to investigate the South 
African print media, was largely ignored, the commission claiming it lacked the time to 
investigate the role of the national press. 
 It did recommend the establishment of a statutory Press Council “for the self-control 
and discipline of the Press”. The proposed Press Council was empowered to impose penalties 
and fines, with no right of appeal to the courts against decisions. Every journalist had to 
register annually with the Press Council and accept the Council’s 10-point press code. 
The newspapers strongly opposed these plans and the government eventually backed 
away from this somewhat Draconian model. The owners of the country’s major dailies and 
magazines moved swiftly to introduce their own press code and board of control to apply a 
degree of self-regulation. The government welcomed this, exempting members of the 
Newspaper Press Union (NPU) from regulation under the Publications and Entertainment 
Act. 
  During its lengthy investigation, the Van Zyl Commission seriously destabilised news 





The First State of Emergency 
The Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960 was a watershed in South African politics. Led 
by Robert Sobukwe, leader of the Pan African Congress, and supported by Nelson Mandela’s 
African National Congress, a large crowd of black South Africans gathered outside the 
Sharpeville police station to protest against the pass laws imposed by apartheid. The pass laws 
were statutes that required all black men and women to carry a reference identity book with 
them whenever they travelled outside of their home towns. In the end 60 protesters were 
killed and 188 were wounded while trying to flee from police. It was an incident that 
provoked international outrage and swift reaction by the South African government. 
On March 30, 1960, the government announced the first State of Emergency under the 
Public Safety Act of 1953.18 Widespread powers under the State of Emergency meant that 
certain types of reporting could be summarily banned; for example, calls for boycotts, 
advocacy of protests and strike action, and published statements   deemed   subversive.  
Detention without trial and banning orders on journalists further eroded routine news activity 
during this period. Police or government agents also had the right to search and seize printed 
matter in newspaper offices.  
 The Government also sought to impinge on   press freedom by trying to force 
journalists to reveal their sources to police under the provisions of the Criminal Procedures 
Act. Several journalists were jailed using such tactics, including Brian Parkes for 16 days and 
Patrick Duncan for eight days in October 1960. 
Both   refused to name sources. In 1962, Fred Carneson, of the New Age, was charged 
for refusing to give information about a contributed article. Huge registration deposits were 
introduced, subject to forfeit if newspapers were banned for contravening the rules. This 
stifled the development of an independent and emerging radical or anti-apartheid press. 
 In addition, foreign correspondents encountered difficulties in sending their articles 
overseas because of an interventionist policy at the Post Office. Often Post Office officials 
would refuse to send cables dispatched by foreign correspondents. Among the publications 
banned in the 1960s were titles such as Fighting Talk (1963), New Age (1962), Spark, Contact 
(1963), African Communist (1964), New African (1965), Forum (1965), and Drum (1965-
1968).   The national news distributors Central News Agency (CNA), refused to handle or 
distribute   titles perceived as left-wing.19 
National Party, English press  
The government attacks on press freedom and criticism were epitomised by Afrikaner 




One reaches a point where criticism stops and treason starts and the 
English press too often exceeds that point.20  
          The Afrikaner press added its demand in Die Transvaler that the English-language 
press should become “truly South African”. The animosity between the leadership of the 
National Party and the English-language press can be traced back to the creation of the 
National Party in 1934. During World War Two, when the South African [Nationalist] 
Government advocated neutrality and relinquishing English control, Dr Danie Malan had 
warned:     
That section of the press which up to the present has served foreign 
interests will have to be kept within bounds. Should it try to cause the 
republic to be undone, this will be regarded as high treason and will be 
treated as such.21 
 The National Party won the 1948 elections with an overwhelming majority despite 
opposition from the “hostile” English-language press. Prime Minister Malan described it   as 
the most undisciplined in the world. In his view, journalists should be registered, like doctors, 
and struck off the roll for unethical conduct. At the 1958 general elections, the National Party, 
returned with an increased majority and launched even stronger attacks on the press, 
especially the Rand Daily Mail.  
The Mail fought back with an editorial accusing National Party MPs of constant attacks 
on the English-language press, not only to denigrate it but also to justify further restrictions 
and controls. Bitter and hostile attacks on the press were constantly reinforced by succeeding 
Prime Ministers. Prime Minister Hans Strijdom, the National Party leader in Transvaal who 
succeeded Malan, sustained a campaign of vituperation.  Soon after taking office, Strijdom 
accused the English-language press of “playing the venomous game of inciting the natives, 
not only against the government but against the white man”.22 
In   Parliament, Strijdom immediately went on the attack against the newspapers which 
he accused of being anti-South Africa. He obtained a vote recording parliament’s strongest 
disapproval of newspaper attempts “to create strife between the two white language groups ... 
as well as between white and black, and to undermine the good name of South Africa and its 
economic stability by publicising incorrect and misleading statements”.23  
Strijdom died in 1958 and was succeeded by Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the former editor 
of Die Transvaler, and an architect of apartheid. Verwoerd firmly believed that if the separate 
development policy was to succeed, then the media had to be controlled. He viewed criticism 
of the government or its apartheid policy as intolerable, vicious and disloyal. Verwoerd 




language press as a dangerous enemy to his plans. His increased crackdown on the press was 
certainly not unexpected and he did not disappoint. 
 At the 1960 referendum, when whites voted in favour of establishing a republic, Dr 
Verwoerd warned the press: “We cannot allow the future of the republic and the future 
welfare of the nation to be ruined by sensation-mongering, incitement or the besmirching of 
our country’s name or that of its leaders”.24 
Merrett described as paranoiac the Government’s policy (bearing the imprint of 
Hendrik Verwoerd) towards the English-language press: 
It was frozen out of the information flow surrounding Parliament and was 
subject to Government misinformation tactics. In Nationalist eyes, the 
English press became not the Fourth Estate but a fifth column.25 
 The English press survived this onslaught because it was part of the white 
establishment. It was necessary for the “democratic basis” of South African government, 
without influencing the white electorate enough to unseat the government. Hepple agreed:  
In its ceaseless efforts to maintain the apartheid system, the Nationalist 
government recognises the fact that its position is not threatened by the 
white electorate but by the rising militancy of the voteless black masses 
whose cause is supported almost unanimously by the outside world. 
Against such formidable forces, the Nationalists desperately need a 
“responsible” press − that is a press which will represent apartheid and its 
works in a most favourable light and thereby discourage discontent at 
home and win friends abroad.26 
Verwoerd to Vorster 
Verwoerd was followed by a comparably authoritarian figure. John B. Vorster   became Prime 
Minister in 1966 after Verwoerd was assassinated in Parliament. A nationalist with 
impeccable National Party credentials, he was jailed during the war years for his leadership of 
the neo-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag movement. This was an anti-British, anti-democratic, 
national-socialist movement with a clandestine membership of influential Afrikaners. Vorster 
aimed to introduce laws against the media “that would provide not so much for the 
punishment of reporters but to make the publishing companies pay for employing those sorts 
of people”. And he threatened newspapers that he would be forced to legislate against what he 
described as ascertainable factual lies in newspapers and magazines.27 
 When the Argus group moved to take over SAAN in 1968, Vorster stepped in to block 




takeover went ahead he would legislate retrospectively, if necessary, to prevent it. Further 
warnings followed over foreign investment guidelines, and control and ownership of South 
African newspapers. 
At a meeting on October 6, 1971, Vorster told 40 executives and editors of the major 
national newspapers that he was holding off the planned legislation to control and discipline 
the South African press because he was still negotiating. He appealed to the newspapers to 
apply self-censorship so that legislation would not be necessary. Ministers savagely attacked 
the English language press for colluding with the enemies of South Africa and undermining 
the nation’s morale in its struggle for survival.28 This appeal for self-censorship was repeated 
by the Minister of the Interior, Dr Connie Mulder, in May 1973.  He urged the press to “act in 
such a way with the freedom they have that it will not be necessary for the government to 
decide against freedom of the press”. 
The 1980s ushered in a renewed period of antagonism between the government and the 
press. With violence and public unrest across the country seemingly out of control, Vorster’s 
successor, President P.W. Botha was even tougher on South African journalists and overseas 
representatives perceived as emphasising continuing civil unrest and instability. The 1980s 
also saw the development and rise of the alternative or anti-apartheid press in response to 
Botha’s authoritarian controls. 
 The Steyn Commission 
In early 1980, President Botha established the Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media – 
better known as the Steyn Commission after its commissioner, Justice M.T. Steyn.  It held 
hearings from November 1980 to April 1982 and issued its final report and draft regulations 
to Parliament on February 1, 1983. Justice Steyn held fundamentally antagonistic views on 
modern trends in journalism. He had been a senior member of the right-wing and secretive 
Afrikaner Broederbond. The inquiry was designed to reassure whites who were worried about 
the growing pressure for change.29  The Steyn Commission was the first of many inquiries 
initiated by Botha   impacting on press freedoms and practice. 
The mandate of the Commission was to inquire into and report on the question of 
whether the conduct of, and the handling of, matters by the mass media meet the needs and 
interests of the South African community and the demands of the times, and, if not, how they 
can be improved. The seeds of the Steyn commission were planted in 1979, shortly after 
Botha, a former Defence Minister, became President and warned the nation that there was a 
Marxist drive which aims at controlling the subcontinent. Botha said that he needed the help 
of the private sector to fully support the government in establishing national security and that 




Steyn and his Commissioners heard testimony from a wide section of the community 
but no black journalists sought to appear. Although specifically assigned to inquire into the 
media, the Commission spent much of its time on black nationalism and groups that 
supported the anti-apartheid and black consciousness movements, the rise of “black 
theology”, the World Council of Churches and its role in supporting black political 
aspirations. The Steyn Commission also focused on disparate groups perceived as hostile 
including the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the Soviet Union.  In the 
eyes of the administration, these unlikely partners constituted part of a Total Onslaught to 
overthrow the status quo in South Africa.  
This could only be prevented by a counterveiling Total Strategy to confound these 
forces of destruction. 
The Steyn Commission was delivered in two parts, with a large section of the second 
part   devoted to a scathing attack on the WCC and South African Council of Churches: 
The World Council of Churches is staffed by professional ecumenists and 
conference-going ‘intellectuals’ who exhibit all the symptoms of the 
sickness which is common in the West.  Consumed by post-imperial and 
post-colonial ‘guilt’, they are convinced that the West can only expiate its 
‘crimes’ by humbling itself before its former ‘victims’, the Third World, 
and its future destroyer, communism. Politics are for them, in effect, an 
elaborate form of suicide for which Christianity affords a moral 
justification.30 
The commission said the South African Council of Churches was trying to provoke 
internal socio-economic upheaval by means of political action. Included in this far-reaching 
attack were several clerics and black theologians leading the anti-apartheid cause and the 
black media workers’ organisation, MWASA (Media Workers Association of South Africa) 
described as a front organisation for black consciousness. The major black newspaper the 
Sowetan, a successor to the banned newspaper the World, was depicted as anti-establishment. 
The two major recommendations were breaking the monopoly of the major national 
newspaper groups, (the Argus group and SAAN,) and the licensing of journalists. According 
to Hachten and Giffard: 
The differing views within South Africa over the rights and duties of the 
press and its proper role in that divided society surfaced clearly during the 
extended hearings. The Government used these hearings as a sounding 
board to express its unhappiness with the press and to lay the groundwork 




the commission was a continuation of the process of harassment and 
intimidation that had begun in 1950, soon after the Nationalists took 
control. The parade of government officials who testified revealed much 
about the right-wing attitudes towards the press and echoed anti-press 
statements heard years before.31 
An interesting aspect to emerge from the Steyn Commission was the united opposition 
from the English-language press and the editors of the leading Afrikaner newspapers.  The 
editor of Die Transvaler, Dr Willem de Klerk, urged the state to be careful not to restrict the 
freedom of the press by any further legislation. Ton Vosloo, editor of Beeld, said the Steyn 
Commission recommended “a revision of existing statutory restraints on the press”. 
 The sharpest criticism came from Harold Pakendorf, the editor of the National Party’s 
mouthpiece, Die Vaderland, who called for fewer, not more curbs on the freedom of the 
press, a constitutional guarantee of free speech and legislation based on the First Amendment 
guarantees of the Constitution of the United States.32 This unexpected response from the 
usually supportive Afrikaner press largely stifled the government’s efforts to implement the 
proposed Journalists Bill. This aimed to “professionalise” journalism under a vague code of 
conduct enforced by a central council of journalists.33  
This would have made it compulsory for journalists to be registered on a journalists’ 
list, pass examinations and meet certain levels of qualifications to work as journalists. Any 
person who had been convicted of “subversive activities” would not be allowed to work as a 
journalist. 
Given the widespread harassment, arrests and attacks on journalists from as far back as 
the 1950s, the code would have ruled out some of the finest journalists in the country because 
they had run foul of the myriad laws passed to restrict the free flow of information. After five 
months of bargaining with the Interior Minister, Chris Heunis, the National Press Union 
agreed to establish a media council of its own design with powers to reprimand and fine 
newspapers, but not to de-register journalists.  
The government was to formally recognise the new media council. Heunis accepted the 
offer of self-discipline by replacing the old press council with a new one. But in June, 1982 he 
introduced a Bill that made the new media council a statutory body, and all newspapers were 
to submit to it by joining the NPU. The statutory requirement was later withdrawn but a final 
compromise law that included the right to cancel the registration of newspapers if the 
publishers did not subject themselves to the NPU’s new media council was passed in July 




Although the Steyn Commission’s recommendation for licensing journalists was not 
adopted by the government, the report was ominous in the continuing struggle to dominate 
and control the press.  In particular, it reinforced the two-pronged threat from Total Onslaught 
and consequent riposte from Total Strategy.35  Hachten and Giffard   suggest that the real 
message of the first Steyn Commission was that the press − in particular, the surviving 
opposition newspapers − was to be co-opted into the emergent Total Strategy.36 (See below). 
The parliamentary opposition rejected Total Strategy, as did a wide cross-section of the 
community, including the editors of the English-language newspapers, some Afrikaner 
editors, and the clergy.  Respected Afrikaner academics regarded it as an effort to divert 
attention from fundamental changes to apartheid. According to Jackson, “the (Steyn) report’s 
conclusions resoundingly endorsed government thinking that a Total Strategy was the most 
suitable way of addressing this perceived (outside) threat”.  
This ignored widespread criticism of the report as unrepresentative of either the media 
or the public “because the commission included no practising journalists and comprised only 
of whites”.37 
Total Onslaught – Total Strategy 
The bizarre concept of Total Onslaught-Total Strategy was peddled by the Botha government 
from around 1980-81. It was a sinister strategy which originated in the Defence Force.  Its 
ultimate aim was to maintain the support of the white electorate, get the disgruntled black 
masses on side, and persuade the press to support whatever the national security forces 
deemed to be in the national interest. This might be incursions into Angola, Zimbabwe or 
other frontline states, or savage attacks against the “enemies of the state” and anti-apartheid 
campaigners. 
Tyson, as editor of The Star, became aware of this concept in 1979, when military 
correspondents of his newspaper were allowed to eavesdrop on major briefings by the chief of 
the Defence Force, General Magnus Malan, and his colleagues. 
The Total Onslaught-Total Strategy campaign really took off after the then Defence 
Minister P.W. Botha became prime minister, with General Malan as the driving force. This 
need and desire for secrecy, Tyson suggests, was because of the military’s “dirty tricks” 
campaigns. From 1979 this covert strategy involved the state security system in targeting 
civilians in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho with letter bombs. By the late 1980s “dirty 
tricks” included unconfirmed reports of nuclear blast tests and the production of six atom 
bombs by the South Africans all bigger than the Hiroshima bomb. In this climate of secrecy 
and censorship, it was not until March 1993 that President F.W. de Klerk, under the emerging 




inspections of South Africa’s nuclear facilities but found no evidence of any program for 
developing nuclear bombs. 
 Overwhelmingly, the military rationale underpinned the Total Onslaught-Total 
Strategy concept:  
General Malan had earlier interpreted the rolling tide of Black Nationalism 
and decolonisation in southern Africa as a Soviet-inspired Total Onslaught 
by seeking by all available means to spread Marxist influence through the 
neighbouring black countries with the ultimate purpose of attaining Soviet 
dominance over South Africa and its strategic minerals. The South African 
response [Malan] argued repeatedly, had to be a Total Strategy that would 
meet the threat in the political, economic and psychological spheres as 
well as the military one.38 
This threat generated fierce attacks on the opponents of apartheid inside South Africa, 
and signalled the start of repeated attacks on neighbouring countries that offered sympathy or 
a home to ANC dissidents. In the Total Strategy concept, the ANC was targeted as furthering 
Soviet domination. The perception was encouraged that the ANC was infiltrating certain 
sections of the mass media, and presenting the Total Onslaught that would see the overthrow 
of white rule in South Africa. For this reason Prime Minister P.W. Botha harassed and 
imprisoned both black and white journalists through the 1980s. He implemented the most 
restrictive legislation imposed on the news media in South African history under State of 
Emergency regulations.  
Under the Total Strategy concept, it became clear that Botha and Malan expected 
opponents and dissidents in the media to get on side with the government. In short, they had 
to support uncritically the work of the police and the security forces, and the policies of the 
National Party regardless of where they led the country. 
 This applied not only to the press. All social classes had to band together in defiance of Total 
Onslaught: businessmen, working people, political groups, the churches, but especially the 
national press.   
The Star made a spirited response on behalf of the press, launching a bitter attack on 
the government and the shift into politics by the Defence Department: 
The onslaught [against South Africa] of course, is not total. It is directed 
more against apartheid and unjust laws than the existence or sovereignty 
of South Africa itself. And South Africans can, and should, oppose those 
same things without being branded as enemies of the State. The so-called 




rule of law and the freedom of information; still less for inflicting minority 
racist prejudices on a whole country. It is apartheid that the black people 
hate. If it stays, violent conflict is inevitable. The choice is in the hands of 
the government. Peaceful change, in other words, will require a very 
different kind of total strategy.39 
The new security machinery included a complex national management system 
consisting of a State Security Council comprising Ministers and/or officials of the Foreign 
Affairs Department, police intelligence, and Defence.  The Prime Minister was chairman. 
Below the State Security Council was an executive committee of bureaucrats to carry out its 
orders. The third tier was a secretariat that became the nerve centre of the entire system where 
all staff work on national strategies was done. There were 15 interdepartmental committees 
for planning purposes.40 Finally, a network of joint management centres worked under each 
territorial military command, apparently to sharpen up government services and encourage 
co-operation with black South Africans. The Total Onslaught-Total Strategy ploy cast a wide 
net:   
Various elements of the Total Onslaught are presumably all working to the 
same end, so that even the New York Times and Washington Post as well 
as the South African English press are aiding and abetting Soviet strategic 
aims. But even so, there are certain identifiable enemies: Soviet 
Communism, Western liberalism, black theology and Black Nationalism, 
and the Black Consciousness movement itself. The main thrust of the 
onslaught comes from Moscow itself. 41 
From the Prime Minister and Cabinet down through all levels of the Botha 
administration, the press was clearly perceived as an instigating factor for black activism. 
During the 1980 school boycotts in Cape Town, the Minister for Coloured and Indian Affairs, 
Marais Steyn, blamed the English press for exaggerating their extent, thus encouraging more 
students to participate. 
 Steyn chided that this kind of “propaganda” would not be tolerated. He warned that the 
newspapers would have to decide whether they were on the side of law and order or those 
attempting to bring about change by force. In parliament, Prime Minister Botha warned that 
he was prepared to curb the press if newspapers continued to give prominence to “activities of 
subversives”. 
States of emergency: 1985-1990 
From the first half of 1981 through to 1985, South Africa’s civil unrest and uncontrollable 




organise an effective response, though, until the mid-1980s when it reverted to drastic 
strategies of earlier apartheid years. 
 Under the Public Safety Act, President Botha declared his first state of emergency on 
July 21, 1985. It covered 36 magisterial districts including the most volatile areas in the 
country, mainly in the Transvaal and the Cape Province.  
The State of Emergency was in effect until March 1986 and was followed by a second 
declaration on June 12, 1986, covering the entire country. Under the State of Emergency, the 
security forces were afforded almost unlimited powers to cope with what could not be quelled 
or dealt with under the existing laws. According to Cape Times editor, Tony Heard, “pictures 
of rugby and beauty queens have replaced township violence on many front pages ... the 
darkness is almost complete”. 
 Merrett considered the censorship much more radical and effective than before 1985-
86. It was not overly ambitious, sought to control information only from within South Africa, 
depended almost entirely on state employees to enforce it, and encouraged self-censorship.  A 
major purpose of the Emergency was to minimise the crisis for whites so as to engineer a 
psychology of normality. Thus, the declarations   obliterated what was left of the independent 
role of the newspapers in South Africa.42 
The emergency regulations had an immediate stifling effect on the flow and control of 
information, including a ban on the names of persons detained under the new regulations, and 
an all-embracing ban on reports that could “cause anyone any harm, hurt or loss, whether to 
his person or to his property or in any other way”.43 Part of this ban aimed to prevent 
encouraging foreign countries from considering economic boycotts against South Africa as a 
form of protest The partial emergency from 1985-1986 did not include additional curbs on the 
media. But from June 12, 1986 the police specifically targeted news organisations. 
 Merrett described it as “a period of bizarre and surreal experience throughout South 
Africa in which normal discourse, written and spoken, came to a virtual standstill ... all anti-
apartheid newspapers were in disarray”.44 Newspaper offices including Grassroots, New 
Nation, the Weekly Mail, the Sowetan, Sunday Tribune and City Press were raided and 
journalists detained. Overseas correspondents, both print and broadcasting, were accused of 
damaging the image of the republic with harmful and inaccurate reports.  
The Foreign Correspondents’ Association described the censorship regulations during 
the emergencies as the toughest its members had encountered anywhere in the world. Some 
correspondents qualified their reports as censored by the South African government. Others 





Official comment came via the South African Bureau of Information and its spokesman 
David Steward who threatened journalists who refused to moderate reports. Examples of 
contentious phrases included “white minority regime” and “riot-torn”. Such control over 
language was necessary, Steward explained, to ensure that the population was properly 
informed in a time of national debate.46 
 The Bureau of Information imposed additional burdens by insisting that it would only 
respond to questions submitted four hours in advance. On September 25, 1986 the media 
centre in Pretoria was shut down. The bureau would only respond to written questions by 
telexes. Newspapers reacted in a variety of ways to the difficulties imposed by the 
Government. Some appeared with thick black rules through the copy where it had been 
censored. 
Others chose to run stories with blank spaces to emphasise the paragraphs amended. 
Ilanga, Weekly Mail, the Star, and the Sowetan all used blank spaces, and the Sowetan ran a 
black box instead of a leader. The Weekly Mail used black lines and white space, to identify 
paragraphs that had been excised. Such indications of censorship were themselves banned.47 
Over an extended period during the mid-1980s; the Star carried a strip that reminded its 
readers each day that the newspaper was produced under extremely harsh censorship laws. 
This notice was dropped only after President F.W. de Klerk took over as National Party leader 
from P.W. Botha in 1989.  
[P.W. Botha was elected prime minister in 1979 and became state president in 1984. 
F.W. de Klerk replaced P.W. Botha as National Party leader in February 1989 after Botha 
suffered a stroke and in August 1989 De Klerk replaced him as president.] 
New bureaucracies 
At a meeting in Cape Town in September, 1987, attended by 32 editors representing leading 
metropolitan newspapers and the “alternative” press, the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel 
Botha, announced that the government had established a Directorate of Media Relations to 
monitor observance of the new emergency regulations issued a week earlier. Journalists’ 
organisations, editors, media lawyers, commentators, and some opposition MPs condemned 
the move as further erosion of freedom of speech and   press. The Media Workers’ 
Association of South Africa said it was clear the Government “would once more be 
policeman, prosecutor and judge”. The editor of the Sowetan, Joe Latagomo, described the 
move as the final nail in the coffin of press freedom [in South Africa]: 
The Government’s intention must be seen for what it is: a sinister plot, 
involving faceless people accountable to no-one, prescribing to people 




secrecy is nothing new in the Government’s onslaught against those who 
disagree with them.48 
The new powers under the directorate enabled Prime Minister Botha to suspend 
publication of offending newspapers for up to three months at a time, or to appoint censors to 
vet their material for publication. The Prime Minister defended the new legislation saying it 
could act against newspapers which fostered a climate of violent overthrow of the state.49 It 
was aimed both at the mainstream press and the Alternative press, although the initial 
emergency regulations  sought to curb directly the increasing role of the Alternative press. 
The Star described Stoffel Botha’s new curbs as frightening: 
In creating a Directorate of Media Relations to control ‘propaganda’, the 
Minister of Home Affairs has fallen into the old trap. He believes his own 
propaganda. It is sad to watch South Africa declining into the crude and 
unsophisticated procedures of unstable banana republics. And puzzling 
too.  
Why should the State want yet another mechanism to threaten and frighten 
the press? It already has a law which allows it to close down newspapers 
without even giving a reason. Its actions in the past were ruthless and 
unjust, but at least the Government avoided hypocrisy.50 
Explaining the new Directorate of Media Relations, Stoffel Botha said the Government 
would use a system of “scientific evaluation” to decide whether newspapers were promoting 
violent revolution. In his briefing to the editors, Stoffel Botha tried to dispel notions that the 
aim was outright censorship. 
The proposed directorate, set up by the Department of Home Affairs, comprised a panel 
of experts including political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers and journalists 
drawn from universities and research organisations.  
Action would only be taken against a newspaper after the Minister and his expert 
advisers had satisfied themselves that the publication, as a general policy, was promoting 
violent revolution. It was a wholly subjective exercise, but reviewable by the courts under 
common law. Stoffel Botha had by this time managed temporarily to shut down the 
alternative papers New Nation, Saamstaan, and South. His sights were then set on others, 
including the journal Work in Progress, Weekly Mail, and the Sowetan. 
Although the Minister was empowered under this new emergency legislation to place 
censors in newspaper editorial offices, he resisted the temptation. Merrett   suggested this was 




enabled him to argue that there was no censorship under the Emergency, and because he had 
other effective weapons at his disposal”.51  
Between 1986 and 1987, an average of one new Act a week was passed to tighten the 
grip on suppressing vital topics. Percy Qoboza, of the World, (and later the Sowetan), 
observed that the emergency regulations had reduced the credibility gap of the press. 
Township people, who had suffered at the hands of the police, the army, and other elements 
of the Nationalist government, came to distrust the newspapers because traumatic events were 
not being fully reported.52 
Shortly after the announcement of the new media directorate, Tyson tried to 
explain the mechanics of the new legislation:  
 The Minister has announced a five-step censorship programme, but in 
practice it comes down to three steps that pretend to be − or mock − 
scientific and judicial process. 
Step one: A ‘scientific’ assessment is made of the newspaper’s reports and 
comments, weighing ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ news. 
Step two: Should the anonymous panel feel that the accumulated impact 
amounts to ‘subversive propaganda’, then the Minister issues ‘fair 
warning’. 
Step three: Unless an editor can satisfy the Minister, or voluntarily tries to 
read the Minister’s mind more carefully in future, the newspaper must 
accept total pre-censorship. (So papers are closing down, as I speak.) ... 
My analysis does not claim to be scientific − there can be no such thing. I 
offer only the opinion of an average newspaperman.53 
Yet another ploy by Stoffel Botha and the Home Affairs Ministry was a plan for 
licensing journalists under Section 11 of the Newspaper Amendment Bill making it   
compulsory for freelancers, news correspondents and local news agencies to register with the 
government.  
The net was cast too wide by including organisations not gathering news in media 
terms such as stock brokers, currency exchange staff dealing with overseas publications, and 
other providers of information on a limited basis. The plan was much too vague, and legal 
implications forced Botha to abandon it, claiming that he wanted merely to stifle some far 
right-wing publications, among them the racist Patriot. Mathews concluded that the 
fundamental problem with South Africa’s system of public law, “stated shortly and sourly”, 




There is of course a strong power element in the most enlightened systems 
of public law, but in South Africa it is so grotesquely bloated that it now 
occupies − indeed overflows − all space within the system ... In the sphere 
of censorship, the powers of the ordinary courts have been reduced and 
their functions transferred to a Publications Appeal Board whose present 
policy of liberalising censorship appears to be due to the transient factor of 
the personality of the office-holders rather than to rules or institutions.54 
 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to public accountability was the statutory shroud of 
secrecy which had been thrown over vast areas of State administration. The basic anti-
disclosure law was the Protection of Information Act of 1982, which re-enacted in 
substantially the same form the former Official Secrets legislation inherited from Great 
Britain. 
This law enabled government to make a state secret of almost any official information 
it did not want disclosed, including information relating to mismanagement, waste and 
bureaucratic bungling. 
 Not unexpectedly, additional legislation extended the pervasive controls over 
information permitted by official secrets legislation, especially involving   security matters. 
The police and prisons department had long been protected by laws prohibiting the 
publication of “untrue” material relating to their activities. These legislative trends reached a 
climax in the media regulations which were promulgated under the 1986 State of Emergency 
and reintroduced, with additional restrictions against court ‘“meddling”, in the emergency 
provisions of June 11, 1987. The media regulations made a virtual state secret of the entire 
law and order operation, with the public bottle-fed on government pap released selectively. 
  Van Der Merwe argued that the media curbs were not designed to stop all criticism of 
the government but to stop the promotion of revolution.55 Stoffel Botha agreed, saying that the 
government would not allow the press “to be used as a tool of war in the hands of foreign or 
other aggressors”. According to the minister, “freedom of expression: would not be allowed 
to the extent that it fostered chaos, murder, confusion and revolt in South Africa”. 
Government intent was to “secure and promote the welfare of the people”, to promote 
development and to rule according to a set of fundamental principles within a given system 
and given parameters. The press must have a right to act as public watchdog but in a 
“qualified” manner:  
In this country, freedom in general, and press freedom in particular, must 
be looked at in the context of an attempted revolution by such violent 




Party. When the leaders of these organisations themselves blatantly admit 
that they collaborate with the mass media to further their violent struggle 
for the take-over of South Africa, it should be clear to everyone that 
sections of the local and international press in this revolutionary process is 
no flight of the imagination on the part of the government. . . . Whatever 
your reaction may be to what I [Stoffel Botha] have said, I must, in all 
frankness, add that if I have failed to convey to you a perception that there 
is substance in South Africa’s case, that will not deviate me from my 
course and my obligation to my country.56  
Taking a stand 
At the height of the media clampdown in the mid-1980s, The Star took a defiant stand against 
the continued assaults, threats of closure and harassment. It warned that South Africa was 
rapidly relinquishing any differences it had from totalitarianism because of   the prolonged 
state of emergency: 
Even for unaware South Africans seeking no more than limited legal 
protection and “responsible” freedom of information in these difficult 
times, warning bells should be ringing loudly and urgently. The Star takes 
the unusual step of editorialising on its front page today because the 
dimming lights and warning bells appear to go unheeded ... the threat 
facing all South Africans is that the new rules, given disguised 
respectability through elaborate procedures and publications in the 
Government Gazette, blatantly deny proper legal process to any 
publication practising freedom of speech. Freedom is denied for the sake 
of peace and protection of legal government, the public is told. A small 
minority, mainly white South Africans, swallow this. Their forebears, the 
Voortrekkers and the 1820 Settlers, would not – and did not.57 
 The Government had placed a severe restriction order on the ANC veteran Govan 
Mbeki, released from prison a month earlier, and several other national activists. In December 
1987, it banned an edition of the weekly New Nation alternative newspaper, declaring it 
undesirable in terms of the Publications Act of 1947.  (Three earlier similar decisions had 
been appealed and overturned by the Publications Appeal Board.) Acting editor Gabu 
Tugwana said the government’s actions had wider consequences: 
 People will probably only realise this when it [New Nation] is gone.58  
At the time of this banning, the founding editor of New Nation, Zwelakhe Sisulu, one of 




invoked under the State of Emergency regulations. He had been arrested and detained on the 
orders of Police Minister Louis le Grange on December 12, 1986. (New Nation was launched 
earlier that year.) The South African Society of Journalists (SASJ) said the banning order on 
New Nation was part of “a well-orchestrated state attack on what little is left of press freedom 
in South Africa, the brunt of which is presently borne by New Nation and other newspapers 
which fall outside the mainstream commercial press”. The South African Police 
Commissioner, General Hennie De Witt claimed the orders were necessary to prevent 
promotion of a revolutionary climate. 
President P.W. Botha had an opportunity to fine-tune the second State of Emergency in 
terms of the Public Safety Act. Two days before it lapsed on June 11, 1987, the Government 
signaled its intentions to extend and toughen restrictions, and to close   loopholes in the 
legislation. On June 10, 1987, notices were promulgated in the Government Gazette extending 
all   regulations under the expiring Emergency, as well as tighter controls on the media. 
New restrictions under the third State of Emergency since 1985 made it an offence to 
quote an unlawful or restricted organisation in any way, even by spokespersons who were not 
banned. It became an offence for any person or organisation to encourage a boycott of the 
municipal elections, with the exception of registered political parties.  
All news agencies had to be registered, with the exception of 13 organisations which 
included the established news agencies such as the big four international agencies and the 
national news agency, South African Press Association (SAPA).  
  Regulations on periodicals published irregularly were tightened, and the Minister of 
Home Affairs given powers to close down irregular publications for three months. This was 
increased subsequently to six months, after which the Minister could order copies of the 
offending periodical to be seized, or both.  The government also assumed wide powers for the 
seizure of television film and sound recordings if they were considered to contain subversive 
statements. The new emergency regulations gave the Home Affairs Minister and the Police 
Commissioner powers to seize all copies of the film, sound tape, or publication.  
This was based on a judgment that the material, on publication or distribution, would 
foment or promote revolution, uprising, unrest, feelings of hatred or hostility towards the 
security forces, or promote banned organisations or boycotts. They also had the power to 
enter any premises and use whatever force was “reasonably necessary to carry out the orders”. 
The security forces were also empowered to carry out these orders.  
National and international outrage was predictable and the national media was united in 
its condemnation of the third State of Emergency, as it had been of earlier crackdowns. Jolyon 




additional powers to extend the suspension of publications simply by placing a notice in the 
Government Gazette as particularly worrying for the media:  
The Government seems intent on converting the written word to the 
hidden word. It keeps adding to the list of things that may not be 
published, in the apparent hope that ignorance will create bliss ... This is 
censorship by edict in its worse form.59 
Bob Steyn, of the South Africa Media Council, saw the new measures as seeming to go 
further than the previous regulations which had been criticised by the council was critical: 
Our task is to try to secure the freest possible flow of information in the 
public interest.60 
The regime changes 
On August 14, 1989, President P.W. Botha resigned and was replaced the following day by 
Acting President F.W. de Klerk as head of the National Party. The end of the   Botha era 
signalled the passing of the most sustained and bitter attacks on the national media. Jackson 
described the 1980s as “the blackest years of the press”. Even so, the South African press 
carried a vast amount of legal baggage on its journey towards a post-apartheid society: 
 Especially ironic was that for all the power the security laws granted the 
government, South Africa’s security situation was far worse in the 1970s 
and the 1980s than when the laws were first introduced starting in the 
1950s. In the absence of a solution to the country’s political problems, 
even the far-reaching South African security legislation could not hope to 
contain political opposition in the long term.61 
Tyson [1993] considered the battle of an authoritarian regime against an independent 
press as becoming, over the years, a game of chess in which both sides knew most of the 
gambits: 
Each side was too wary to try all in a single blow ... Instead, the general 
pattern was for the authoritarian crocodile [P.W. Botha] to lash its tail and 
snap its jaws, and hope that the press, with an irritated push from the white 
establishment, would fall into the water in terror. The press, however, 
would woo the public, then pretend to feed the crocodile a sacrificial meal 
− which usually turned out to be an empty bag of bones.62 
 In the period immediately before the transition and continuing through into the post-
apartheid era, the South African media faced continued pressure to curtail press freedom. In 




Disillusioned by a lack of career opportunities and low pay in journalism, many left the 
profession for more lucrative jobs in newly created government positions.  
 Print Media Association of South Africa warned in April 2001 of South African 
government plans to form an independent Media Diversity and Development Agency 
(MDDA) to regulate the media industry. The PMA feared it could lead to political 
interference with press freedom and responded to earlier comments by the Minister in the 
Office of the Presidency Essop Pahad who complained that the South African media were still 
suffering from a colonial mentality.  
 Pahad complained that the media only represented a narrow range of interests which 
did not do enough to cover communities marginalised by gender, race, disability and the 
broad democratic movements that fought against apartheid.63 
 In its 2001 annual survey on world press freedom, Reporters sans Frontiers also 
targeted Pahad’s criticism of the national press and complaints that the South African 
government was a victim of systematic hostility from the press. In February 2001, while 
reaffirming his attachment to press freedom, Pahad denounced the “irresponsible journalism” 
of certain publications: 
We face a situation that is almost unique in democratic countries. The 
ultra-majority political tendency in South Africa represented by the ANC 
[African National Congress] does not have the slightest representation in 
the media.64 
 However, Reporters sans Frontiers found that on the whole press freedom was still 
observed in South Africa even though tension between the media and the State President had 
become frequent. Throughout 2001, the South African press fiercely criticised the diplomatic 
and Aids policies of President Thabo Mbeki and attracted fierce government hostility and 
accusations of bias. 
 The Freedom House global survey of press freedom in 1999 found that after years of 
apartheid and white minority rule, the democratic government of South Africa was still in 
transition leading to an election later that year. Even after a new constitution was approved, 
the oppressive apartheid legislation, including some 100 laws affecting the news media, 
remained  on the statute books, though not enforced. The majority of the print press — all but 
two of 33 papers — remains in the hands of white owners. The daily and weekly black press 
edited mainly for a black audience. 
 By 2001, the Freedom House global press survey indicated continued improvements 




police, national defence forces, prisons, and mental institutions remained in effect, as do laws 
that may compel journalists to reveal sources.  
 However, these laws are not generally used to restrict the media. A freedom of 
information law was passed in January 2001. Several journalists and media offices suffered 
harassment during the year.65 Although South Africa has one of the world’s most liberal 
constitutions to protect freedom of the press, in 2002 many of the old apartheid era 
restrictions remained in effect such as laws that compel journalists to reveal their sources. In 
addition, the restrictions on reporting matters affecting the police, the national defence forces, 
and other institutions remained in effect and the government was considering an Interception 
and Monitoring Bill to empower the police and defence forces, the intelligence agency and 
the secret service to maintain monitoring centres. The government had already seized 
journalists’ equipment and compelled them to reveal their sources under the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedures Act.66 
Summary 
The National Party’s reign from 1948 was marked by ever tightening restrictive measures to 
control and silence the press. Merrett confirms in 1986 and 1987, an average of one new 
regulation a week tightened the net around vital topics. At issue was the preservation and 
prosperity of the apartheid system. Restrictive legislation, banning orders, states of 
emergency, shutting down and banning of individual newspapers and the imposition of hefty 
fines all contributed to a growing authoritarian culture. 
This chapter has considered the effects of such restrictive measures on the press and the 
way in which the press coped with the restrictions. Harvey Tyson examines the issue in 
considerable depth in Editors Under Fire and offers the view from the perspective of a senior 
Argus executive and editor of The Star, that despite the obstacles placed in its way, the press 
somehow managed to play a meaningful role in society and refused to cower to an 
authoritarian government that demanded support. Tyson’s idea of a meaningful role for the 
press was from the perspective of a white editor who worked on a conservative white English 
language newspaper aimed at a select middle-class Johannesburg readership trying to appease 
politically restless blacks and fending off intense government scrutiny and harassment. A 
seemingly impossible task. 
It is against this background that there emerges conflict. By white standards and in the 
face of such vast government machinery Tyson claims credit for a defiant press while on the 
other hand, blacks who suffered under apartheid felt the press, especially the liberal English 
press, was not doing enough. There were accusations of self-censorship to avoid government 





 In such a repressive era, mistrust and suspicion was rife. Accusations of bias against 
white-controlled newspapers and complicity with the government’s aims were regularly 
made. It is this sharp difference that still retards the development of the South African press in 
the post-apartheid era. 
While there remains significant validity in the argument, it is not simply a case of every 
white journalist or every white editor being a closet racist and in the government’s pocket. Far 
from it. A case of too little too late for some but the efforts of crusading editors like Tyson, 
Donald Woods and Tony Heard in the fight against apartheid cannot be dismissed. Heard, in 
particular, paid a huge penalty for publishing material in The Cape Times that the government 
and his management found undesirable and he was sacked. 
To answer the question of accountability, Chapter Four looks at post-apartheid press 
paradoxes and the same complaints of media control, authoritarianism and government 
threats. But this time it is the black Government of National Unity that stands accused of 
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This chapter reviews the apparatus of apartheid, its impact on freedom of speech and press 
freedom in general and its lingering impact after the disintegration of apartheid in the early 
1990s and the transitional period to its eventual demise by 1994. Chapter Four also highlights 
sharp differences of opinion between the emerging black press and some sections of the 
Government of National Unity, it offers a snapshot of the post-apartheid press and the impact 
of a submission by Independent Newspapers to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
New forms of attack 
By 1994, a new interim Constitution was introduced to guarantee freedom of the press in 
South Africa. On October 11, 1996, a revised new Constitution was adopted and came into 
force on February 7, 1997. It has an extensive bill of rights section headed by a human dignity 
provision which makes it similar to the German Constitution. 
A black majority government was in power and a redevelopment program in place to 
redress the imbalances of the apartheid years. Yet the cumulative impact of years of 
interference, even sustained repression, was hard to dissolve.  Indeed, new forms of attack 
emerged to threaten hard-won rights and freedoms. The ANC-led Government of National 
Unity claimed unfair treatment at the hands of what was still perceived by blacks as a white-
dominated English and Afrikaner national media. In turn, the press responded to what it 
perceived was sustained government pressure on its traditional prerogatives. 
 Mike Siluma [1996] then editor at the Sowetan, believes government criticism of the 
press was a result of both the media and the new government trying respectively to define 
their new role in society. The black press, defiantly opposed to the views and practices of the 
previous apartheid government, now had to review this traditional opposition. In place was a 
black government largely supported by the press. On the other hand, the transition from 
liberation organisation to government and the closer scrutiny of the media attracted 
unwelcomed criticism and led to a complex dilemma: 
 Both sides are grappling with new realities. We are trying to define a new 
role for ourselves (as black journalists). Government is trying to grapple 
with the idea of being in government, working very hard in their view to 
transform society, and to make things better, and everyone continues to 




be above criticism…but I think that this transformation is giving rise to a 
lot of hot air.  
There is a lot of confusion [in the media and government] some people 
still feel that the media should be oppositionist. There are people, black 
journalists who hold very strong political views and who do not agree with 
the ANC for instance, who feel that the whole transformation has been a 
sell-out. And then you have the white editors who are still rooted in the old 
system who want to take a view that the media must distrust everything 
and anything the government does. And then of course you have other 
people who believe you have to support the ANC in the interests of the 
transformation. So there is no universal kind of position the media is 
taking.1 
 In August, 1993, the South African Institute of Race Relations assembled five senior 
black journalists, a leader writer and a prominent celebrity entertainer to consider perceived 
deficiencies in media coverage. The discussions revealed incipient pressures on publication 
which amounted to new forms of censorship applicable to certain institutions and issues. 
Thami Mazwai, a senior assistant editor and business editor of the Sowetan newspaper put it 
this way: 
We have now reached a point where the journalist is told: You are either 
for us or against us. It is sheer political blackmail. Many of us have been 
in jail several times, and we don’t mind going to jail if it is in pursuit of 
what we believe in. I am a journalist and have been one since 1969, and I 
don’t think I am going to write distortion simply because a law has been 
passed by the government. I will take whatever risk I can to make sure that 
the public knows what is happening.2 
Although journalists under the new dispensation were far less exposed to arrest or 
detention and incarceration by the government, they were threatened and manhandled by 
political activists in the townships, and told to “toe the line or else”.  In short, they were 
expected to be propagandists. According to Mazwai at least 50 per cent of newspaper content 
“takes up a particular political position, specific distortions and an attempt to influence the 
reader − the public − to think in a particular direction.” Pressure from the so-called comrades 
− mostly young and poorly educated black political extremists − could be extremely 
persuasive and dangerous for reporters, particularly those considered as “against the 




The weapon being used is to whisper, to spread the word around that so-
and so is against the struggle. Heaven help you should you ever be 
cornered by youngsters. They will make you pay for being against the 
struggle.3 
Connie Molusi, a South African Press Association journalist, ascribed this   radicalism 
largely to political intolerance built up during a period of the mass insurrection era from 1984 
to 1986: 
[This was] when a culture of people’s war was born, which assumed 
ideological homogeneity among black people; and as a result you had the 
formation of street committees pursuing the political aims and objectives 
of particular community organisations. No-one could absent himself from 
those street committees because he would then be declared “an enemy of 
the struggle”, therefore you had to participate even if you were opposed to 
the decisions being made.4 
These “street committees” gave rise to new fears about the integrity and direction of 
the media, causing dangers for working journalists and in some cases threatening staff, who 
invariably lived in the same townships, with death or injury.5 But the growing assault on the 
role of the press in South Africa did not end there. There were rumblings of political pressure 
from the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, and Essop Pahad, a senior ANC member with close 
links to the Communist Party of South Africa. Both adopted increasingly adversarial 
positions, and some newspapers accused them of threatening the media. Pahad was 
particularly sceptical:  
It will take a sea change to convince me that sections of the media do not 
have secret agendas or that some of them have not positioned themselves 
as the political opposition of the ANC. I trust one day they will have the 
courage to state this publicly instead of pretending that they are ‘objective’ 
observers, reporters, commentators and editors.6 
Mbeki raised a more sombre hint of media intervention, urging changes in media 
ownership dominated by whites “who prospered under the former apartheid system and 
therefore were against reforms”. He called for African media to increase reporting on their 
own countries and continent instead of relying on the international wire agencies: 
 Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, the BBC ... what they 
tell us about neighbouring countries, we must do ourselves honestly, 




  The South African President, Nelson Mandela, entered the debate in 1994, arguing 
that the print media had to change and adapt to better reflect post-apartheid South Africa. 
Mandela warned against an unproductive dogfight between government and news media. He 
called for the “expansion and deepening of media freedoms” which should be linked to 
greater access to information and freedom of expression for people disadvantaged by more 
than 300 years of white domination and four decades of apartheid.  
Mandela challenged South Africa’s editors to adapt South Africa’s media structures 
developed under apartheid to fit South Africa’s new democracy: 
What are the perceptions feeding what could develop into an unproductive 
dogfight? It is in the nature of your trade and it is absolutely crucial that 
you should be searching, critical, and even sceptical. At the same time you 
also have to exercise the responsibility of accurately reflecting the hopes 
and fears, the aspirations and apprehensions ... as they exist in society.8 
Mandela’s address was made 100 days after the ANC took government and followed  
growing concern within the ANC that the print media, owned almost exclusively by three 
white organisations, were biased and deliberately antagonistic towards the new black 
government. The ANC complained especially about biased print media comments about 
legislators and ministers accepting lavish perks and pay, including luxury cars and free air 
travel. 
 This growing tension between government and the press was also echoed by Tokyo 
Sexwale, the premier of PWV province, which includes Johannesburg. Sexwale accused the 
print media of trying to undermine public confidence in the new government and threatening 
the initiatives of the Reconstruction and Development Program. 9 
In our view society with all its elements, is constantly changing. South 
African society is changing rapidly. The media must capture and address 
itself to these states of affairs which is aimed at providing better quality of 
life for all our people, entrenching political stability, the reduction of 
crime levels, especially socio-economically related crime, and of course 
serious crimes largely unrelated to adverse socio-economic conditions and 
the creation of a healthy economic climate for both domestic and foreign 
investment. 10 
It was Sexwale’s thinly veiled threat that caused ripples of concern in the national 
press: 
Let us well, rectify an incorrect perception that suggests that the business 




Media should reflect fairly on the entire society … the media must be seen 
to be critical of itself. When shall we hear media self-criticism? 11 
What Sexwale alluded to was the need for the media to be more critical of its own 
reporting and behaviour, and for the media to be more aware of the needs of a transitional 
post-apartheid society. However, in the white dominated press Sexwale’s comments were 
interpreted as a sinister threat to the role of the press and an attack on its criticism of 
government and the Reconstruction and Development Program. The Freedom of Expression 
Institute also challenged the statements by Sexwale, interpreting it as an attack on free speech. 
 The FXI expressed fears that the statements could be construed as fertile grounds for 
restricting certain sections of the press critical of the government and demanded clarification 
as well as a reaffirmation of the government’s commitment to freedom of expression 
generally and press freedom in particular. 
This episode from the Premier of the PWV region provided yet another avenue of 
concern and an attack on the news media in South Africa. To interpret yet another paradox in 
the long struggle of the South African press for political and legal tolerance of its freedoms, it 
is necessary to go back to the dismantling of apartheid structures. 
Beginning of the end 
As President, F.W. De Klerk ushered in a new era which ultimately transformed South 
African politics, seemingly pointing as well to profound change in the national media. In a 
momentous speech to Parliament on February 2, 1990, De Klerk announced the 
Government’s declared intention to normalise the political process in South Africa without 
jeopardising the maintenance of good order. 
 With this announcement came dramatic changes: the lifting of bans on 32 proscribed 
organisations including the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress and a 
variety of groups ranging from Marxist to Far Left, all proscribed previously under the 
Internal Security Act. All publications specifically banned under the Internal Security 
legislation were also freed from bans. The State of Emergency was substantially amended and 
relaxed. The effect on the national news media was not immediately apparent despite the 
easing of some regulations that now permitted publication of news about unrest and riots. 
Some controls were maintained over the right to publication and police retained the right to 
restrict journalists from restive areas, but restrictions on photographs of unrest were lifted.  
 The changes ushered in by De Klerk did not immediately free up the national media, 
whether English, Afrikaans or alternative. Despite some notable concessions, for example 




Weekblad received its registration fee of R30,000 plus R9000 interest dating to 1988 when the 
fee was first imposed. In 1991, New African received R20,000 plus nearly R14,000 in interest 
payments but efforts to suppress the news continued. This was especially so in the KwaZulu-
Natal region where legislation existed to exclude journalists from specific areas.  
Under the Natal Emergency, passed into law on June 8, 1990, the security forces could 
still restrain journalists from entering and reporting on what was happening in restive areas. 
Provision was made for detention of up to six months for breaches of the legislation. By 
October 18, 1990 it was dropped in favour of a comprehensive new law, incorporating the 
Unrest Areas under the Public Safety Amendment Act, which included 19 magisterial districts 
and 27 townships in the Transvaal alone.12 The government continued to use its Emergency 
regulations, especially to pursue the radical Afrikaans weekly, Vrye Weekblad. 
 It chose to use   powers under the Emergency regulations rather than the Defence Act 
which required more specific amendment. In the changing environment of the early 1990s, 
with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, the move towards the first non-racial general 
elections and later the installation of the ANC-led Government of National Unity, the role of 
the media and the easing of restrictions would have resulted in an unprecedented free flow of 
information. But this was also a torrid period of change for the mainstream and the alternative 
press. 
 The Argus Group moved to acquire the Cape Times, and the Sowetan changed owners 
and was acquired by a black consortium of businessmen. Consequently, the concentration of 
media ownership was marginally reduced. It was a difficult period for the alternative press 
with New African  folding in 1992 and Vrye Weekblad  less than two years later, in February 
1994. It also signaled the end of the radical academic monthly magazine Work in Progress.  
The Mail & Guardian, started in 1985 by Anton Harber and Irwin Manoim, struggled on as 
an independent but failed to crack the big mass circulation market dominated by Independent 
Newspapers’ metropolitan English-language newspapers. 
New masters, old conflicts 
In post-apartheid South Africa during the 1990s and leading up to the first non-racial general 
election, emerging as it did from decades of oppression and harassment of the print media, the 
expectation was that better days were ahead for the traditional watchdog role of newspapers.  
But this was not to be.  
The complaints came quickly and they came from across the political spectrum. The 
common theme was that the national print media, more particularly the liberal English 
language print media, was not doing its job properly. Newspaper criticism of government 




reports on rising national crime figures, the slow response by the government to improve 
housing and basic facilities such as domestic electricity and water supplies, fraud and rorts by 
government officials were interpreted as an attack on the black government by a “white press” 
unable or unwilling to come to terms with the new political dispensation. 
 There were accusations from the ANC-led government that the English press was 
protecting vested interests and big business that thrived under apartheid, and that it also had a 
hidden agenda that ran counter to the aims of the new administration. Now the complaints 
came from a black government. 
From the leading partner in the Government of National Unity, the African National 
Congress, came complaints that the national media was slow to change and even slower to 
embrace the new order, antagonistic towards the government, and largely staffed by the 
agenda setters of the old regime. The implications clearly were ominous that the white 
dominated print media was reluctant or tardy in its efforts to reshape to meet the new 
challenges. 
It was a complaint based on unfairness and lack of balance. The criticisms levelled 
against the press included being unsupportive, and even dismissive, of government attempts 
to improve the lot of the victims of apartheid, an almost obsessive focus on the nation’s 
spiralling crime rates and its effect on foreign investment, a tendency to ignore major 
instances of white-collar crime, and generally negative, confrontational approach to 
government initiatives. The ANC complained especially about what it perceived as biased 
comments about legislators and ministers accepting lavish perks and pay. 
On the other hand, the National Party accused the ANC of trying to manipulate the 
national news media to be a supportive and uncritical lapdog. The print media, for its part, 
complained it was being pressured by the government, suffering because of poor government 
communication networks and, in some departments, an absence of formal government 
communications structures. 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who accused the media of perpetuating its apartheid 
era role of criticising the government and looking for crises, said the media could guarantee 
its own freedom by helping to ensure that South Africa’s fledgling democracy became a 
strong and stable society. It was “quite correct” to seek to ensure that the press was not 
controlled either overtly or covertly by government and that it remained independent “but one 
could not view press freedom outside the context of freedom of society generally”.13 
Mandela also raised the issue of growing confrontation between the new government 
and  the press. He admitted that after only a brief period, relations between the government 




assurance that he believed a critical, independent and investigative press was the lifeblood of 
any democracy and had to be free from state interference. But he said it was “clearly 
inequitable that in a country whose population is overwhelmingly black, the principal players 
in the media have no knowledge of the life experience of that majority”.  
Mandela’s comment sparked criticism from media organisations who viewed it as a call 
for some sort of affirmative action to dilute the upper echelons of the media and reflect 
national diversity. The National Party immediately accused the ANC of trying to manipulate 
the media while the interim constitution, the Bill of Rights and guarantees of freedom of 
speech were still being formulated. The ANC replied that it had no lessons on media freedom 
to learn from the South African media barons, again accusing the media of lagging in the 
transformation process and calling for radical change to ensure the free and accurate flow of 
information. 
Kaizer Nyatsumba, political editor at The Star, conceded Mbeki’s complaints about an 
unrepresentative national media were justified. He suggested, though, that the government   
was in many ways to blame for how national unity was portrayed. Nyatsumba offered three 
examples of how the government failed in its efforts both to lobby and to keep the media 
informed of its basic programs, its difficulties and its plans for the immediate future. 
 The first  involved a proposed informal briefing program by which senior government 
officials and Ministers could get to know the political journalists writing editorials and 
comment pieces about them. This was an initiative by The Star based on the British 
parliamentary briefing sessions. Nyatsumba saw this as an important opportunity both for 
political journalists and politicians: 
 For us it is an opportunity for an off-the-record briefing with the political 
movers and shakers, and for them it is an invaluable opportunity to interact 
with our political writers ... And yet the response was not exactly 
overwhelming.14 
The second weakness identified was simply the government’s failure at many levels to 
communicate at all:  
Among those represented here are ministries which have a non-existent 
media profile. Perceptions of Government non-delivery abound in the 
townships and frustrations growing in some Government circles, and this 
leads to accusations from some top Government figures that the press does 
not communicate sufficiently to the public the good things the 
Government of National Unity does to bring about change. Reality, 




which are simply not aggressively communicating their successes, limited 
though they may be, and not explaining what problems they encounter and 
which may impact on the rate of delivery.15 
The third complaint involved coverage of important overseas trips by the President and 
his deputies and the government’s failure to accommodate news media in the travelling party. 
“We don’t want to travel and be accommodated free of charge; we are more than happy to 
foot our part of the bill,” Nyatsumba said.16 Arranging individual itineraries for journalists 
however, was often difficult so formal visits were either not covered or covered less fully than 
they might have been. These were all legitimate complaints, the government conceded, and 
promises were made to rectify the shortcomings in government information. 
  Rumblings persisted about threats to media freedom in the new administration and 
complaints about a lack of media diversity and ownership. Mbeki said, though, that the 
government remained committed to “the policy of transparency and accountability to the 
citizenry” and the rights of “members of society to participate fully in the shaping of the 
destiny of our country”. He reiterated the aims of the Reconstruction and Development 
Program:  
The government fully recognises and accepts the role of the media to be a 
critical commentator on government activity. The media should be beyond 
the control of government. They should at all times retain the right to 
determine how and what to cover. For the media to reflect the needs, 
desires, and views of society, they must remain independent. Having said 
this, the question rises in sharp focus: are the relations between media and 
government of necessity hostile? Our own view is that such a relationship 
is not generic to those two institutions. Hostility must, I believe, derive 
from the pursuit of agendas that are inherently hostile to each other ... We 
cannot afford a situation where the majority of our people are mere 
consumers of information and opinion whose content is determined by one 
sector of society. The people out there are crying out to be heard.17  
With the majority of the country illiterate, the penetration of the print media was 
estimated at only around 5 per cent of the population. According to Mbeki, the use of the 
electronic media, particularly radio, appeared the most viable outlet, especially to the rural 
poor. 
 Recalling the intensifying of media repression almost 20 years earlier [see Chapter 2], 




leading force in government and for as long as it existed, it would resist any attempts to  
undermine the independence and the integrity of the media: 
We have inherited a media which reflects in its ownership and control 
many of the economic distortions of our apartheid past. It is a situation 
which mitigates against the free flow of ideas and the airing of a broad 
range of views and ideas ... Some people have attempted to portray our 
stated position as a challenge to media freedom. Nothing could be further 
from the reality. The position which the ANC has expressed on several 
occasions over the last few years … is intended to enrich media freedom 
and give it real substance.18 
This spirit of goodwill soon evaporated. A year after Ramaphosa’s declaration, Deputy 
President Mbeki was pessimistic. He accused the four major newspaper institutions in South 
Africa of going slow on implementing the previously disadvantaged program. Between them, 
these institutions controlled more than 80 per cent of the South African print media market. 
Yet staff recruited under previously-disadvantaged (affirmative action) programs were almost 
non-existent, black journalists were few, and blacks occupying higher levels in the companies 
were even fewer.19 
 Beeld, the Afrikaans paper owned by Nationale Pers, offered in-house training for 
reporters with a marginally successful affirmative action recruitment program. Two black 
reporters were employed in the news room − one at Beeld in Johannesburg, the other at Die 
Burger in Cape Town. Nationale Pers editorial manager Dolf Els said it had difficulties 
attracting black reporters to an Afrikaans newspaper for obvious reasons. In addition, many 
black people were unable to write in Afrikaans, did not have the required entry standards of at 
least a diploma or a first degree.  
At Rapport, another Nationale Pers publication, there were no training programs for 
journalists. Business Day (Times Media Ltd) had three black reporters out of 17 on its finance 
side and four out of 16 news reporters. Business Day had no specific affirmative action policy 
but preferred locals (or South Africans) for journalistic vacancies, provided they had the 
necessary skills. The Mail & Guardian had five black journalists but the editor, Anton Harber, 
said the independently owned paper had trained dozens of young blacks but they were 
poached by the bigger news organisations.   
These were either reluctant or slow to start their own training facilities for journalists 
from black and coloured backgrounds. The Citizen, owned by Perskor, had no affirmative 
action program or training facilities for young black journalists, but had some interest in 




 At Independent Newspapers, emphasis was placed on training all journalists but 
focused on potential reporters from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Independent Group led 
the way in training and appointing affirmative action candidates, for example, the first black 
editor at The Cape Times, Moegsien Williams. The group had five editors in Natal, of whom 
three were Indians, and there were two black deputy editors.  
The government’s appeal for an aggressive affirmative action policy was supported by 
the editor of the Sowetan, Mike Siluma, a former labour reporter at The Star and one of the 
few black journalists to work in the Argus company’s London bureau. Siluma said   a “whole 
backlog of neglect” characterised black journalism in post-apartheid South Africa, and skills 
of black journalists had to be enhanced. 
He agreed that “the strengthening of a democracy is partially the role of the press, and 
freedom of expression does not mean that reporters are unaccountable.20 Greater consultation 
with government would help media stakeholders”:  
 If you assume that a democracy needs an effective press to assist civil 
society to make informed decisions and ask intelligent questions, then we 
need to ask ourselves what is our role. If you assume that proprietors run 
commercial enterprises and are profit driven and we, as reporters and 
editors, are involved because we want to inform people, then we need to 
find some common ground because our objectives are far removed from 
[government].21 
This great divide between government and the press and the conflicting objectives of 
journalists on both sides of the colour line, and effects, of a predominantly white newspaper 
ownership was a driving force towards establishing an emerging black press. A black 
consortium, New Africa Investments Ltd, led by Soweto medic Dr Nathato Motlana, was 
formed to secure all or part of Anglo American’s 48 per cent stake in Johnnic, a strategically-
placed media company. Among other core assets of Anglo, this company included 
Omnimedia which in turn owned Times Media Ltd, the smaller of the two leading English 
language newspaper groups. Included in this Group were titles such as the Sunday Times and 
the Financial Mail, as well as some magazines. 
 With a prospect of new black ownership looming, Times Media Ltd editors moved 
swiftly to incorporate a new editorial charter “as an appropriate means of preserving the 
traditions within TML”.  Johnnic and Omnimedia explained why: “With Anglo American 
having been the custodian of newspaper publications for about 50 years, there is a sense that 
they would want their traditions preserved”.22 This drew sharp criticism from black journalist 




Mazwai, it confirmed the desperation of some white editors eager to cling to the past of white 
ownership. All of a sudden a charter had become a matter of urgency.23 
 The Government’s complaints against the national media reflected a perceived 
reluctance by the white-controlled media to embrace the post-apartheid transformation.  There 
was also an accusation of bias and implied racism, although consistently and strongly rejected 
by editors and journalists on the white English-language papers. They argued that they had 
always been at the forefront of opposition to the apartheid policies of the Nationalists and 
ultimately played a leading role in their demise. While it would be wrong and unfair to reject 
outright the important role many of these newspapers played in the political struggle, it would 
be just as much an exaggeration to suggest that the liberal English press took on the hue of the 
society in which it operated. These were “white papers”, whichever way one looked at it.   
At a Commonwealth Press Union meeting of editors, Reverend Frank Chikane, a 
leading anti-apartheid campaigner closely linked to the ANC and the Mandela Government, 
said that in the new order, there were new roles for the media. He questioned the future of 
aggressive media policy and freedom of the press, suggesting instead a developmental media 
that “helped the national project to develop a just, equitable, non-racial, non-sexist, 
democratic society”. No place for a watchdog here! Chikane also suggested that the national 
press only concern itself politically with the “different views of different parties in their 
debate around the question of the national interest”. Chikane did not define his perception of 
the national interest nor who should define it.24 
Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting Minister Jay Naidoo saw the future of a 
free and independent media in South Africa as based on the willingness of the press to be 
accountable to the community at large and not to the government of the day. Naidoo also 
supported a charter of the press to ensure a code of practice for journalists: 
In South Africa, a stricter adherence to a press charter on the basic ethics 
of professional journalism will greatly strengthen the credibility of the 
press. 25 
Climax of the debate 
Towards the end of 1996, the simmering debate between the government seeking 
transformation of a national media it did not own nor control, and the press accusing the 
government of constant media bashing, reached a climax. 
  President Mandela accused    the press of failing to discharge its duties.  He stridently 
criticised the South African media for failing to expose the role of the so-called Third Force 




“secret agenda” and were doing the dirty work of their bosses by trying to destroy the 
democratically-elected government. The black journalists were pawns because the 
government could not accuse them of racism when they objected to government policies. 
Mandela did not name   journalists whom he said were acting in their own self-interest 
and for promotion. It was a sharp and bitter rebuke, the government’s first stinging indictment 
on the work of South Africa’s black journalists who, in turn, complained bitterly that the 
President had got it wrong. 
The outcry against the president’s accusations was swift and fierce. The Media 
Workers’ Association of South Africa, representing the majority of black journalists in the 
country, said it was “terrified by Mandela’s consistent attacks on black journalists”. The Star 
was particularly fierce in its rebuttal of the president’s claims:  
President Nelson Mandela’s smear campaign against unnamed senior 
black journalists is as unsubstantiated, unbalanced, and ridiculous as that 
waged by the Nats [National Party] during the worst days of the onslaught 
... We challenge Mandela to name these Judases − and their masters. And 
we challenge him to conjure up proof of their dishonesty and cowardice. 
Of course, he cannot.26 
In response The Star provided a centrespread to ANC MPs Carl Niehaus and Tony 
Yengeni under the headline, The Star accused of gutter journalism to address the 
government’s concerns. Three of The Star’s senior black journalists Kaizer Nyatsumba, 
Justice Malala and Newton Kanehema were accused of spreading articles based on 
“misinformed opinion”, “distorted facts”, and in some instances “outright lies”. The editor of 
The Star, Peter Sullivan, was presented as sponsoring gutter journalism. 
The South African Union of Journalists’ president, Sam Sole, feared that media 
freedom was again under threat but from a new direction: 
The frequency and intensity of the attacks on the media by senior 
government figures, including President Mandela, are becoming very 
worrying ... The protection granted to the media in terms of the law can 
come to mean relatively little if journalists face brow-beating or even 
intimidation ... Black journalists are particularly vulnerable, hence the 
attacks specifically against them are of great concern.27 
The Mail & Guardian was puzzled by Mr Mandela’s remarks, taking pride in its 
investigative journalism into the “dirty tricks” and shady practices of the Nationalists. It 




atrocities committed during the apartheid years. The Mail recalled the Vlakplaas terror unit, a 
clandestine security forces group accused of murder and torturing political opponents.28 
 Responding to Mandela’s criticism that investigative reporting on the so-called “Third 
Force” in South African politics was inefficient or neglected, the Mail & Guardian argued 
that its obsessive pursuit of the “Third Force” was commercial suicide and had bored its 
readers: 
To now be attacked by our own president for a dereliction of duty in 
failing to pursue the Third Force, would be painfully ironic, were it not 
laughably so.29 
Ryland Fisher, a coloured editor at the Cape Times, was more conciliatory. In an open 
letter to Mandela, he denied the accusations of bias and rejected suggestions that he and other 
black editors were merely token figureheads appointed to appease public and government 
concerns while doing the work of their white masters. Fisher rejected allegations that in the 
three years that the Government of National Unity was in power, the bulk of the national 
press was working towards the demise of the ANC. 
I did not expect to be told that I was part of a “counter-revolutionary” 
conspiracy, nor that I was a token. I plead not guilty on both counts.30 
Fisher countered that the transformation for black newspaper editors was as challenging 
for him and his colleagues as it was for the new government and that if they were failing in 
their duties then it was by design: 
 [I] would readily admit that my colleagues and I sometimes fail in our 
duty to inform the public properly. This is not because of lack of trying, 
Mr President. It is also not due to conspiracy, complicity, or connivance, 
but because of less flattering reasons such as ignorance or our inability to 
always understand our complex society properly.  
I think that most white journalists at English-language newspapers are 
trying to understand a part of our society from which they were legally and 
forcibly separated over many decades. At the same time, I believe that 
black journalists at these papers are committed to make sure that our 
newspapers begin to reflect this part of our society which has not been 
properly reflected in the media.31 
The post-apartheid press − a snapshot 
This account of the post-apartheid period has focused so far on the general cut-and-thrust 




white in its orientation. The arguments articulated somewhat randomly in the mid-1960s were 
refined and strengthened in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Before looking more closely at the dialectic of the TRC, it is helpful to give a further 
snapshot of the structure of the national press as it had evolved to the mid-1990s. In essence, 
it was a near-monopolistic market in which 1.3 million newspapers were sold each day, a 
market with too few players and an awesome grip on the market by Independent Newspapers. 
Few countries in the world could boast such a massive concentration of power, as Cohen 
observed: 
Whether these monopolies employ black or white editors is a very 
important issue ... but what matters more is their power in the market, in 
their extraordinary influence and control over the advertising and 
distribution channels whether anyone else (black or white) could ever get a 
foot in the door.32 
 Of the 1.3 million newspapers sold each day, 57 per cent belonged directly to Tony 
O’Reilly‘s Independent Newspapers or were controlled by it. Independent Newspapers took 
over the Argus group in March 1994. If the Afrikaans press was ignored then 75 per cent of 
all English-language metro daily newspapers sold in South Africa were controlled by 
Independent Newspapers. 
 In the second and third largest cities, Durban and Cape Town, all the morning and 
afternoon metro daily newspapers were controlled by Independent. In Johannesburg and 
Pretoria, where around 580,000 metro daily newspapers were sold each day, Independent 
controlled 70 per cent of the market via The Star, the Sowetan and its stake in the Pretoria 
News. In the East London-Port Elizabeth area, the smaller rival Times Media Ltd group had 
absolute control over the English metro dailies. 
 Unquestionably, Independent Newspapers dominated the national English press with 
much the same power and reach that the Argus group wielded during the apartheid years, 
which its editors had claimed credit for opposing and helping to dismantle. Independent 
Newspapers published in excess of 160 newspaper titles and magazines worldwide. In South 
Africa, Independent was the country’s leading publisher with 31 per cent of the total 
newspaper market and 58 per cent of the English language market. It published 14 daily and 
weekly newspapers in South Africa and also had a 14.9 per cent shareholding in Kaya FM 
Radio. 
 By 1996, there was a dramatic shake-up of South African media ownership. The new 
media barons include former trade unionist and ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa, 




past Inkatha general secretary Oscar Dhlomo and Irish business tycoon Tony O'Reilly. It left 
only two of the country's major commercial newspapers, Die Burger and Beeld, in the hands 
of conservative white South Africans. In the past, the two Afrikaans press groups Nasionale 
Pers and Perskor were unashamedly National Party mouthpieces. 
Independent Newspapers and the TRC 
In the context of transformation in the South African print media, a crucial factor was the 
submission in February 1997 to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Jerry 
Featherstone, the chief executive of Independent Newspapers (formerly the Argus group). 
Featherstone’s expression of regret for the failures, shortcomings and omissions of the 
company was a momentous and historic occasion in the South African print media. 
Furthermore, it indicated a more profound role by the press in the political trauma of 
the apartheid years and their aftermath than had been previously acknowledged. Furthermore, 
it discredited the claims of an influential group of former editors who said they had nothing to 
apologise for.  
While the former white editors felt they did everything within their power and the law, 
the new cluster of black executives considered that the former bosses did too little and that 
often too late. Featherstone lent weight to the argument that the English-language press, 
despite its constant carping and opposition to prevailing Government policy, still fell far short 
of expectations. It was always a white press for, and staffed mainly by, whites. Now, in the 
post-apartheid era, this English liberal press faced a formidable challenge in reflecting the 
totality of South Africa’s mixed heritage, particularly 30 million blacks.   
 Written by a former Argus company executive and retired editor, John Patten, the 
submission’s brief was “to provide an independent and objective overview of Independent 
Newspapers (previously the Argus group) from 1960 to 1993. It sought to identify areas in 
which the company and its staff were either victims or perpetrators of human rights abuses or, 
either directly or by default, played some part in allowing human rights violations to occur”.33  
Featherstone explained that the report recounted the hardships experienced by the 
company’s editors and staff. It emphasised shortfalls in achievement while expressing regret 
for failures. But, he said, there were successes in combating human rights abuses during the 
apartheid years for which the company could be justifiably proud.  
The 55-page document provided valuable insights into the way the largest newspaper 
group in South Africa operated. It was an overview, and not definitive.  While it considered 
mainly the role of the editorial section of the group, the TRC approached the media in its 




illuminating and it is worthwhile to focus on one specific section that goes to the heart of the 
problem 
 Collusion with apartheid 
In the submission to the TRC, under the heading, separate Black Editions [Section 11c], 
Patten said that these had been a sore point with certain black journalists. Although it created 
jobs for black journalists, and some black journalists liked them, it was an unsatisfactory 
venture tinged with tokenism. Senior journalist Mathatha Tsedu said the Rand Daily Mail had 
a black edition called Extra, “meaning by inference that blacks were the extra readers”.34 The 
Sunday Times also had an Extra “which concentrated on lightning strikes and witchcraft 
stories”. Patten had supported the abolition of an “Extra” edition in The Pretoria News, but a 
subsequent editor had reintroduced a separate “Soccer” edition reflecting blacks’ greater 
interest in soccer, while the other edition emphasised rugby to suit white readers. 
Patten had introduced a Metro edition to The Mercury during the 1990s as an attempt to 
provide a Natal paper catering to black readers wanting to read English. Such an edition had 
the potential for hiving off as a separate newspaper catering specifically for black interests. A 
change of ownership in 1993 re-positioned The Mercury as an upmarket newspaper, and the 
Metro edition was abandoned as inappropriate. It was decided then to expand the Sowetan’s 
circulation in Natal to cater for black readers wanting a paper in English.  
 In summary, there were two ways of looking at special editions for blacks. Some 
journalists, like Tsedu, regarded them as apartheid editions. Management and other journalists 
saw them essentially as zoned editions aimed at specialist readerships. There was no 
suggestion of inferiority or discrimination in news selection; only special provision for 
specific reader interests in certain sections of the paper. Ian Wyllie, editor at the Sunday 
Tribune, long resisted a special edition for Indian readers in the Sunday Tribune. He changed 
his mind when the Sunday Times’s metro edition in Natal started making inroads into the 
Sunday Tribune’s readership in Chatsworth, a predominantly Indian area. 
This seemed to show that targeted readers actually supported these editions and sought 
them out, despite the connotations of apartheid. The argument raged on, with the Sunday 
Tribune subsequently abandoning a special edition for Indian readers, and the Star also 
jettisoning its extra edition. Though differences of opinion are very evident, there was no 






Liberals versus liberationists  
As if to deflect accusations of human rights abuses, Jon Hobday, editor of the Saturday Argus 
and the Sunday Argus, observed that the Argus company was always a very conservative 
company: 
It paid conservatively, it took to innovation conservatively. It was a slow-
moving company. To try to class us in the category of pioneers and pace-
setters is a mistake. It was not the nature of the company. It was 
conservative economically. It was conservative in every way. It was an 
establishment company run by establishment people... but that is not to say 
we did nothing.35 
The confrontations of editors with the government, legal wrangles and court challenges, 
harassment by senior government officials, warnings from successive authoritarian prime 
ministers and the constant battle to negotiate a maze of legal hazards and  determining the law 
on an almost daily basis during the 1980s were all well documented and not in dispute. The 
indifference of the Argus company towards equality for all staff, with career prospects for 
black and coloured journalists, implied far-reaching bias in agenda setting and compromised 
the role of the English press in South Africa. It facilitated the complaint that the liberal 
English language press, just as much as the Afrikaans press, was a “whites only” press.   
The role of the newspapers in South Africa, as Wilbur Schramm suggests, reflects the 
society in which it operated.36 So, when Patten quotes Hobday as saying: “…we should 
perhaps have recruited, done the process of getting more people of colour into our news 
rooms earlier”, it may have been the wiser option. The political and social climates, however, 
were just not favourable to integration. Hobday raises some of the ambiguities involved:  
The fact is, I can recall recruitment beginning in the early 1970s, generally 
in association to boosting soccer coverage. But you must remember, black 
reporters couldn’t go anywhere. This was still apartheid. You could hire a 
black reporter, but you couldn’t send him to court, because the magistrate 
would throw him out. So there were practical problems.37  
Certainly, black and coloured were taken on mainly as soccer writers where the white 
reporters either would not go or it was supposedly unsafe for them to go.38 But to suggest 
black or coloured reporters would be barred from the courts is inaccurate. The courts were 
usually filled with black and coloured people, either facing trial or consoling friends or 
relatives.    
In the TRC submission, an unnamed former editor points a finger of blame at the way 




The fault lies in the fact that we were almost exclusively white, male. 
WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant], certainly Western-orientated. 
That was our heritage, that was our system.... It happens that the Western 
liberal press is virtually the only free press in history and on earth. There 
isn’t any other ... It is this very press which reports criticisms of 
themselves. So I think if there is an accusation that we are liberal, that 
does not require defence. It is a fact of life. And it is probably preferable to 
any other ideology.39 
Did the South African press, and more specifically the major English language press, 
operate along the Western democratic model? The Afrikaans press was a party political 
animal, the Government policy was one of authoritarian control and the media was subjected 
to a battery of laws inconsistent with traditions of a vigorous and free press. Under the 
authoritarian concept, diversity of views is wasteful and irresponsible, dissent is an annoying 
nuisance and often subversive, and consensus and standardisation are logical and sensible 
goals for mass communication.40 
This was the objective of the Nationalist government. It was an ideology that the 
English press did not subscribe to, yet it is wrong to suggest that the Argus company operated 
under the Western libertarian model of a free press. Hachten concedes the Western press 
concept is “comparatively rare in today’s world, although many authoritarian governments 
give it lip service”.41  
Whether or not the South African print media in general, and the former Argus 
company in particular, managed to maintain Western standards of a free press in the face of 
extreme  pressure is  largely dependent on political perspectives. 
 Patten summarises this as the difference between the liberationist black journalists’ 
view of what role the media should perform or should have performed, and the more 
traditional liberal view maintained by the editors stressing maximum objectivity and balanced 
reporting whatever the circumstances: 
I believe it is of key significance in considering this report to take note of 
the two main vantage points from which the issue of human rights abuses 
under apartheid is being viewed from within Independent Newspapers and 
in press circles. So fundamental is the division of opinion based on these 
separate agendas that it can colour the whole field of assessing arguments 
presented from both sides in this report. Unfortunately, there is little 
common ground between them in handling the apartheid issues (though 




a full democracy), resulting in a so-far unbridged chasm between the two 
schools of thought when looking back at many of the fraught issues of 
those times.42 
 Patten concluded that the difference could be summarised briefly as the liberals’ view 
versus the liberationists’ view. The liberals’ view was held generally by white editors and 
many of their white staff. The liberationists’ view was held generally by black journalists, so 
it had the added disadvantage of representing a racial divide in the company. 
 It would be seriously defective, though, to suggest that this split along racial lines 
within the largest media group in South Africa was simply the result of clashing media 
ideologies, and a company policy that was more in keeping with British and American 
traditions of the press. The split was more primal. No Argus company journalist could argue 
convincingly that traditional freedom and liberty were also extended to journalists who were 
not white. Whether as crude and petty apartheid policies in the workplace, such as barring 
“non-white” staff from the company canteen, separate toilets for different racial groups or 
simply not extending invitations to black journalists to the office Christmas party, to the more 
esoteric arguments that black journalists were not sufficiently educated for senior editorial 
positions, the divide was clear and pervasive. 
Former Saturday Star columnist Jon Qwelane argued that South Africa’s media owners 
and operators should be made to explain their “naked collusion with apartheid” to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. He argued that “it is not only the manner in which our 
bosses failed us as journalists which must be investigated and exposed but also the hopelessly 
indefensible treatment which they gave the news”.43  However, in defence of the Argus 
company from 1960 to 1993, Patten argued:  
Argus company newspapers supported increased political rights for 
disfranchised groups of colour. It is probable, if individual editors had 
been asked during much of that period for their view on what political 
rights blacks should have, that a variety of answers would have been 
given. It is also probable that most would not have expressed support for a 
simple transfer of power from whites to blacks. But the question would 
have been somewhat academic, in that their editorial policies were 
determined by practical issues of the day.44 
Inequity and discrimination   
Certainly, a wide range of discriminatory practices within the Argus group extended 
nationally from Cape Town to Johannesburg and Durban where the major publications were 




inquiry. Police raids investigated new staff appointments at the Daily News in Durban. 
Editorial intervention at the World and Ilanga in Johannesburg, the two biggest black 
newspapers in the country, meant that black editors submitted to the editorial whims of white 
directors. The Cape Herald was designed as a coloured newspaper, staffed by coloureds and 
aimed at the coloured market in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. There was a separate 
journalists’ cadet course for black journalists because it was felt they could not cope with the 
demands of the Argus cadet school. 
 Concluding, Patten listed 24 points marking the history of the Argus company during 
the most troubled years in both South Africa’s history and the history of its press. 
Considerations of the commercial viability of the company the need to make profits, to relate 
especially to core market readers and to attract advertisers placed limitations on how far the 
Argus Company could go in being a tool against apartheid. It remained first and foremost a 
newspaper chain and did not see its role as primarily political. This may have blunted its 
cutting edge in exposing all the wrongs of apartheid, including human rights violations. 
Apartheid, security and media laws and regulations proscribed or restricted free news 
coverage of newsworthy, but politically sensitive, subjects. This interfered with the function 
of a newspaper as a watchdog of the people in an ostensibly open democracy. 
Laws enforcing separation of different racial groups in many spheres of life made free 
access to a full range of news sources more difficult.45 The laws as such were an interference 
with human rights, making the company a victim, but the company also made insufficient 
effort  particularly in the earlier years of the period under review − to overcome this obstacle. 
It was discriminatory in the staff selection process, particularly as the company did not try to 
make the target market for its newspapers the white community exclusively in spite of its 
historical roots. Laws prevented black reporters from practising freely in large areas of public 
life and this was a disincentive to newspapers employing them.46 In this respect, both the 
company and black journalists were victims of government-generated human rights abuses. 
Besides apartheid, security and media laws, Patten highlights other legislation on 
politically-sensitive subjects seriously inhibited the company’s newspapers in generating 
relevant news. The laws included nuclear matters, fuel supplies and transportation, defence 
matters, police matters, prisons, and even the publication of trade figures with certain 
countries. These obstacles amounted to a human rights abuse affecting the general public and 
the newspapers that served them. Journalists were harassed and intimidated, arrested, detained 
and sometimes prosecuted by police and other agents acting for the government. 
Harassment and intimidation were also applied by agents of the liberation struggle, to a 




by participants in the political struggle for the control of power in South Africa were a gross 
human rights violation on journalists. The violations even overflowed into harassment and 
threats from individuals in the general public. 
Though objectivity was the aim of most of the company’s newspapers, proper balance 
to coverage in the political events was not achieved. Imbalance in the racial complements of 
editorial staffs, judgments made on white perceptions in news identification and news 
gathering, and a white monopoly of news selection in most sub-editors’ rooms, caused   
distortion. 
 In the company’s black newspapers, a reverse situation applied, made more obvious by 
the open commitment of staffs to the liberation cause. Political developments polarised 
emotions in society, and some of this rubbed off on journalists, even though they tried to be 
objective. Black journalists were affected by the many acts of oppression and brutality applied 
to their black communities.  
White journalists were affected by the effects of liberation struggle strategies which 
included bombs in streets, shops, parking areas and restaurants, land mines on country roads, 
sport and commercial boycotts, economic sanctions and disinvestment campaigns. All these 
factors led to human rights abuses on such a scale that journalists themselves were victims of 
those abuses. 
The inherited political situation of enforced racial separation and separate communities 
led to black and white journalists  becoming isolated from,  and disinterested in, communities 
other than their own. With most of the company’s papers mainly white,   news coverage 
concentrated on white political rivalries. Issues affecting blacks were at the heart of many of 
these rivalries, causing them to be covered, but from the angle of white decision-making. It 
was only late in the day that the imbalance in this respect was rectified, as liberation 
movements became centre-stage players in the political drama. To the extent that the 
newspapers cultivated attention to white political rivalries and overlooked full coverage of 
black political aspirations and activities, Patten concluded that the company should regret the 
imbalance that occurred. 
There was a lack of commercial incentive to pursue certain black-interest subjects. 
Advertising support was more evident where white interests were involved. Black readerships 
generally lagged behind white readership, giving blacks a minority status in the company’s 
main newspapers. While this reflected market conditions, it was a distortion of the overall 
national picture, and the newspapers perpetuated that distortion. Though a Press Council had 
been established to prevent government control of the press, it was set up under duress in the 




making the industry partly responsible for its own endangered plight, compromised by 
association with the oppressive government. Not only was it disliked for this role, but it was 
not representative of the whole South African population. 
When editors eventually sought to avoid the restrictions embodied in laws and 
regulations, many loopholes were found enabling the press to do its job better. Such efforts   
were only made on any scale during the emergency regulations applied during the latter 
1980s. This meant the press languished under laws it could possibly have evaded if efforts 
had been made earlier. Some editors of smaller newspapers such as The Daily News, in 
Durban, The Eastern Province Herald, in Port Elizabeth, and the Diamond Fields Advertiser, 
in Kimberley were less willing than others to test the limits of legal restrictions the 
government imposed on the media.  This situation meant some human rights abuses were not 
addressed when they might have been. 
A major problem in assessing culpability on human rights abuses arose from the 
different agendas of liberal journalists as opposed to liberationists. There was friction over 
what were considered realistic political rights for disenfranchised groups. Argus company 
newspapers, while steadfastly opposing apartheid, pursued gradualist goals within white 
politics for many years before opting for constitutional settlement through negotiation with all 
representative groups. This led to accusations that it kowtowed to apartheid. 
 The alternative press showed the Argus Company had to some extent lost touch with 
the oppressed masses. Participation in government news conferences, briefings, and 
conducted tours subjected the company’s news gatherers to naked propaganda.  
Though this was identified and countered to some extent, it was not always possible to 
counter-balance such propaganda equally, because of lack of sufficient access and contacts 
with liberation movements. The company applied the government’s petty apartheid laws on 
its premises, and this was broken down in some cases only by black disobedience action in 
the face of abuse from other company employees. 
For many years the company’s newspapers followed the practice of publishing the 
names only of white accident victims, while mentioning black accident victims as statistics. 
This was discriminatory.  
Argus management appeared not to trust black editors with full editorial responsibility 
for their newspapers. While this was probably done to protect the business from threat of 
government closure (and some closures did occur), it was a paternalistic practice that caused 
bitterness among black journalists. Although not dismissive of the problems of white 
companies and white journalists under an invidious system, Patten’s report in total portrayed a 




Voices of dissent 
The   response to John Patten’s report was as quick as it was bitter. More interesting in many 
ways was the difference between emergent black editors and the recollections of the “Old 
Guard” white editors from the apartheid years. Even before the report was made public, 
Harvey Tyson, a prominent Argus editor, rejected accusations of complicity and any need for 
a public apology. In a public outburst, Tyson asked what gross violations of human rights did 
South Africa’s English language press commit between 1960 and 1993, then proceeded to 
answer:  
Speaking for myself, I worried throughout all the years of legalised racism 
about not doing enough as a professional, trying to be a balanced 
journalist, or enough to help save the oppressed from violations of their 
rights.47 
In deflecting the pointing finger of guilt, Tyson argued that journalists had perhaps 
themselves to blame. Their petty squabbles within the mainly-white English language press 
were partly the cause of the huge divide between the liberals and the former liberationists. For 
his part, he did not believe he owed   any apologies:  
I shall never apologise for a single thing I did as a journalist. I feel no 
guilt, only pride in the record of the Star, with which I was associated for 
more than 20 years.48 
Three former editors of the Argus company John O’Malley, Ian Wyllie, and Michael 
Green rejected the apology by Independent Newspapers in a statement entitled We Stand By 
Our Record: 
Independent Newspapers, which is based in Ireland, played no role in 
public affairs in South Africa before 1993, when it bought control of the 
Argus company and changed the name to Independent Newspapers. It is 
therefore, in our view, inappropriate that the directors and chief executive 
of Independent Newspapers should apologise for actions for which they 
were not responsible.49 
 The triumvirate denied that the conduct of their newspapers was cause for apology to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.50 The English press was the strongest visible and 
legal critic of government excesses during the period of review.  
  Shortcomings were perceived as the result of oppressive and restrictive laws 
introduced by the government “with the express intention of muzzling the press, laws which 




four decades of  constantly opposing, criticising and challenging National Party apartheid 
policies, exposing injustices, cruelties and wrongdoing:  
Our newspapers were by no means specifically white-orientated. For the 
past 40 years they have had a very large number of readers from other 
sections of the community. This was one of the reasons why we did all we 
could to employ and advance black editorial staff, though this was often 
difficult because of the lamentable education policies of the National Party 
government.52 
There were few black journalists who could accept this proposition. More importantly, 
the claim that these newspapers were not white-oriented because they had large numbers of 
readers from other sections of the community hardly strengthened the argument. 
Rafiq Rohan, political editor at the Sowetan, seriously challenged this claim with some 
personal recollections of his experience as a   rising star within the Argus group in the 1980s.  
Then, he was convicted and jailed as a member of the ANC’s military wing uMkhonto 
weSizwe [Spear of the Nation]. Rohan was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on Robben 
Island and says he did not receive a single message of support from his employer, Post, a 
division of Natal Newspapers: 
My golden boy status came crumbling down in the eyes of my white 
overlord at Natal Newspapers. From star status, I became a source of huge 
embarrassment to the bosses. During my time in prison, while awaiting 
trial, my colleagues at Post-Natal were forbidden by the editor to visit me. 
I was allowed visitors only on Mondays and Thursdays and staff were 
warned not to visit me during working hours. Working hours were the 
only time I was allowed visitors. Staff were not amused. Only after they 
had written a stinging letter to my editor, did he shamefacedly put in an 
appearance at the prison.53 
 Rohan said his release from prison in 1991 further tested the good faith of the Argus 
Group and gave clear indications why most black journalists regarded it as supine during the 
apartheid years.  He did not get his job back.  As Rohan told the TRC: “The irony of it all was 
that my avowed enemy at the time, the apartheid state, had seen fit to pardon me yet my own 
company had seen fit to put me back on trial!”54 
 The deputy editor of The Star, Rex Gibson, wrote a leader page article stating that if it 
were up to him to decide, he would banish Rohan to a back room “where he would not be able 
to tamper with the news”. Rohan’s attack on the Argus Group’s record and the way it 




concerned it was always a “white” employer and the market was clearly white-orientated, 
even if it sometimes provoked the more extreme elements of the Government. 
The aftermath of TRC 
In the late 1990s, the Government was apprehensive that the very fabric of society in the 
emerging democracy in South Africa would be threatened by a combination of extreme social, 
economic and political problems. These genuine fears were underpinned by massive socio-
economic problems facing the Government of National Unity.  
 Such massive difficulties could ultimately undermine the fragile democracy if the 
ruling African National Congress failed to deliver a better life for its millions of supporters. 
The role of the national media was closely linked to how this problem could be resolved. This 
was the sort of rationale used by Nelson Mandela, as when he established a commission of 
inquiry in March, 1998, to investigate leaks. It was alleged that the government faced possible 
revolt, and that unnamed sources plotted to destabilise and eventually overthrow it. This, 
however, was later proved untrue. 
At a news conference in July, 1997, Mbeki said it was “quite clear that if corruption in 
the police, the judicial system, the prisons services, and the Department of Home Affairs is 
not stopped, you could have a collapse of the entire democratic system”.55  He warned that 
crime was halting investor confidence and damaging the economy.  Pointing to evidence of 
extensive corruption in the police and criminal justice systems, he contended that greed was 
not the cause of the problem; rather, a lack of commitment to a democratic South Africa. 
Major crime syndicates included security force members from the apartheid era. Mbeki 
painted a chilling vision of a struggling democracy in crisis and almost on its knees. This was 
a major problem not only for the Government, but it also has serious ramifications for the role 
of the national media in a time of crisis. The media was independently owned, guarded its 
independence jealously and pursued a vigorous watch on government.  
For the new black government, it was too vigorous. Constant negative press was 
unhelpful and undermined government initiatives to speed up social change. More than that, 
the vigorous watchdog role of the press stirred accusations that it was a media campaign 
designed to embarrass and undermine the black government by showing it was unable to 
govern.  
Under normal circumstances, there would have been nothing wrong with this approach. 
It is traditional of the Western media in developed democracies. The response from the South 
African press was that it was simply doing its job. The South African Government, though, 
accused the national media of pursuing a hidden agenda of undermining the new government. 




burden of censorship or government restraint. There were as many problems, though, with 
adopting a developmental media framework that aimed to work towards some loosely defined 
national interest as there was pursuing a vigorous Western libertarian media approach. 
Summary 
Sharp differences between the national press and the new black Government of National 
Unity escalated almost immediately with high-profile ANC leaders accusing the press of 
maintaining a hidden agenda by working against the aims of the new government. Chapter 
Four has revisited the simmering conflict between the ANC-led government and the white-
dominated media. Attacks on the press by Nelson Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki 
accused the national press of being bitter, conservative and out of touch with black society.  
 The ANC government was urging a more compliant and sympathetic national press, 
which reflected its inability to cope with fiercely critical, sharp scrutiny. 
 Mandela angered both black and white journalists by accusing newspaper owners of 
manipulating and using black journalists to give greater credibility to their attacks on the 
government and to avoid charges of racism. The reaction was predictable with the South 
African National Editors’ Forum rejecting the charges. But the government maintained its line 
that the media remained in the hands of conservative whites who found it difficult to reconcile 
themselves with the fact that a black democratic movement had destroyed white supremacy.  
This chapter has also focused briefly on the Truth and Reconciliation’s inquiry into the 
media and the submission from Independent Newspapers to the inquiry expressing regret for 
any failures, shortcomings or omissions by the company during the apartheid years. 
A group of former editors opposed and criticised the apology from Independent 
Newspapers chief executive Jerry Featherstone and said they had nothing to apologise for 
during their years as editors of the Argus publications. 
  This chapter highlights the sharp distinctions between the government, journalists and 
media companies about the role of the press in an emerging democracy, the perceived racist 
bias of the national press, and the difficulties in trying to transform the landscape to what 
Mandela refers to as “more representative of the black majority, both in ownership and 
staffing”. And as a consequence, Thabo Mbeki’s veiled threat to the media to change or be 
changed. 
 In the following chapter, different media systems in operation around the world are 
considered. The objective is to canvass lessons from the most workable systems and to 
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TOWARDS A FREE PRESS 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to consider a variety of media systems and ideologies in practice 
and to consider whether there is a way to facilitate a workable solution to find new directions 
for the press in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter also reviews sharp criticism from 
senior ANC-government members who accused the press of orchestrating a hidden agenda to 
destabilise the fragile new government, and responses from sections of the print media 
accusing the government of trying to nobble the press.  
Authoritarian controls or developmental approach 
The hallmark of the authoritarian concept of the press is that it is strictly controlled by the 
government. The authoritarian model seems to be the preferred policy of Third World 
countries and totalitarian regimes to control the flow of information and regulate the 
operations of the national press for what is considered to be “in the national interest” − as was 
the case with the National Party government that was in control in South Africa from 1948 to 
1993. 
 Hachten [1994] found that the basic principle of authoritarianism was quite simple: 
the press was always subject to the direct or implied control of the state or sovereign. A 
printing press or a broadcasting   facility cannot be used to challenge, criticise, or in any way 
undermine the ruler. The press functions from the top down: the king or ruler decides what 
shall be published because truth (and information) was essentially a monopoly of those in 
authority.1 
 The authoritarian theory can be traced to the mid 15th Century and Johannes 
Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type which made printing possible. The rulers had a 
monopoly over the printing press virtually from inception, and press freedoms were won only 
after centuries of struggle. It was a logical extension of the theory by which monarchs ruled 
by divine right or absolute power. 
 Merrill [1991] considers the authoritarian model, first presented in 1956 by Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm in Four Theories of the Press, has not faded with the waning of 
monarchies. Authoritarianism continues to exist in countries where strong rulers wield power. 
And, unpalatable as it is to the Western model of the press, Hachten concedes that there is 
much in Western political philosophy that stresses the central importance of authority in 




From Plato’s Republic through Hobbes’s Leviathan to Hegel and Marx, 
the all-powerful state is given both the right and duty to protect itself in 
any way necessary for its survival.2 
 John Stuart Mill, a fierce defender of a libertarian press and an advocate of virtually 
absolute freedom of thought and discussion in his essay On Liberty, first published in 1859, 
also seems to suggest limited controls over the press:  
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, 
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant.3 
 In the case of the South African press, with its history of media repression, it remains 
an option in the new democratic South Africa to seek ways in which the national press can be 
made to function in a way that is more supportive of national security and survival. If it is the 
aim of the national press to charge ahead in an adversarial way, then perhaps the Government 
can look at ways in which the national media can function responsibly without infringing the 
provisions and guarantees of freedom of information nor threaten the slow process of nation 
building, reconstruction and development.  
 There are options other than restrictive measures which can be pursued to sway the 
press in a different direction without it having to be a sycophantic or a feeble mouthpiece of 
the government. This could include improvements in the way that the government 
communicates with the press, enabling free and easy access to government information, 
policies and ambitions. It could also include measures whereby the press and government can 
find some balance for working in the national interest without the need for censorship or a 
compliant press. Among other options, the press can swiftly correct mistakes and work 
towards reducing claims of bias, distortion, implementing more stringent quality control to 
improve the standard of journalism generally and more specifically providing more training 
and education for journalists.   
  The Western-libertarian model of the press is not without shortcomings and there is a 
long history of basic criticisms against the near monopolisation of information by the major 
Western news services. This criticism does not only come from developing nations where 
governments try to fulfil national, social, political and economic goals and where differences 





 The criticism also comes from developed nations concerned with the imbalance in the 
cross-flow of information and the hurdles faced by journalists reporting from developing 
countries where they are impeded by a lack of access to government, censorship and 
restrictions of various sorts. The pleas for a new world information order are not new. 
However, it is a call that has since fallen from favour. The developmental journalism theory, 
largely denounced by the West, which holds that the media has a role to play in national 
development, stemmed from the New World Information Order debates of the 1960s. It is a 
theory that failed to live up to its expectations and there is general disappointment especially 
from Third World countries where development-orientated news has erroneously been 
equated with government-controlled news. However, some aspects of the developmental 
journalism theory could have a positive impact on the way journalism is practised in the new 
South Africa will be considered in the final chapter. 
 Media theorists also have been challenged by the question of what constitutes the 
ideal Press-State relationship. Siebert et al, in Four Theories of the Press, preferred what they 
described as the Social Responsibility theory of the press although they concede that their 
initial four theories are in fact just derivatives of two basic theories: the Authoritarian, and by 
extension the Communist theory; and the Libertarian theory, and its extension, the theory of 
Social Responsibility. Theodore Peterson [1953] says briefly the social responsibility theory 
has as its major premise that “freedom carries concomitant obligations”. John Merrill [1983] 
argues that uneasiness about the growing power of media owners and managers to control 
information, much as the authoritarian rulers had done in Gutenberg’s day, led Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm to the social responsibility theory. 
 Social responsibility differs from its roots in that the function of the press is to 
provide a medium for discussion of conflict, whereas under libertarianism the press was to 
check on government. And whereas the libertarian theory provides that the media are 
available to all who have the economic means to use them, social responsibility theory holds 
that everyone with something to say has the right to use the media. A third distinction 
between the two theories is that a socially responsible press will be controlled by community 
opinion, consumer action, and professional ethics, whereas libertarianism relies on the free 
marketplace of ideas for its correction.5 
 The social responsibility theory implies recognition by the media that it must perform 
a public service to warrant its existence. It is a theory that draws much of its roots from a 
report published in the United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press under the 
chairmanship of Robert Hutchins, of the University of Chicago. The Hutchins Commission as 
it became known in 1947, studied the American press and assessed articles for sensationalism 




 The Hutchins Commission found that because of the pervasive impact of the media, it 
had gone beyond such libertarian concepts as the search for truth and the right to access to 
information so the Commission determined that “the importance of the press in modern 
society makes it absolutely necessary that an obligation of social responsibility be imposed on 
the Communications media”.7 The Commission demanded that the press not only present the 
facts in a meaningful context but that it should also disclose the “truth behind the facts”. 
Objective facts were not enough, the Commission found. Reporters also had to find out what 
lay behind them and to present the truth of what they had discovered by closer scrutiny and 
analysis.  
 The Hutchins Commission’s plea in 1947 is the plea of the new South African 
government – that reporters not take cheap shots at a number of serious socio-economic 
problems facing the government and which they have little hope of rectifying over many 
years and the plea is that the media present these problems in a meaningful context rather than 
in a sensationalist, muckraking way or in a way that threatens the national interest. 
 Merrill says in recent years many Third World countries have gravitated towards “a 
kind of press responsibility concept which would increasingly make journalism a co-operating 
partner with the governments for the sake of national progress and development”. It is a 
concept which most Western journalists view with caution and suspicion and which they 
reject as threatening the free flow of communication and information.  Since its first 
publication in 1956, Four Theories of the Press has been an influential yardstick in assessing 
media models. It is now quite dated and has been revised by other media theorists. Among 
them, Ralph Loewenstein [1979] who finds the Siebert, Peterson and Schramm typology 
inflexible. Loewenstein revised the social responsibility theory to become the social-
libertarian theory “to be rid of the ambiguity in the original term and to reflect more readily 
the roots of this theory in libertarianism. The new term retains the sense that some regulation 
of the media may be required to ensure public benefit”.6 
 While Ralph Loewenstein and John Merrill tinkered with the four-theory typology 
and offered refinements of the original model, it was Hachten [1981] who offered the first 
significant changes to the four theories of the press.7 Hachten proposed a five-concept 
typology ie. Authoritarian concept, Western concept, Communist concept, Revolutionary 
concept and the Developmental   concept. Hachten holds that “the differing perceptions about 
the nature and role of journalism and mass communication are rooted in divergent political 
systems and historical traditions” and they are broadly reflected in these five categories.8 He 
combined libertarianism and social responsibility into what he called the Western concept and 




 In the context of future options for the South African media in an emerging 
democracy, Hachten’s Western concept and also his Developmental concept offer some 
directions. In the Western concept, Hachten combines the theory of social responsibility with 
libertarianism and he concedes that only a handful of Western nations meet the criteria 
although many pay lip service to the concept. The Western concept, Hachten said, holds most 
strongly that a government – any government – should not interfere in the process of 
collecting and disseminating news.  
 The press, in theory, must be independent of authority, and of course, exist outside of 
government and be well protected by law and custom from arbitrary government interference. 
And so an independent press usually means one situated in a free enterprise capitalist 
economy, enjoying the same amount of autonomy as other private business enterprises.9  
 Hachten concedes the Western news media are not without their shortcomings – 
commercialism, sensationalism, concentration of ownership, triviality, and entertainment 
orientation and he admits that the Western media is not immune from pressure within its own 
governments. He sees some modification of the Western concepts falling under the umbrella 
of social responsibility and a view that the media have clear obligations of public service that 
transcends profits.10 
 Hachten’s Western concept of the press is a distinct deviation from the traditional 
authoritarian controls that developed and evolved during the rise of democracies in Europe 
and North America. An important facet of the Western model is the right to talk politics, the 
right to criticise the government without fear of retribution, censorship or harassment. It 
subscribes to the self-righting principle, the free marketplace of ideas first championed by 
John Milton and others and Hachten lists five characteristics of a free and independent press 
that is found in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Denmark, 
Austria, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Switzerland and Japan. They are:  
1.  A system of law that provides meaningful protection to individual civil liberties and 
property rights; 
2. High levels of per capita income, education and literacy; 
3. Governance by constitutional parliamentary democracy or at least with legitimate 
political oppositions; 
4. Sufficient capital or private enterprise to support media of news communication; 




 By this definition, the press in South Africa meets all the criteria of the Western 
concept of the press. But it is argued that perhaps with the societal complexities and the 
diversity of socio-economic and political problems facing the emerging nation, it is definitely 
the desirable goal but in the interim it can hardly be the preferred option. Is it fair, for 
example, for an ANC government to allow the Afrikaner press to continue as it did before, 
and in doing so undermine and destabilise the efforts of the government or would the 
preferred option be for the government to step in and be decisive by setting temporary 
parameters? 
 In answering this question on the future direction of the South African press, it would 
be prudent to consider the merits or otherwise of press freedom as it operates in democratic 
countries such as England, Canada, Australia and the United States where there is a long 
history of freedom of the press. And by focusing on the peculiarities of the pancasila model 
of Indonesia, there are lessons to be learned from a national media that is controlled and 
operates within strict government guidelines. 
Liberty of the press 
Under the Western or libertarian system, even with its guarantees of non-intervention by 
government in the free flow of information, it is not unusual to find serious infringements on 
the liberty of the press in some highly democratised countries. We should view the theories of 
the press along a continuous line with authoritarian controls at one end and the free 
expression libertarian model at the other extreme with various shades in between.  
For instance, Canada is a highly democratised country with a Western model that 
guarantees freedom of the press. Eaman [1987] pointed out that despite constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of the press, there are in fact many constraints on freedom of speech in 
Canada. He points out that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the new Canadian 
Constitution states that the fundamental rights of all Canadians include “Freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion, and expression, including the freedom of the press and other media of 
communications” (Canada Act, 1982). This ostensibly gives Canadians the same written 
guarantee that the Americans acquired in 1791 by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which declared that ... “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press.” He says: 
But it is not enough, of course, simply to have such words on paper. We 
need to look beyond the letter of the law to the legal and political reality. 
After all, Section 25 of the Constitution of the [former] Soviet Union 
states that “the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law (a). freedom of 




freedom of speech and of the press is subject to a number of constraints. 
This does not entail that such freedoms do not exist, but it does mean that 
that they are not regarded as absolute.11 
 In Australia also, freedom of the press operates by convention rather than 
constitutional guarantees. Australia has a highly developed Western-style libertarian media 
where there is robust investigation and criticism of the government.  
 Freedom of the press is cherished as a symbol of a free and open democratic society 
yet in recent years even the Australian government has intervened, for example, to refuse 
entry to persons whose views it finds offensive or contrary. Among those who were refused 
entry to Australia were the Palestine Liberation Organisation chairman Yasser Arafat (June 
23, 1997), the controversial British historian David Irving (November 8, 1996), Sinn Fein 
leader Gerry Adams (November 8, 1996) and former Black Panther Lorenzo Kom’Boa Ervin 
(July 8, 1997). 
 We turn to Britain, with a history and tradition of fearless journalism and a 
commitment to freedom of communication. The noted media commentator and the former 
editor of The Sunday Times, Harold Evans, challenges the existence of a free press in Britain 
– and by implication, in other democracies.12 
 Evans concedes there are certain freedoms in the UK which are guaranteed by 
convention in what he terms “the half-free press” and he makes a stand for almost unfettered 
freedom of publication and he opposes the impediments of prior restraint, based mainly on the 
situation in the United States where freedom of the press is guaranteed under the First 
Amendment of the American constitution. In Britain, as in Australia, freedom of the press is 
not guaranteed by a Bill of Rights or the constitution but operates with some success by 
convention. Evans seems almost jealous of US press freedoms by comparison. 
But constitutional guarantees of press freedom do not necessarily mean that freedom 
actually exists and, conversely, that there may be freedom of the press without constitutional 
guarantees. Even under first amendment guarantees, the American press remains subject to a 
variety of State and Federal laws.13 Constraints on freedom of the press in Britain which sit 
uneasily with Evans include the rules of contempt of court, the cry of sub judice: 
There are certainly exaggerated ideas about our powers … we must keep 
within the laws of libel, the law of trespass, of slander, of confidence of 
copyright, of contempt of court, of Parliamentary privilege and the 
bureaucrats of the all-purpose chastity belt, the Official Secrets Act.14 
Evans makes a case for the Washington Post’s investigations that subsequently led to 




put the scandal on the national agenda and he makes a case for the abolition of civil contempt 
laws and relaxing the straitjacket of sub judice. 
In Britain, at the point of litigation, fair comment ceases at the risk of prejudicing fair 
trial: “Once a writ is issued there must be no reporting of fact, according to the Law Lords, 
because it might prejudice the issues.” Evans indicates the wide gap in but two legal areas 
between the freedom of the press in the US and the half-free press in Britain. 
John Keane traces the historical basis for the freedom of the press in Britain.15 The 
landmarks of the British struggle for press freedom commenced with the English Revolution 
running through to the works of Milton, Locke and Mill, Erskine’s defence of Tom Paine, 
charged with seditious libel, and continued with the collapse of the licensing system, cheap 
and portable printing presses and the expiry of the Regulation of Printing Act in 1694, which 
led to the publication of the Daily Courant in 1702 as the first daily newspaper. 
Keane identifies four basic justifications for press freedom in Britain: 
1. the theological approach expounded most eloquently by John Milton’s Areopagitica; 
2. the idea that the conduct of the press should be guided by the rights of individuals as 
outlined by John Locke; 
3. the theory of utilitarianism viewed state censorship of public opinion as a licence for 
despotism and as contrary to the principle of maximising the happiness of the governed 
as espoused in the writings of William Godwin and James Mill; 
4. a fourth defence of liberty of the press is guided by attaining truth through unrestricted 
public discussion among citizens.16 Some of this concept is contained in the writings of 
J.B. Priestley and Leonard Busher. 
 Evans embraces the objectives of the British model of press freedom but goes a step 
further than the legacy bequeathed by Milton, Locke and Mill in defence of “the public’s right 
to know”. Evans agrees free expression is a natural right for human dignity and happiness but 
argues it is not enough. The ethic is too much centred on the rights of free speech which was 
alright in the historical context but it is too much concerned with the individual’s opinion. 
 Evans describes it as “more invective than investigative”.17 Lord Windlesham, 
however, suggests “there are evident similarities between people who work in the media and 
people who work in politics”. He argues that the political role and the journalists’ role are 
interdependent, with the balance between them being a matter of fundamental concern to all 
practitioners in the communications environment. 
 He believes the state of the press in the UK is maintained in freedom and although 




ideological standard but by a shifting balance of conflicting interests”.18 All have equal access 
to the media and are regularly briefed by party headquarters and the Parliamentary lobby. 
While discussion must take place and public debate must be allowed to develop in a 
democracy as we understand it, Windlesham suggests ultimately journalists and politicians 
are on the approach that fits in snugly with Evans’ description of the “half-free” press. 
  The press and politics may feed off each other in the public’s interest but the role of 
the press in a democracy is to inform, interrogate and keep the government clean, not to 
pander to government ideology. Windlesham suggests a vigorous exchange between the 
media is necessary and desirable Keane’s fourth justification for freedom of the press ie. that 
the press is guided by the idea of attaining truth through unrestricted public debate but he 
appears “soft” on the idea that state censorship of public opinion is license for despotism and 
contrary to the principle of maximising the happiness of the governed.19 
 He raises the question of media impartiality and agenda setting in the context of 
private ownership and the suggestion hangs that in criticism of the government, freedom of 
the press could reflect freedom of the publishing owner to publish or pursue individual 
interests. And he poses the question: Does the press, I wonder, have any responsibilities 
towards Government as distinct from the community? The inference here seems that an 
unfettered press as guaranteed by the constitution of the United States would not sit very well 
with Lord Windlesham, who appears willing to concede the public has a right to know. It’s 
just a case of how much they should be allowed to know and in whose interest.20 
 Graham, the publisher of The Washington Post, champions the cause of a free press 
as it exists in the United States but in the Guildhall Lectures on freedom of speech she makes 
the important distinction that the British parliament has several mechanisms in place whereby 
the government can be called to account, even ultimately be dismissed − there is Question 
Time in Parliament, and there is a history of official inquiries.21 The contrast between the 
British and the American idea of freedom of the press is grounded in two very different 
concepts of democratic government. The British system has quick and conclusive ways to 
expose and deal with the sins and errors of Ministers. The burden of inquiry does not fall too 
heavily on the press. Under the US system this is not the case. Power is entrusted to officials 
for fixed terms. 
 Graham defends British claims that the American press should be much more discreet 
and tractable because “... unbridled freedom which we assert can easily become a licence to 
distort events, destroy reputations, and inflame public opinion recklessly”.22 
 The former United States president, Richard Nixon would never have been 




function of the American press as “to probe, to ask inconvenient questions, to report fully and 
fairly what is going on, and thus to keep the government accountable. It is an adversary 
system ... less efficient than it ought to be  But it is a necessary job and one which could not 
be performed if the press in America were subject to the constraints which our colleagues (in 
the UK) must operate”.23 
The role of the press under the British system aims at exactly the same virtues espoused 
by Graham. It is what the media in the UK and Australia, for that matter, have always aimed 
at. Whether they do it more or less successfully because the Americans have constitutional 
guarantees on the right to publish, is another matter. The liberty of communication is but one 
of a great diversity of liberties. 
While the Americans can be accused of conducting trials by publicity in the media and 
prejudicing an accused’s right to a fair trial (consider here the O. J. Simpson case as an 
example), under the British constraints of sub judice and contempt of court lurks Harold 
Evans’ gripe of a “half-free British press”. But the problem of a free press versus a fair trial 
has, as Graham describes, “the ring of a genuine constitutional dilemma, a head-on collision 
between two fundamental tenets of our free society”. Without the free and probing press, the 
events and import of Watergate would, in all probability, never have been revealed. 
If any lesson has emerged from the turmoil and tragedy so far, it is that the press in 
America should be more free, not less. More vigorous and more probing. More alert to its 
larger responsibilities − and less easily satisfied with its own performance, says Graham. Of 
course, there is no way of telling but there is more chance than not that corruption on the scale 
of Watergate would sooner or later have been discovered had it occurred in Britain, whatever 
the model of press freedom because things have a habit of coming out − especially when 
loyalties are strained. 
 Freedom of the press revisited 
Freedom of the press at its most basic level is the right to gather and publish details, 
information or comment   without fear of punishment and restrictions or government controls. 
 It can apply to the print media as well as television and radio, magazines, books, 
pamphlets and a range of information materials. The issue of censorship is closely related to 
matters affecting freedom of the press. Governments can [and often do] restrict publication or 
dissemination of information by censorship. It usually works in two ways, (a) by prior 
restraint, whereby the press is restrained from publishing specific material and (b) by 




 In the United States, and in most democratic countries, prior restraint is rare. and any 
restraints on the freedom of the press are vigorously challenged. Freedom of the press is 
guaranteed and protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution. It states that 
“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press”. It is a 
restraint on the federal Government that was made binding on the state governments by a 
Supreme Court interpretation of the 14th Amendment. Even with press freedom guaranteed 
under the US Constitution, the right to publish is not absolute in the United States. 
  There are restrictions on matters that affect national security, obscenity and 
indecency, school textbooks and libraries and restraints on the mass media of 
communications. The US Congress has passed many laws over the years deemed to be “in the 
public interest” that infringed or restricted freedom of the press despite the provisions of the 
First Amendment that was first ratified as part of a Bill of Rights in 1791. Academics remain 
challenged by aspects of the First Amendment and articulate a vision for the future where the 
First Amendment remains important, but no more important than other rights. And political 
leaders regularly put forward proposals that seek to amend the First Amendment or would, for 
example, censor the Internet, or decide what television programs should be watched. Among 
ordinary citizens too, there is unease about speech that is too free. 
 Donna Demac [1998] finds two centuries after its ratification, the First Amendment is 
under threat. Huge libel awards and other forms of litigation, Demac finds, are weakening the 
inclination of the press to carry out its watchdog function. Demac says: 
Courts often consider press coverage to be inimical to the goal of fair 
trials. The federal Government and the Pentagon want to control what 
journalists report during military conflicts. The country’s youngest 
journalists − that still in school − are often denied the very rights they are 
taught about in civics classes. To make matters worse, the American 
public seems to have developed a suspicion of the press that breeds 
tolerance of disturbing developments.24 
Demac says the American press certainly bears some responsibility for these attitudes 
that show an erosion of public support of the First Amendment that has reached “alarming 
levels”. She blames a tendency towards sensationalism, a rush to report unsubstantiated 
statements and other forms of sloppy reporting that continue to weaken the relationship 
between the press and the public. 
 The media should be − and routinely are − taken to task for their shortcomings and 
lack of accountability. Yet it should be kept in mind that freedom of the press does not require 




government restrictions will not improve the quality of journalism. Such actions, she says, 
would only serve to make the press more timid, which in the end will work to the detriment of 
everyone in a democratic society. Freedom of the press is one of the grand themes of 
American liberty. The ability to report on government behaviour and contemporary events 
without fear of official censorship or retribution is indispensable to democratic self-
government.25 
 However, levels of intervention, or censorship, differ across countries and remain 
essentially a political decision dependent on the level of political freedom of the citizens. 
There is no denying that there are instances where public debate can lead to conflict, national 
instability, or security issues that place the national interest at risk that could require some 
intervention in the dissemination of information to the public.  
The levels of intervention are what matters and gives cause for concern in some 
countries. What works in one society is not necessarily beneficial in all societies. So, it is not 
only the claim of Asian nations such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia who proclaim that 
the Western model of the press is not a suitable model for them, it is also the claim of African 
nations where the imperative is to reduce poverty and hunger before freedom of the press. The 
Western model has its faults. The Asian approach of control and censorship also has its faults. 
For the South African media, there is a unique window of opportunity to reshape the way in 
which the press can operate by using as a yardstick the prevailing media systems in other 
countries. 
A developmental approach 
Gordon Jackson [1993] offers a detailed and comprehensive analysis which he describes as 
rewriting the map for the new South African press and in deciding what kind of approach the 
post-apartheid press would have to contend with and he suggests newspapers will be called 
upon “to draw maps that differ as their land continues to change” and this must also be seen 
against the background of the ground rules by which the authorities will allow them to 
operate.26 
 Jackson looks to the major press theories, authoritarian, libertarian, social 
responsibility, and Soviet Communist styles as well as developmental journalism. In assessing 
the future of the South African media, of the five systems, Jackson immediately rules out as 
unsuitable the libertarian system and the Soviet Communist style “because each has minimal 
prospects of being embraced”, the authoritarian, social responsibility and the developmental 
modes appear to have more prospects of being embraced.27 
 Jackson suggests one of the three models may be accepted yet it may even be a 




Berger who also suggested a combination of media systems can be the answer to the future 
directions of the South African media. Jackson maintains that the system that will actually 
emerge will correlate very closely with the kind of political changes that occur. He says: 
 A black government might also promote developmental journalism, 
seeking to use the press with some level of compulsion to advance 
government policies, especially on economic, racial, or ethnic issues. 
Because of South Africa’s apartheid history, a black government might 
well forbid the media from carrying racist material, however that might be 
defined. Proactively, the government might implement subsidies to benefit 
some financially weaker newspapers.28 
 He feels that the developmental approach will have little chance of success although 
it may be the plan of the government to seek to use the press with some sort of compulsion to 
advance government policies, especially on racial and ethnic issues or economic matters. This 
is quite tangible because the new government does not own its own newspapers nor does it 
have a sympathetic media such as benefited the National Party. 
 However, there is a strong and well established tradition in the mainstream press of 
independent journalism and a developmental approach will militate against the aspirations of 
the press as well as interfering in the process of freedom of speech. The press is likely to cling 
to the social responsibility approach for as long as possible and Jackson maintains this is the 
correct approach. But he concedes it is not to suggest that the social responsibility model has 
served South Africa flawlessly in the past and should continue unchanged in the future. 
The point here, however, is that despite the South African press’s evident 
and ample shortcomings, whether in the mainstream or alternative 
segments, developmental journalism as a whole offers little to redress 
these weaknesses. Elements of developmental journalism are indeed likely 
to be incorporated into tomorrow’s press and ought to be welcomed. But 
any future government that decreed this approach to be the marching 
orders for the press would not only be misguided but also meet intense 
resistance.29 
 Jackson  points out that only the most naive would expect South Africa to move 
rapidly and smoothly towards a markedly more open and democratic society. He says: 
 Not only is that unlikely to occur soon, but the press is equally unlikely in 
the near future to enjoy the freedoms typically marking most Western 
societies. The press is thus likely to function under a hybrid model, 




adapted to South Africa’s realities. For the country is itself a strange 
hybrid, with a mix of First World and Third World components. 
Accordingly, its press system reflects the tensions of many papers aspiring 
to follow the social responsibility system while operating in a clearly pre-
democratic society. [This was written in 1993]... One crucial factor 
underlies how the exact mix of these three models will take shape. Will the 
press be regarded − by the government, the public, and perhaps the press 
its self − as primarily a First World or a Third World institution.30 
The question is then how can one expect to operate the media by First World 
standards in a Third World society? Jackson answers by saying: 
 When it comes to the press, however, it seems the editors and journalists 
desperately hope that they can maintain what has primarily been a First 
World model, knowing that newspapers might increasingly operate as if 
they were running according to Third World standards ... If those in the 
press conceded that it was indeed changing into a Third World institution, 
it would be virtually impossible to adhere to its previous standards. Worst 
still, if editors openly acknowledged that their papers could be evaluated to 
Third World standards, that would open the way to, and even legitimise, a 
wide range of government anti-press actions, Government officials could 
say: ‘We always said you people in the press had unrealistic expectations, 
now that you’ve admitted our country’s Third World needs and special 
circumstances, these are the ways we all need to work together for the 
national good.31 
 Jackson admits such a development is not only a logical step but it would seriously 
curtail independent journalism in South Africa. This was a valid observation before the 
historic political transformation in 1994, but with the benefit of hindsight and ten years later it 
is clear that the press in South Africa did not slip into the mould of a Third World media 
operating in a Third World environment. Despite its many failures and shortcomings in the 
post-apartheid era, the national press has struggled yet continued to maintain its role as a 
public watchdog. And in answer to Jackson’s question, the post-apartheid press is regarded 
primarily as a First World institution that struggles with a government that views its actions 
with suspicion. The mainstream press, bolstered by the provisions of the Constitution, 
operates independently without direct government intervention. At times the relationship 
between the government and the press has been fragile and strained but there is no threat of 




 The Indonesian press model of a developmental media system during the Soeharto era 
may hold some lessons for the press in the emerging “new South Africa”. The noble 
aspirations of a press that was forced to operate under strict government guidelines 
determined by the national interest was a system flawed in its execution. However, it evolved 
from a developmental into an authoritarian model that served to hide government excesses 
and was forced to cover up graft and corruption under the rule of President Soeharto. 
 Backed by the powerful military, Soeharto established his New Order regime through 
which he tolerated little dissent in the pursuit of political stability and economic growth. 
Among the significant changes included were changes to the national press system and the 
introduction of the philosophy-driven pancasila press. 32 
The five tenets of pancasila are: 
1. Belief in the one and only God: this principle of Pancasila confirms the Indonesian 
people’s belief that God does exist and it is embodied in Article 29, section 1 of 
the 1945 Constitution. 
2. Just and civilised humanity: This principle requires that human beings be treated 
with due regard to their dignity as God’s creatures. 
3. The unity of Indonesia: This principle embodies the concept of nationalism, of 
love for one’s nation and motherland. 
4. Democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations 
amongst representatives: This principle embodies decision making through 
consensus and with a deep sense of responsibility. 
5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia: This principle calls for the 
equitable spread of welfare to the entire population. 
The role of the national press is central to the aims of pancasila. The principle of 
pancasila democracy is the ideology of the State and the life philosophy of the Indonesian 
people. This was a shift towards a unique and radically different press system. It was also a 
major element in the process of nation building. Soeharto described the role of the press as an 
important institution since the beginning of independence and he viewed the press as having 
an integral role to play in developing Indonesian society, the nation and State. At a National 
Day address in 1988, Soeharto explained: 
The press has an important role to assist in managing this nation in all its 
complexity through the dissemination of news, opinions, ideas, grievances, 
and hopes to the masses. In other words, without the national press we will 




ourselves. It is in this respect that the press has a role to play in helping 
build and preserve our unity and cohesion as a nation.33  
Soeharto warned that a successful press would accelerate efforts to achieve national 
targets while a press which did not achieve its role would “no doubt delay the attainment  of 
identified targets” and  he urged the national press to adhere to and to support the slogan 
“positive interaction between the press, the government and the people”.34 
Explaining the role of the media in Indonesia, Soeharto commented just before the 
elections of March 1997 that there was no room for political dissent in Indonesia. He said that 
critics of his government did not understand the country’s political system and he warned that 
the globalisation of information and economic activity was in some ways posing a 
tremendous threat to the nation’s unity. 
The free flow of global information has brought people in all countries 
closer to those in others. This enables people to receive foreign values that 
can erode their sense of nationalism. So extreme is the impact of foreign 
influence in some people they no longer care about maintaining their 
nation’s unity.35 
The role of the media in Soeharto’s New Order Indonesia had a determined role to play 
in maintaining national unity and stability under the principle of pancasila.  
However, during the Soeharto era legislation and government intervention kept the 
Indonesian media under strict control with demands for the press to act only in the national 
interest under the broad political umbrella of pancasila. Soeharto did not hesitate to shut 
down newspapers or magazines, or use the censor’s pen to restrict the free flow of 
information when he considered the boundaries of tolerance were exceeded and the national 
interest was being undermined or threatened.  
But, what exactly was determined as being in the national interest was often unclear. 
The effects of such repressive measures were much clearer. Journalists were  arrested, 
harassed and threatened by the military and many journalists were driven into hiding as the 
Soeharto government ran roughshod over the media to prevent open and independent 
coverage of business and politics. 
Newspapers and magazines that once dared to challenge the establishment by reporting 
on the Soeharto family’s business deals have been shut and reporters remain in fear of their 
lives if they dig too deeply into the country’s financial troubles, rampant cronyism in business 
and corruption in high office. This repressive media policy has been blamed for exacerbating 
Indonesia’s economic and social problems. It has also provided the impetus for widespread 




free fall that led to widespread changes and political instability and national unrest. The 
argument here is not whether the media had any influence or impact on the turbulent events in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia, but rather whether aspects of the pancasila press such as its focus on 
nation building and issues of national interest holds any worth for the press in South Africa.  
 The Indonesian, and by association, much of the Asian doctrine of journalism 
challenges the fundamental Western theory of journalism that incorporates among other 
things a free flow of ideas , the public’s right to know, reporting fully and fairly about what is 
going on in government and in so doing keeping government’s honest and accountable and 
the population suitably informed. By contrast, this theory sits uneasily in the developing 
nations of Asia and elsewhere where the attitude towards the media is developmental in 
theory. Unfortunately, in practice it remains more authoritarian. 
 Hemant Shah [1996] suggests because of the negative connotations associated with 
the term developmental journalism it is preferable to replace it with the term emancipatory 
journalism to facilitate recognising “a role for journalists as participants in a process of 
progressive social change”.36 Shelton Gunaratne [1996] expands Shah’s point in the context 
that “communication can contribute to participatory democracy, security, peace, and other 
humanistic principles that are at the core of the discourse on modernity.” 
  Emancipatory journalism requires not only provision of socially relevant information 
but also journalistic activism in challenging and changing oppressive structures; gives 
individuals in communities marginalized by modernization “a means of voicing critique and 
articulating alternative visions of society”, and encourages “journalists to abandon the role of 
neutral observer while reporting in a manner that is thorough, deeply researched, and 
historically and culturally grounded, and that promotes social change in favor of the 
dispossessed”.37 
Public journalism model 
Spawned in the United States from 1993 to 1997, the concept of public or civic journalism 
developed as a controversial experiment in a push to reshape the way news is presented. At 
the heart of public journalism is the aim to connect newspapers with the community in a 
mutually beneficial way. 
 A core element is the belief that journalism has an obligation to public life and that it 
is an obligation that goes well beyond simply telling the news or unloading the facts.  
 Developed out of a perceived need to reshape American political reporting, Jay Rosen 
[1998] singles out Washington Post political commentator David Broder as among the first to 




belief that “the [political] campaign and its contents are the property of the candidate” and 
newspapers should show new leadership in the way politics was reported. 
What can I do? My answer is tentative and expressed without any great 
confidence. But if we are going to change the pattern, we in the press have 
to try deliberately to reposition ourselves in the process. We have to try 
and distance ourselves from the people we write about  the politicians and 
their political consultants  and move ourselves closer to the people that we 
write for  the voters and potential voters.38 
 According to Rosen, it was Broder’s leadership and foresight “that had some tangible 
effects, most notably in the experiment that has come to be known as civic or public 
journalism. Driven by media research foundations – mainly the Pew Centre for Civic 
Journalism in Washington, the Kettering Foundation, and the Knight Foundation who 
between them provided funding for research, conferences and experiments in the field, Rosen 
finds much was accomplished in the years 1993 to 1997 when “public journalism” or civic 
journalism came to the attention of the American press. Rosen states: 
The profession had some trouble coping with this development because 
public journalism was not a single phenomena, but a broad pattern of 
activity that moved in many directions and relied on a multiple sources of 
support.39 
 Public journalism attracted a great deal of criticism, in particular the elite press which 
attempted to dismiss the experiment as a gimmick or fraud but as one of its main advocates 
Rosen finds that  “even the most shallow critiques revealed where the critic stood on some 
key questions: What does civic purpose mean in journalism? What should the power of the 
press be used for? What’s the best way for this profession to serve democracy? What is the 
role of a journalist?”40 
 Another major advocate of public journalism, newspaper editor Davis Merritt [1994] 
says public journalism is “about fundamental, cultural change in journalism; about attitudes 
and traditional concepts that no longer serve either us or our communities well” and that 
journalists must move beyond simply telling the news, journalism can improve public life, 
and news organisations can become more than reporters and recorders of events.41 
 Skjerdal [2001] suggests that although public journalism was a reaction to a particular 
American struggle with democracy, this kind of journalism can be exported to other parts of 
the world as well since the fundamentals are assumed to be universal.42 As a vehicle for 




where the press faces growing antagonism for the way it reports politics. (This aspect will be 
revisited in the concluding chapter.) 
Washington Post executive editor Leonard Downie is among the many critics of public 
journalism and he challenges both the methods and the motives of public journalism: Downie 
says: 
Too much of what is called public journalism appears to be what our 
promotions department does, only with a different kind of name and a 
fancy evangelistic fervour.43 
And the ombudsman at the Washington Post, Joann Byrd agrees: 
The goals of civic journalism can be accomplished without compromising 
journalism’s important principles. It does not help the community or the 
paper to have the paper acting as a booster or as champion of its own 
agenda. Communities always need a paper that can stand back, take 
the long, broad view of the conflicts and the possibilities and avoid, 
in service to the whole community, taking sides.44 
 The aims and objectives of public or civic journalism correspond in some 
ways to the objectives of developmental journalism with its focus on agenda setting 
and community upliftment but there are serious divergent principles. Developmental 
journalism focuses on nation building and the role of the media in developing countries. It has 
its origins in the New World Information and Communications Order movement driven by 
UNESCO in the 1970s and its central theme was that the national media could be used by 
developing countries to build themselves. The media has a role in nation building. But in most 
cases, the objectives were overlooked by developing countries who preferred to interpret it as 
a way of controlling the national press and this was where the developmental theory and the 
developmental practice was on a collision course. Civic journalism is a return to the aims of 
developmental journalism, but instead of the media being used to push the government’s 
agenda, it is used to push the people’s agenda. Civic or public journalism can be described as 
an experiment to “democratise the media” and making the media responsive to the needs of 
the community.45 
A broad spectrum of media theories and models have been canvassed here with a view 
to providing options for the press in South Africa to be distinctly different to the authoritarian 
controls imposed elsewhere in Africa. The history and tradition of freedom of the press in 




authoritarian government controls. Journalism is a hazardous occupation in most African 
countries and the environment is hostile. 
 In 1980, about 90 per cent of black Africa’s daily newspapers were either government 
owned or controlled by the government or a government corporation in at least half of the 
nations of Africa, as of 1980, no privately-owned or commercial press of any kind exists. This 
is either through the actions of government or a lack of investor capital and finance. 
Wilcox points out that most of the newspapers in Africa are directly under the control 
of the information ministries of the various countries and of the 38 independent sub-Saharan 
nations, 14 nations have only one daily newspaper while five nations − Chad, Gambia, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Rwanda − have no daily newspapers.46 Nigeria has a law under which 
journalists can be prosecuted if they publish anything that could bring public officials into 
disrepute, notwithstanding that the reports which they write may be true.  
Uganda considers itself to have a relatively free press by African standards. It has in 
place a constitutional guarantee of the right of access to government information. But in 
practice, freedom of the press is a myth. The national press is government controlled and 
stringent limitations are imposed in an effort to muzzle the press. Journalists are also routinely 
arrested on flimsy charges as a way of intimidating and stifling a vigorous press. And in 
Ghana, the national  constitution protects freedom of expression, which theoretically affords 
some guarantee of press freedom yet the country’s libel laws are flexible to the point where 
the state is allowed to arrest and punish journalists for criticising the government. 
 Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia all protect freedom of speech in the constitution but in 
all three countries, journalists have been jailed for sedition, libel and defamation. Military 
rulers in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia have rejected court rulings and suppressed 
press coverage by executive decree. 
In Botswana, the government keeps the state-controlled media in place with onerous 
censorship legislation similar to the Section 205 legislation that was so viciously used by the 
National Party during the apartheid years in South Africa.  
And, any attempt to emulate the Indonesian pancasila model of the press is fraught with 
dangers for the transformation of the print media in South Africa. Despite the dubious appeal 
of some aspects of commitment to the upliftment of national ideology, it is a restrictive and 
oppressive system in which cronyism and corruption flourishes with impunity. 
The unrealistic demands of government and the influence of the military and Soeharto 
placed an onerous burden on the investigative role of the national press. For all its lofty 




much of what was bad and corrupt in government to flourish because the role of the media 
was not that of keeping the public informed and keeping government honest. 
Constitutional directions 
At the heart of South Africa’s transformation to a new democracy is the country’s new 
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press is guaranteed 
under the provisions of the Constitution. For this reason it is timely to consider the rights to 
free speech and a free press. 
Section 16 of the South African constitution provides for freedom of expression: 
Section 16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which 
includes: (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive 
and impart information and ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) 
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
And it further states: 
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to: (a) propaganda for war; 
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is 
based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement 
to cause harm.47 
Constitutional Court directions 
A suggestion that some sort of limitations upon the freedom of the press would not be out of 
place was raised by the president of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Justice Arthur 
Chaskalson. In an address to the Commonwealth Press Union’s biennial conference in Cape 
Town in 1996. Justice Chaskalson pointed out that South Africa was engaged in a brave 
struggle to establish democracy.  
 He warned that the difficulties in the way of obtaining that goal were very real and 
should not be underestimated in a country with a history of denial, deprivation and 
oppression.48 
 He argued that there was in place a framework for democracy in a constitution that 
guarantees open government and fundamental rights but added “we must breathe life into that 
framework, give substance to the rights that are guaranteed, and establish a culture of 
democracy”.49 The press will be intimately involved in that process, Justice Chaskalson says, 
and so too will the courts. And, he warns that the two will sometimes clash. What do we mean 




Do we mean that the governments ought not to interfere with the press 
through legislation or other means designed to curb its activities and 
secure a compliant press? Or do we mean more than that; that the law 
should also recognise the special role of the press in a democratic society 
and allow it the space and freedom that it needs to fulfil that role?50 
 Justice Chaskalson concedes a free press is an indispensable pillar of democracy and 
he says there can be no doubt that the law should be sensitive to the importance of a free and 
independent press, and in particular, to the needs to protect it against government actions that 
threaten such independence. But he queries whether the press should be privileged by the law 
and, if so, in which respects he asks, because it is a complex and much more difficult 
question. 
 By illustration, Justice Chaskalson points out those journalists who are particularly 
concerned to protect their sources almost at all costs, and rightly so. But what is to be done 
where the information sought from a journalist is needed for the investigation of a serious 
crime? Justice Chaskalson says: 
This is a frequent bone of contention in South Africa where journalists 
invariably refuse to provide such information to the police. When that 
happens the media tends to portray the conduct of the police or the 
prosecuting authority in attempting to obtain such information as being an 
invasion of a universally recognised right, yet the converse is true, for 
almost all countries have and enforce laws requiring such disclosures to be 
made. 51 
 In the past the South African courts have adopted a fairly rigid and strict approach to 
refusals by journalists to reveal their sources. Even during the social unrest, riots and protests 
that swept the country in 1976, it was often unnecessary for the police to demand that 
journalists reveal their sources. Many white South African journalists, reporters and 
photographers rode shotgun with the police patrols into the riot-torn townships and in this 
cosy relationship journalists would be provided safe haven and easy access to police accounts 
of the unrest.  
 In exchange, photographers would hand over their photographs so that police could 
more easily track down community leaders whom they described as agitators. This is an 
aspect that would in all probability be denied by the liberal white English press. It is, 





 But there were times when some journalists refused to comply and refused to disclose 
their sources. South African courts have always held that such material is not privileged and 
that the press has no immunity against search warrants or subpoenas.  
 However, in post-apartheid years this has been somewhat relaxed because under the 
present constitution it is not yet clear what the implications of the constitution will be on this 
issue or whether, in fact, it will result in greater protection being given to the press against 
subpoenas and search warrants than has been the case in the past. 
 Justice Chaskalson says information in the hands of journalists is not necessarily 
confidential information and he says that confidential information is not necessarily 
privileged information, pointing to other relationships in our society eg “priests, doctors, 
psychologists and others who are often recipients of confidential information yet their 
interests are subordinated to the overriding principle that the public interest requires the 
prosecution of crime and the co-operation of all people to be able to give material evidence 
needed for a successful prosecution”.52 
 It is in this direction that Justice Chaskalson raises the complexity of freedom of the 
press − freedom which must be pointed out is still freedom within bondage, there is nowhere 
to be found absolute press freedom − especially in the context of a struggling and developing 
nation coming to terms with democracy: 
 There can be no doubt that attempts to procure information from 
journalists in order to mount a criminal prosecution gives rise to sensitive 
and difficult issues ... I raised the question, not to answer it, but to 
illustrate the complexity of according special rights to the press. Press 
freedom cannot be seen in isolation; it impacts on other rights and interests 
and has to be balanced against them. The problem, as far as the law is 
concerned is according to what principles, and how, should the balance be 
achieved ... Rights are never absolute and press freedom is no exception to 
this rule. Press freedom does not entitle journalists to trample upon the 
dignity and privacy of others; a constraint that some journalists and 
newspapers are reluctant to acknowledge.53 
 Despite constitutional guarantees on press freedom, the media in South Africa has 
continued to face difficulties when reporting on matters of national importance. Assaults on 
journalists have become common place, increased pressure from political parties intent on 
influencing the media and repressive legal provisions have all contributed to the difficulties 





Hazards and limitations 
Issues of confidentiality and the protection of sources remains a major hurdle with on-going 
legal action setting the limits of confidentiality for the media and defining the role of 
journalists. A case in point is the efforts of the Directorate of Special Operations who 
subpoenaed editors of The Cape Times, Reuters news agency, Cape Argus, Associated Press 
news agency, Die Burger, South African Press Association, and the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation to hand over all photographs, video footage, notes and transcripts 
pertaining to meetings, gatherings and demonstrations of an anti-crime and drugs vigilante 
group, PAGAD, in Cape Town. Five senior members of the group People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs faced charges of murdering a leading gang boss involved in the drug 
trade. 
 Cape Times photographer Benny Gool refused to testify for two reasons: first because 
of his profession, it conflicted with constitutional guarantees on freedom of the press and 
would compromise him as a journalist if he were to reveal his sources. Secondly, Gool feared 
for his life. 
 He complained that witnesses in this particular case were “being killed left, right and 
centre”, police were forcing him to testify under threat of prosecution while not even 
affording him any security. 
 The South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) objected and argued that the 
subpoenas were in breach of an agreement reached with the ministers of justice and safety and 
security as well as the national director of public prosecutions. The undertaking recognised 
the need, under appropriate circumstance, to protect media sources and information. 
 SANEF chairman Mathatha Tsedu described the dilemma: 
We go into situations where we present ourselves as journalists and people 
allow us into these situations because they know we will respect their 
confidentiality. If we are called to testify, then we may as well be police 
consultants.54 
 The simmering feud between the press and government dramatically raised the levels 
of mistrust and animosity with the South African National Editors’ Forum expressing growing 
concerns and fearing that the relationship had gone beyond a tolerable and accepted point and 
fearing that it could damage South Africa’s young democracy. This led in 2001 to an historic 
meeting of the editors forum and Mbeki and his Cabinet to try and resolve their differences. 
Tsedu, as chairman of the group, put the case for SANEF: 
We feel there’s a fundamental misunderstanding of the role and the current 




fully and accurately reflect the transformation process. This is a pity, 
because the truth is, South African editors do not disagree with President 
Thabo Mbeki’s definition of press freedom.55 
 Tsedu debunked government complaints of media bias and misrepresentations, 
pointing out government inadequacies in communicating policies and programs and “an 
inclination to resort too easily to media bashing when failures and mistakes are reported”. 
And he called for a more transparent and open administration: 
At the administrative level, the core problem is poor communication 
between government and the media. There is a gap between our 
expectations of each other and the reality. Journalists need but often don’t 
get quick responses and access to the right people at the right time. The 
problem is exacerbated by poor performance of government media liaison 
officers as well as a lack of understanding by some of them of the basic 
tenets of journalism and how the media works.56 
And, in a provocative note, Tsedu chided the government: 
In the end, the expectation of both ordinary members of the public and 
government on what the media in South Africa can deliver, must take 
cognisance of the economic environment in which we operate. It would 
indeed be foolhardy for a government hell-bent on a capitalist market 
system to expect the media that operate in that environment to deliver or 
operate on the basis of an agenda that is essentially socialist.57 
Promoting free expression 
The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) is a South African-based non-governmental 
organisation dedicated to opposing censorship, and promoting the rights to free expression 
and access to information. It was formed in January 1994 following the merger of two 
organisations involved in campaigning for freedom of expression during the apartheid years, 
namely the Campaign for Open Media and the Anti-Censorship Action Group. The FXI also 
established the Media Defence Fund to sponsor freedom-of-expression court cases on behalf 
of media representatives who are not able to afford the legal costs. An analysis of the cases of 
censorship handled by the FXI in 2001-2002, pointed to the following trends: 
•  Censorship is on the increase: Censorship is definitely on the 
increase, with more and more limitations on freedom of 




•  Public and private sector censorship on the increase: Not only 
is censorship taking place at the level of the state; there is 
increasing number of cases involving private sector censorship, 
especially company censorship of employees. 
•  Recourse to apartheid legislation becoming more 
commonplace: Public and private sector bodies are making 
increasing use of the legislation and practices of the former 
government, where apartheid legislation that is still on the statute 
books is invoked to effect censorship against journalists and 
ordinary citizens. 
•   New censorship provisions being introduced in legislation: 
Apart from invoking apartheid legislation more and more often, 
there is also increasing evidence of the democratic government 
introducing censorious provisions in new legislation.58 At the 
World Conference Against Racism, held in Durban during 
September 2001, concerns were raised that new legislation would 
be used to suppress the media. A proposed Interception and 
Monitoring Bill that would empower the police, the national 
defence forces,  the intelligence agency and the secret service to 
“establish, equip, operate and maintain monitoring centres” aimed 
at combating terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, also raises 
concerns for its impact on press freedom. 
 In April, 2002, the South African government announced plans to form an independent 
Media Diversity and Development Agency (MDDA) to stimulate the development of 
community media. The proposed Bill was attacked by the Print Media Association of South 
Africa which feared it could lead to political interference in the media. [The Newspaper Press 
Union (NPU), established in 1882, restructured itself on December 1, 1994 to become the Print 
Media Association (PMA).]  Brian Pottinger, as spokesman for the PMA, said: 
The proposed mandate for the MDDA is broad, which then creates a legal 
entity with much wider powers of investigation, lobbying, intervention and 
advocacy in virtually every area of publishing The wider the powers for 
MDDA, the more it sets itself up as a target for potential sectarian political 
appropriation … there is a definite threat to press freedom if the draft 




 Shaun Johnson [1997], at the time editor of The Argus and later group managing 
editor, also takes up the question of press freedom in his editorial column and asks: 
 Will the government and, more importantly, the people, accept and 
endorse a definition of media freedom akin to that of the world’s 
successful democracies in the late 20th century, a definition which is 
predicated on a delicate but vital balance between true independence and 
genuine responsibility. The question is not banal, as recent exchanges 
between media and the government have shown. There remains a 
philosophical chasm over what precisely constitutes “acceptable 
criticism”, and what is subversion or treason.60 
 Johnson says two extreme positions have developed between the government and the 
press and somewhere in between rests the case for a new relationship between press and state. 
On the one side the government accuses the national press of disloyalty and antagonism on 
the other side the media accuses the ANC government of showing signs reminiscent of the 
previous government.  
Simplistically, one side of the coin shows a situation whereby the corridors of the 
fledgling state power (where portraits of apartheid’s architects still hang in less travelled 
thoroughfares), many  in government grow impatient with the demonstrably imperfect media  
– but conclude that the failings are not the result of human frailty and the frustration of 
gradually transforming inherited institutions, but of conspiracy “to undermine the 
transformation”, in the angry words of President Mandela. 
 For their part, some in the media quickly equate signs of growing adversarialism 
between media and their government with a return to the pre-1990 era: ‘The ANC is behaving 
just like the Nats did’ school of thought. The conflict cocktail is potentially wicked, but both 
positions are wrong.61 
  Johnson denies there is a widespread conspiracy plot against Mandela’s black 
government although he concedes some individuals in different quarters of the media may be 
pursuing such an agenda. And he rejects the notion that legitimate ANC government with its 
commitment to freedom of the press and its guarantees under the constitution can be 
compared to the illegitimate government of P.W. Botha with its many restrictive rules and 
regulations. As for the future, Johnson accepts that there are at the present time crucial 
philosophical differences between the government’s and the media’s definition of what 
constitutes proper media freedom. He says: 
 We can predict that these questions, among others will form the nub of 




long as private sector media remain within the law, the appropriateness of 
the content they choose to publish must be judged by consumers and 
advertisers, not government? 
•  Will it be accepted that criticism of government, even particularly 
robust criticism, does not necessarily indicate disloyalty to the new 
democratic society, but is part of the duty of a free media? 
•  Will it be accepted that a view sincerely expressed, even if it is wrong, 
has the right to be expressed? 
• Will it be accepted that while the private media should and do have a 
role to play in nation-building, this should never be equated with blind 
loyalty? 
• Will it be accepted that media groups are sincere about rectifying the 
internal skewness of the apartheid era, and are doing so voluntarily?62 
 These are valid questions that need to be addressed and it forms the nub of the hard 
decisions facing both the media and the ANC-led government and Johnson concedes there 
could be endless permutations to the questions on this basic list and without offering 
suggestions, he says his own view of the debate on the future role of the media is that it can 
only proceed if a greater degree of trust is achieved on both sides – trust in the sense that the 
integrity and bona fides  of the protagonists are accepted.  
This is a crucial issue and while it remains vitally important in the debate, it is far from 
an easy option. Grudges and hatreds still run deep in the South African press and while it may 
be disputed and denied in various quarters, there is still much distrust between black and 
white staff journalists. In addition, attempts to implement an affirmative action program 
generates further problems when black journalists are promoted ahead of better trained and 
more qualified or more experienced white journalists. This adds yet another dimension of 
animosity to the argument. But it is a situation that demands to be settled. 
 At a different level, we hear from the inquiries of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s hearings into the media [1997] that there is still much anger and antagonism 
between white and black journalists in South Africa, there are complaints from black 
journalists that the transformation process is moving too slowly, and that the agenda of the 
metropolitan newspapers still remain by and large the same rather than adapting to the change 
that has enveloped the country.  
 On the other hand, newspaper managements in the English press have reacted with 




in the history of South African newspapers. For the Afrikaans press, however, there seems 
little movement and even less inclination to embrace editorial and managerial changes in 
keeping with the changing face of South Africa. They remain an ethnic, Afrikaner press. It is 
the reluctance of the Afrikaans press, more than any other group, that refuses to move with 
the changing times and that could provide the impetus at some stage for the ANC government 
to implement a media policy that despite the guarantees of free speech under the constitution, 
will force the Afrikaans press, among others, to perform its role in society in a way which not 
only discards the baggage of the past but also projects in a manner that is socially responsible. 
 While the Independent Newspapers group have made rapid and far reaching changes 
in terms of staff development and training, reshuffling the senior managerial levels of the 
group’s newspapers and the appointment of two black editors, Moegsien Williams at The 
Argus  and Ryland Fisher at The Cape Times and various other senior appointments around 
the country, the Afrikaans press has stubbornly refused to budge − just as it also stubbornly 
refused to testify before the Truth Commission hearings into the role of the media during the 
apartheid years. Along this confrontational route signalled by the Afrikaans press, the future 
can only be described as gloomy and it paves the way for action from a government that is 
already totally disappointed with the role of the national media. 
 At an address to the Foreign Correspondents Association meeting in Cape Town on 
November 19, 1996, President Nelson Mandela raised the issue of a (journalism) “profession 
that is itself struggling to redefine its role in a changing society”. And he stresses that the 
media debate, which will continue for many years, “will inform the actual practice, as the 
Fourth Estate transforms itself to become part of the new South Africa both in word and 
deed”.63 
  And he praised the foreign correspondents for bringing with them decades of 
experience about the role of a free press in a democracy and the necessary tensions that exist 
between government and its relationship with the media as well as the dangers that would 
certainly befall government and media alike if such a free press were to cease to exist. 
 Mandela confirms the ANC’s commitments to a free press despite his confrontations, 
especially with senior black journalists whom he accused of not doing their jobs properly. It is 
an altercation with serious overtones which Mandela dismisses as “creative and healthy 
tension between government and the media that is natural in a democracy”. 
 In light of this confrontation, Mandela restates the desire and commitment of the 
government to a free press. He says: 
Firstly, media freedom is not, has not been, and will never be under threat 




This is not merely because of the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights. It is in the selfish interest of the ANC that we should have 
probing, robust and critical media. We cannot change society in a 
fundamental way; we cannot change the state in a fundamental way, if we 
do not have a questioning media to expose the weaknesses of our inherited 
bureaucracy, security forces, judiciary, and indeed the new politicians 
themselves who can easily be corrupted by power. 
Secondly, freedom of speech is enshrined in our basic law of the land, as 
elsewhere in the world, not as an exclusive right belonging to this or the 
other sector or individual in society. Thus, to the extent that we should 
have a robust and critical media, to that extent we should have a robust 
exchange of views between the media and other role-players in society ... 
What should be crucial though, is that such debate should be within the 
normal bounds of decency; it should not be aimed, without justification, at 
impugning the integrity of any of the role players. Thirdly, in terms of 
distribution, wealth and power, ownership, management and senior 
positions in the media are predominantly in white hands. And we would 
not be talking about South Africa if this did not impact on the mindsets of 
the actors in the media industry ... and our hope is that this (media) debate 
will inform the actual practice, as the Fourth Estate transforms itself to 
become part of the new South Africa.64 
 It should be remembered that Mandela is regarded as a moderate within the ANC and 
whether this direction will stand the test of time after the ANC’s 50th national conference 
held at Mafiking from December 16, 1997 where Deputy President Thabo Mbeki was 
formally elected to replace Mandela as party leader when the 79-year-old president stepped 
down. Mandela remained the elder statesman and President until the following general 
election in 1999 when he was formally replaced as president by Mbeki. 
 It was a critical test for the media and it is a moot point whether the direction in 
which Mandela steered the media debate will be eventually overtaken by a more sinister and 
tougher hand on the role of the media. Consider for example the message from Mbeki to the 
Cape Town Press Club in 1994:  
The media could guarantee its own freedom by helping to ensure that 
South Africa's fledgling democracy became a strong and stable society.65 
 The implication is clear that Mbeki does not support the way in which the national 




press have made his views clear. It is a stance that does not find favour with a new 
government struggling for a more sympathetic review of its efforts, aims and directions and 
Mbeki is one of the main ANC leaders who has been constantly sniping at the print media. At 
an address to the Organisation of African Unity, meeting at Sun City, in 1994, Mbeki also 
criticised the South African media for not doing its job properly and peddling unfair stories 
about the African National Congress, called for a change in the predominantly white 
ownership of the media and then lashed out at the big four foreign news agencies for 
maintaining a Western bias. 
 But the pledge towards freedom of the press and freedom of information runs deeply 
in ANC statements. The then secretary-general of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, was another 
high-ranking party official to confirm this objective under any circumstances in a statement to 
commemorate National Press Day on October 18, 1995 to mark the 18th anniversary of the 
darkest day in the history of South Africa’s print media. On October 19, 1977 the apartheid 
government forced the closure of the World and Weekend World, detained their editors, 
banned 17 organisations including the Union of Black Journalists, and opened the way for 
wide-scale harassment of journalists. It was also an appropriate opportunity for Ramaphosa to 
echo party sentiment. 
  In a statement issued on behalf of the party, he said: “On the 18th anniversary of this 
day, the ANC wishes to make a simple pledge: Never again. Never again can a government be 
allowed to act in such a manner to silence dissent. Never again should the state be empowered 
to flagrantly violate people's rights to information and alternative views. Never again can we 
allow a government to suppress the freedom of the media. As long as the ANC is a leading 
force in government – indeed, as long as the ANC exists – we will continue to resist any 
attempts to undermine the independence and integrity of the media”. 
 If a week is a long time in politics, then the prudent question to ask is whether this 
political ideology still holds true. The party rhetoric remains firm to the commitment, yet 
there are signals that indicate that the ANC is committed to a free press but the free press 
which it has inherited is perhaps not the monster that it envisaged and may be looking at ways 
in which it could be “reformed”. 
 If there was ever any doubt that the media is facing a crisis of confidence, then 
President Mandela made it absolutely clear in his opening address to the ANC conference at 
Mafiking where he accused the media of peddling lies aimed at undermining the 
achievements of his government. Mandela said:  
We must refer to the issue of what has, in the general vocabulary, come to 




a refusal by the mass media to tell the truth, that since our election into 
government in 1994, we have failed to deliver. The reality is that the 
masses of our people’s experiences that: the formerly oppressed are now 
governing themselves, the homeless are being housed, those without 
access to modern power are now getting electricity, millions are no longer 
condemned to travelling long distances to fetch unhealthy, unprocessed 
water for personal and domestic use, the formerly oppressed are gaining 
access to free and adequate medical services, many among the very poor, 
including women and children and the elderly, who had formerly been 
excluded now have access to welfare benefits, people who had been 
forcibly removed from their land are regaining their land, and greater 
numbers of people are gathering access to education at all levels.66 
 And it was President Mandela’s unusually harsh criticism of the national press that 
made it unequivocal and clear there were serious problems ahead for the press. He said South 
Africa had to confront the fact that the bulk of the mass media in our country has set itself up 
as a force opposed to the ANC.  
In a manner akin to what the National Party is doing in its sphere, this 
media exploits the dominant positions it achieved as a result of the 
apartheid system, to campaign against both real change and the real agents 
of change, as represented by our movement, led by the ANC. In this 
context, it also takes advantage of the fact that, thanks to decades of 
repression and prohibition of a mass media genuinely representative of the 
voice of the majority of the people of South Africa, this majority has no 
choice but to rely for information and communication on a media 
representing the privileged minority. 
To protect its own privileged positions, which are a continuation of the 
apartheid legacy, it does not hesitate to denounce all efforts to ensure its 
own transformation, consistent with the objectives of a non-racial 
democracy, as an attack on press freedom. When it speaks against us, this 
represents freedom of thought, speech and the press – which the world 
must applaud!  
When we exercise our own right to freedom of thought and speech to 
criticise it for its failings, this represents an attempt to suppress the 
freedom of the press – for which the world must punish us! Thus the 




of our own people, as an instrument to protect the legacy of racism, 
graphically described by its own patterns of ownership, editorial control, 
value system and advertiser influence. 
At the same time, and in many respects, it has shown a stubborn refusal to 
discharge its responsibility to inform the public. Consistent with the 
political posture it has assumed, it has been most vigorous in 
disseminating such information as it believes serves to discredit and 
weaken our movement. By this means, despite its professions of support 
for democracy, it limits the possibility to expand the frontiers of 
democracy, which would derive from the empowerment of the citizen to 
participate meaningfully in the process of governance through timeous 
access to reliable information. 
I know that these comments will be received with a tirade of denunciation, 
with claims that what we are calling for is a media that acts as a “lapdog”  
rather than a “watchdog”. We must reiterate the positions of our 
movement that we ask for no favours from the media and we expect none. 
We make no apology for making the demand that the media has a 
responsibility to society to inform. Neither do we doubt the correctness of 
our assessment of the role the media has played in the last three years. All 
of us know too much about what happens in the newsrooms. In any case, 
we have to confront the product of the posture of the media daily. This 
daily product, reflected in all the media of communication, stands out too 
stark in its substance to allow us to doubt the conclusions of our analysis. 
Conference will have to consider what measures we have to take. In 
addition to what we are doing already, to improve our communication with 
our population at large.67 
By dragging up the ugly ghosts of the apartheid past and comparing the role of the 
national press with that of the National Party as the architects of black oppression, Mandela 
highlighted growing impatience and dissatisfaction with the direction of the press from the 
black government. He is signalling to the national conference a desire for change in the way 
that news is handled. And he points to the privileged position of the white population in 
general and the white-controlled press in particular as it represents a privileged minority. 
 It follows earlier calls from more radical elements within the African National 
Congress for at least attitudinal change in the press. Mandela stresses that while there is a 




and expecting none from the media. But it is his argument that the media’s “stubborn refusal 
to discharge its responsibility to inform the public” and its “vigorous disseminating of 
information to discredit and weaken” the efforts of the new government despite its 
professions of support for democracy  that needs to be addressed. Mandela appears to adopt a 
threatening approach, stating “we have to confront the product” and he urges the conference 
to “consider what measures [we] have to take”. Some measures have been outlined in this 
chapter. 
Despite Mandela’s sharp criticism of the South African press to the national conference 
of the ANC, the vague nature of his demands for change should not be interpreted as a signal 
for a crackdown on the free flow of information or censorship. Statutory guarantees are 
already in place. Mandela’s attack on the press at worst indicates impatience and 
disappointment over the role and direction that the press has taken in post-apartheid South 
Africa. He sees need for a different approach to the way news is covered, especially as it 
pertains to the government.  Similarly, this thesis explores the need for change. 
Summary 
This chapter has considered a variety of media models that will go some way to facilitate a 
workable solution and new directions for the press in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
challenge is not so much to find the workable solution but to speed up structural and 
attitudinal transformation in what is perceived to be a slow-to-change profession. Media 
theories and directions or options for change abound with many offerings coming from 
academic theorists, newspaper editors and journalists who fear for the future of the industry as 
well as the major commissions of inquiry.  
 It is a desire for change both at the managerial and proprietorial levels that needs to 
be established. For as long as there remains a perception at the upper levels of the industry 
that change is unnecessary or undesirable, the implementation of any new media policy will 
struggle for acceptance. It is unnecessary for media owners to offer direction and guidance to 
the editors of their publications. All they need do is select like-minded personnel who need no 
encouragement to maintain the status quo.  
 The choice then remains whether to proceed along the libertarian course that has not 
been without its failings or to find some common ground in the developmental model with its 
risk of a guided democracy, or in a combination of “public journalism” and aspects of the 
developmental model. At issue is whether the emerging democratic South Africa, with its 
economic, social and developmental problems akin to many Third World countries, can 




libertarian press system or whether there is some justification to incorporate developmental 
media options into a struggling media system. 
 The implementation of any new media system is not without risks and would require 
cooperation from all the major participants, ie. media institutions, journalists and government. 
The manner in which the system would impact on how information is treated and the 
reactions of both the media and the political leaders would, by definition, be fraught with 
dangers and difficulties. It is worthy of research as a topic on its own. This chapter has 
canvassed some avenues that lend themselves as candidates for consideration. 
 Chapter Five also reviewed the strident criticism from senior members of the 
government members who accused the national press of orchestrating a hidden agenda aimed 
at destabilising the efforts of the government. While tension between government and press is 
not unusual, in post-apartheid South Africa racial tension still run deep and the criticisms take 
on an added dimension. With the press largely the preserve of whites, there is a perception 
within the black government that all is not well with the way the press has coped with the 
transformation. Old racial tensions and prejudices lurk just below the surface on both sides. 
 The next chapter will examine the significant difference between the ways black and 
white journalists perceive the emerging post-apartheid press. It is seen in the context of the 
South African Human Rights Commission's inquiry into racism in the media as well as two 
commissioned reports that emerged from the inquiry, the MMP monitoring project’s 
investigation into racial stereotyping in the media, The News In Black and White, and Claudia 
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RACISM AND THE MEDIA  
Introduction 
The South African political landscape is scarred with torrid examples of institutionalised 
racism but it does not necessarily mean that the South African press has a mortgage on racism 
in the national media. During the apartheid years, many white journalists supported the 
system directly; others tolerated it as a normal way of life and benefited from the privileges 
that it afforded. The worst of them spied on their newsroom colleagues and told lies about the 
political situation. Many were willing volunteers who spread disinformation, government 
propaganda and intolerance while others knowingly or even unwittingly sowed the seeds of 
prejudice and practised selective censorship by remaining silent or refusing to report on police 
brutality and government excesses. It was these sinister practices that attracted the attention of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Council to consider the role of the press during the apartheid era, 
and the South African Human Rights Commission to the commissioning of the Braude report. 
Chapter Six reviews the Braude report and its recommendations as well as its shortcomings. It 
also considers racism in the media and its impact on the South African press. 
Opposing discrimination 
Anywhere in the world where there is ethnic conflict, racial hostility, and terrorism linked to 
extreme nationalism and where these issues feature strongly on the news agenda, there will be 
some journalists who will perpetuate the political propaganda for racist groups so that the 
media becomes a weapon of intolerance. The United States has failed to come to grips with 
the problem since the early 1800s. Europe has battled the same problem for nearly as long and 
in India, sections of the media are still accused of stirring racial intolerance and hatred that 
has led to deadly riots in Gujarat.1 De Beer [2000] puts the South African struggle in context: 
Racism is not a gestational condition; hatred is learned and reinforced by 
example. The United States has struggled with the issue of racism for 
centuries. In the last 50 years most specifically, the country has dealt with 
a history similar to that of South Africa’s. If, in the course of over half a 
century, racism has not been overcome in the US, how can it be expected 
of a country whose own emancipation is barely six years old? The final 
vote, the ultimate ballot, is the one that is cast when we observe other 




 The International Federation of Journalists in 1996 launched the International Media 
Working Group Against Racism and Xenophobia. It was a modest effort to foster better 
understanding among journalists and other media professionals about intolerance and racism 
issues and the aim was to raise awareness and promote changes to strengthen quality in 
journalism. Aidan White [2002], the general secretary of the IFJ, warns that universal notions 
of press freedom are compromised anytime journalism is subject to political manipulation.3 
White points to the outbreak of conflict in 1992 in the Balkans, genocide in Rwanda in 
1994, and simmering conflicts based on religious rivalry and ethnic differences in the Middle 
East, Indonesia and the Indian subcontinent “as a reminder that human rights law, journalistic 
codes and international goodwill appear to count for little when politicians make violence and 
hatred the benchmark of community relations by fuelling public ignorance and insecurity 
through compliant media”: 
The problem of intolerance is a constant threat to good journalism 
anywhere in the world. Racial violence in urban communities in North 
America and Europe  often characterised by incidents of terrorism  the rise 
in influence in the West of extremist right-wing political parties, the re-
emergence of anti-Semitism in many countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, widespread religious intolerance in parts of Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East, and widespread prejudice and discrimination against national 
minorities on the basis of language and social status, are all part of the 
global landscape of daily news reporting. In this complex news 
environment journalists are sometimes casual victims of prejudice and 
political manipulation. Too often, ignorance and a lack of appreciation of 
different cultures, traditions and beliefs lead to media stereotypes that 
reinforce racist attitudes and strengthen the appeal of political extremists.4 
 During the mid-1980s, Teun van Dijk investigated how the British and Dutch media 
portrayed minorities in the press and tried to explain exactly how the press was involved in 
the continuity of the system of racism by analysing content in many thousands of newspaper 
articles. Van Dijk [1991] draws on earlier research from the United States where racism in the 
press mirrors the South African experiences and by association the European press which in 
many instances resembles the press in North America. And from more than two decades of 
research on the relations between the press and ethnic minority groups or immigrants, the 
findings from earlier research are unambiguous. Van Dijk concludes:  
Most blatantly in the past, and usually more subtly today, the press has 




the white power structure, it has consistently limited the access, both to 
hiring, promotion, or points of view, of ethnic minority groups. Until 
today, its dominant definition of ethnic affairs has consistently been a 
negative and stereotypical one; minorities or immigrants are seen as a 
problem or a threat and are portrayed preferably in association with crime, 
violence, conflict, unacceptable cultural differences, or other forms of 
deviance.5 
 Decades later, these same criticisms remain largely unanswered by the South African 
press. During the apartheid years, racism in the press was hardly unexpected but following the 
transformation post-1994 complaints of racism continue to surface despite efforts by media 
managements to slowly change the composition and structure of the newsrooms. Black and 
coloured journalists face a difficult task convincing a sceptical audience that the negative way 
in which black people are often portrayed by the media and the constant critical focus on 
government failings and mistakes is not a sinister motive to undermine the efforts of black 
people but simply the media doing its job of scrutinising and keeping the government honest. 
 Berger [1997] says one of the challenges in dealing with racism in South Africa 
today, from a media point, “is to get beyond the all-too-obvious” and he warns that there are 
important challenges to overcome as South Africa continues to wrestle with issues of 
intolerance. This includes growing hostility to the influx of illegal migrants from other 
African states coming in search of political asylum or economic survival and competing for 
jobs in a decreasing market, the importance of free speech and the need to guard against hate 
speech towards the unwelcome migrants: 
We are still some way from sorting out our own racial tolerance and 
reconciliation, and the role of journalists therein, and we now face this 
new issue of a majority, as opposed to a minority, practising a kind of 
racism against a group of “outsiders”. There are important challenges to 
overcome. But there is reason for optimism: Racism exists in South Africa 
but it no longer rules.6 
 Berger’s optimism holds well, and it was against this background that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in 1998 included the national media in its scrutiny of racism. (See 
below.)  
 It is not only in the newsrooms of South Africa where black journalists face up to the 
old demons of discrimination. In March, 2001, Tyrone Seale, a coloured reporter for the 
Afrikaans newspaper Die Beeld was refused access to the congress of the extreme right-wing 




explained that “only Afrikaners are welcome […]. In our definition of Afrikaner you have to 
be white”.7 
Van Dijk’s research of racism in the UK and Dutch press in the mid-1980s that the 
press has become “less blatantly racist, but that stereotypes and the definition of minorities as 
a ‘problem’ or even as a ‘threat’ was still prevalent, in particular in the popular newspapers, 
while minority journalists, especially in Europe, continue to be discriminated against in 
hiring, promotions and news assignments.”8 Van Dijk cautions that from the conclusions and 
interpretations reached, it became clear that the theoretical framework in which his results are 
to be interpreted is vastly complex. It is this complexity in defining what constitutes racism 
that led several South African academics to criticise the efforts of the TRC investigation and 
Claudia Braude’s report dealing with racism in the South African press. (See below). 
Defining racism 
In discussing the concept of racism, Michael Banton [1970] turns to a useful definition by 
Ruth Benedict, one of the earlier writers on the subject in her book Race and Racism (1940) 
in which she concludes that “racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by 
nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority”.9 It is a 
definition that no longer suffices and remains a vastly complex issue that continues to intrigue 
mass communication researchers as much as sociologists. 
 Earlier attempts by Pierre van den Berghe (1967) similarly struggled for a workable 
theory and he points to conflicting research dating back several decades.10 Van Dijk [1991] 
concedes that research of racism in the press is complex and difficult and in 2000, Arnold de 
Beer raises the problems inherent in properly assessing the nature and content of racism in his 
criticism of the Braude report (see below). Though, De Beer notes: 
Racism in South Africa, as a social condition and reminder of apartheid, is 
in the hearts and minds of many citizens. Whether race, sex, class, or 
religion is the defining factor of hate-based relations, the ultimate 
responsibility is in the hands of the citizens.11 
 This is a view widely echoed among South African media commentators and 
academics. South African author and researcher H.C. Marais [2002] says the nature and 
history of South Africa virtually guarantees that racism will remain a sensitive issue for many 
decades to come and he sees a need for the term racism to be defined “in a way that would 
make it clearly identifiable and thus offering means to combat it more readily”.12 As a means 
towards a definition, Marais finds it necessary to revisit social scientific theories and research 




What exactly is meant by the term race (and racism) is, however, not very 
clear. It seems to be used interchangeably with concepts such as prejudice, 
discrimination, racialism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. Apart from its 
signalling function, such an undifferentiated use blunts the concept and 
makes its consequences potentially more harmful. Alternatively, the 
meaning of the concept is primarily found in its political connotations and 
functions, rather than in its interpersonal and social dynamics. In this way, 
the term racism has become a powerful emotive weapon that can be used 
against opponents − hardly any defence against it is possible.13 
 A similar search for answers in social anthropology theory comes from Jansen van 
Rensburg who believes South Africans have been inundated with information on racism over 
the years but are struggling to cope with a definition: 
Since most participants to the racism discourse assume an understanding 
of the concept of racism or are very vague when they refer to the concept 
at all, some clarity is called for.14 
 The clamour for a definitive analysis of what constitutes racism and the argument that 
a definitive analysis is needed before racism can properly be addressed comes mainly from 
white middle-class South African academics. For black South African journalists making 
allegations of racism and bias in the media, there are no calls for academic definitions of what 
constitutes their grievances. They see it in their pay packets; it is evident from the lack of 
career advancement, poor job opportunities and the way in which mainly white agenda setters 
continue to determine the focus of what constitutes news. For black journalists, this need for a 
definition of racism before the problem can be addressed can be compared to a poison victim 
foaming at the mouth being denied any first aid until paramedics can decide what poison was 
administered. The need is for immediate action against perceived wrongs and the details can 
be worked out later. 
 For Steven Friedman, a South African author and white journalist on the Mail & 
Guardian, the issue is clear and the aims of the Human Rights Commission (see below) to 
discuss racism in the media with journalist is a step in the right direction: 
That there is racism in the media is blindingly obvious. The task is to get 
people to talk honestly about it so that we can find ways to end it. In this 
and other fields, we need a discussion which can prompt willingness to 





This thesis defines racism from the black South African perspective that Friedman 
notes is blindingly obvious and not from the pedantic academic theorisation. The concept of 
racism for black South Africans is a life experience and it is manifested in their pay packets, 
lack of career opportunities, homes without electricity and running water, a policeman in blue 
uniform with a vicious dog ejecting you from the beach because it is an area designated for 
the use of white people only, even having to sit upstairs on a public bus because downstairs is 
reserved for whites only.  
The concept of racism for black people [and this term is used inclusively for all non-
white people including coloureds, Asiatics and Malays] is manifested in being refused entry 
to schools or universities exclusively on the basis of skin colour and being forced to live in 
poverty, fear, and degradation – not in the subtle nuances of academic sociological definitions 
A Human Rights perspective 
The South African Human Rights Commission in November 1998 announced a major inquiry 
to investigate allegations of racism in the South African media and called for submissions. 
The inquiry was initiated after the Black Lawyers’ Association and the Association of Black 
Accountants requested an investigation in terms of the Human Rights Commission Act. The 
two organisations claimed two newspapers – the Mail & Guardian and The Sunday Times – 
had violated the fundamental rights of black people. 
 As a precursor to the inquiry, media industry representatives were asked to comment 
and an independent consultant, Claudia Braude, was appointed to compile a report. A non-
government organisation, The Media Monitoring Project, was also mandated to analyse 
language, idiom, and images portrayed in the media.  
 A selection of media was monitored for a six-week period from Monday, July 12, 
1999 to Friday, August 20, 1999. Overall 1430 items were monitored during the period. 
Overall results analysed and major trends that emerged in the analysis were discussed. 
  The monitors were all post-graduate students and first-language speakers monitored 
all the languages of the publications.  The conclusions were published in its final document 
The News in Black and White: an investigation into racial stereotyping in the media. The 
findings were that racial stereotyping was still common in the media. 
The monitoring and analysis have suggested that the conventional notion 
of news of Africa and the legacy of the apartheid era ideologies and 





 In general, the MMP found that there was a tendency for racism and racial 
stereotypes to occur as “bad” news stories and that crime was the most reported item. Of 14 
categories monitored, MMP found seven categories supported racial stereotypes. These 
included: blacks are criminals; blacks are irrational; people act according to their ethnic 
identity; black lives are unimportant; all whites are racist; black foreigners threaten South 
African society; blacks are incompetent and incapable. The MMP also found that the dignity 
of black people was not always respected in news stories. Also, the use of graphic images of 
violence and dead bodies was more common in cases that involved black people. 
 Reports of coloured people were characterised by gangsterism, rape and violent 
crime. In its findings, MMP said: 
It is doubtful whether any of the major media are intent on any form of 
racist brainwashing. However, the values and attitudes common in our 
society are no stranger to those who staff the news media and it is often 
only when stereotyping and prejudicial reporting is pointed out that the 
media become aware of the patterns which they have established. The 
media need to recognize their power, their freedom, and their 
responsibility and to explore ways in which they can challenge the 
damaging effects of racism and fight against the narrow perceptions which 
are an unfortunate inheritance of colonialism and apartheid.17 
 However, media attention on the rampant crime rate was not an unrealistic 
expectation. Close scrutiny of such a sensitive post-apartheid issue, however, was 
uncomfortable for the government of national unity. The diversion of opinion was sharp. 
Newspapers argued they were simply doing their job. The government view of the press 
simply doing its job differed. It was a “hatchet” job aimed at destabilising the efforts of the 
black government, giving the impression of incompetence. However, excerpts from official 















Crime category 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Murder  19672 19131 18639 17709 17878 17371 15456 15054 
Attempted 
murder 




62877 60354 50414 50406 63432 70810 79561 87610 
Other robbery 23380 27367 38088 37841 44001 50878 61468 65766 
Rape and 
attempted rape 
29399 33139 36137 37905 35105 36022 37556 37711 
Grievous assault 147551 155576 162758 166775 164510 177162 192750 188961 




89314 92602 95379 93088 92375 96307 100681 103495 
All fraud, 
forgeries 
47308 46482 47346 48402 46442 48845 51828 46600 
Carjacking No data No data 9790 9869 11181 11609 11191 11186 
Source: Crime Information Analysis Centre SA Police Service 
 While the statistics for serious crimes such as murder, rape, robbery with aggravating 
circumstance and carjacking show serious social problems and a police force under pressure, 
the figures are not further reduced under racial categories but it is an issue that is hardly 
defended. Gangsterism and crime is rife in the black and coloured townships.  In mitigation, 
however, that was always the case during apartheid as well as post-apartheid. 
  The national media’s intense scrutiny of crime post-apartheid was bringing the reality 
of the criminality out of the townships and on to the agenda of middle-class white South 
Africa that was previously insulated from these excesses by among other things a resolute 
police force and the effects of the Group Areas Act. The reporting of township crime was 




newspapers such as The Cape Herald,  Post, Sunday Times Extra, Rapport Extra, World and 
Sunday World  the township papers aimed at blacks and coloureds.  
 Braude’s report, Cultural Bloodstains also criticised sections of the media for racial 
intolerance, bias, publishing stories which depersonalises black lives, promoting the 
stereotype that Africa was about violence, disaster and poverty. In doing so, Braude elicited 
scathing criticism from both media and academic interests. The findings of both reports were 
pilloried and widely disputed. The Star described the Braude report as a load of psycho-
babble.18  
 Arrie De Beer [2000] head of the communications school at Potchefstroom 
University, Pretoria, says Braude’s report reads “more like an essay than an objective report”, 
its findings are narrow and difficult to follow, not because of its contents, but its lack of 
coherence.19  Further, De Beer argues that racism in the new South Africa, as elsewhere in the 
world, cannot sufficiently and functionally be addressed (let alone eradicated) without 
objective, scientific definitions, analyses, distinctions and approaches.  
Serious credibility issues arise, on the part of both Claudia Braude and the 
SAHRC itself, as to whether the question of racism in the South African 
media has been addressed at all.20 
 Guy Berger, Lynette Steeneveldt, and Keyan Tomaselli advanced academic argument 
that criticised the South African Human Rights Commission’s terms of reference and 
methodology. Tomaselli found the terms of reference vague and “resulting in research 
approaches which failed to entirely understand the nature of the media, how news is made or 
how theory is applied”.21 Berger argued similarly that the reports by Media Monitors and 
Claudia Braude were fundamentally flawed and failed to understand fully the operations of 
the media.  Berger was critical of the methodology used in both reports and raised the issue of 
lack of audience involvement and the subjectivity of the reports although he conceded the 
core finding of both would have been the same even with different methods. 
 The methodological criticism of Tomaselli and Berger questions the way in which the 
SAHRC arrives at its findings that the media is racist. But they concede that even if the 
methodology were different the results would be the same. Berger described both the Braude 
report and the MMP report as deeply flawed and very weak on the conceptual understanding 
of what constituted racism, what racism-free media was and what was required to get there. 
This is not, of course, to say there is no racism in the SA media only to say 
that the SAHRC studies cannot be trusted to have found it.22 
 Berger presented a critique of both the Braude report and the MMP report to SAHRC 




zealous and subjective. Berger saw the MMP report as too selective and found it ignored 
genres such as advertising and sport. He also criticised the propositions and manner in which 
a particular article was used to support or negate a proposition, saying it would impact on the 
conclusions ultimately drawn. Berger saw as the way forward the need to develop a paradigm 
where race was not the single or the most important defining factor. He mentioned the 
philosophy of the Black Consciousness Movement in arguing for the creation of a new South 
African identity.23 
 In a separate paper titled Seeing past race. The politics of the Human Rights 
Commission into racial representation in post-apartheid South Africa, Berger reinforces his 
argument of “seeing past race”. Berger states: 
Yet, despite heightened racial divisions… the [South African] society 
retains the avowed aim of becoming non-racial. What is needed is some 
sense of its progress towards the objective, and indeed what is meant by 
this objective  whether it is a race-free goal, or one that remains but 
without the racialism. In post-apartheid South Africa, a study of race and 
the media serves as a barometer to assess these issues, and to try and 
understand the complexity of moving from racism to “mere” racial 
differentiation, and to race-free status. The “seeing past race” reference in 
the title of this paper is intended to highlight whether contemporary South 
Africa continues to be visited by the ghosts of its past, or whether the 
current players can see their way past and beyond race issues towards 
achieving a non-racial society.24 
Berger follows up his argument with a critical analysis of the conceptual assumptions 
in the final report of the SAHRC inquiry into racism in the media. In the abstract, he states: 
The flawed conceptualisations plus the generalised character of the 
findings are of little help in assisting the momentum of eradicating racism 
in South African media, and for linking race transformation to issues of 
class, gender, sexual orientation, and xenophobia. This article identifies 
the problems as a race essentialism and a racism relativism, and argues 
instead that journalists need the concept of racialisation in order to change 
their reporting. The argument upholds the desired role of the South 
African media as one that contributes to a non-racial, as opposed to a 
multi-racial society.25  
Berger introduces admirable arguments for a non-racial society and for a media that 




there still remains serious divisions in South African society and the ghosts of the past are still 
haunting many of the previously disadvantaged. Many journalists would argue the same 
problems still exist in the nation’s news rooms. 
 For black journalists, the argument does not revolve around methodology. It does not 
hinge on the findings of racism in the media. The complaints from the black journalists 
encompass more than racism. It is about job satisfaction, career paths, education and training 
facilities and it is about equitable wages as much as it is about opening up the national media 
to reflect a more diversified agenda from a different set of information gatekeepers.26 
  It includes reservations that despite changes to almost every fabric of post-apartheid 
South African society, change in the face of the national press has been too slow and too 
limited in its scope. Black journalists are demanding a bigger slice of the media action. This is 
also largely the view favoured in the joint submission from the five black editors: 
We believe that the fundamental problem with the media in our country is 
that they are largely controlled by white people. For instance, the majority 
of top editors are white, which results in a predominance, by sheer force of 
numbers, of the white viewpoint in our national public debate. This in turn 
leads to the anomaly where the views of the white minority predominate 
over those of a black majority. It is no secret that even in the corridors of 
political power, the views of white editors do tend to receive inordinate 
attention.27 
 Notwithstanding, the Human Rights Commission used these two reports as a basis for 
issuing an interim report, and issued 36 newspaper and broadcast editors and reporters with 
subpoenas requiring them to testify  in response to the findings of the Braude report. It was an 
action that was fiercely opposed and it sent shockwaves through national newsrooms where 
freedom of the press had only recently been enshrined in the Constitution. It raised fears of 
government interference, with the editor of the Mail & Guardian Phil van Niekerk contesting 
the subpoenas as a violation of the press’s right to operate free of government intervention. 
  After some negotiations the subpoenas were eventually dropped and several 
journalists agreed to assist the commission by giving evidence at the hearings. 
 It was against this background that the SAHRC moved to instigate a formal inquiry 
into racism in the South African media. Since its inception, the SAHRC investigation was 
embroiled in controversy, hampered by reluctant participants and became bogged down in 
criticism from both white and black journalists, editors and foreign correspondents who had 
been summonsed to give evidence. Noble in intent, the mandate of the SAHRC was to 




human rights, and to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been 
violated.28 
 The Commission’s interest in the media was not new. Earlier efforts, in 1996, 
involved hosting seminars and workshops for journalists on the role of the media in human 
rights. Workshops were held in Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town with limited success. 
Plans were also under way to sponsor an annual award for the most enterprising journalist in 
human rights. The chairman of the SAHRC explained the interest in the media: 
We have consistently recognised that the media were an important ally in 
the execution of our mandate.29 
 In explaining its objectives, Human Rights Commission chief Barney Pityana said the 
commission was mindful of the implications of this exercise for press freedoms but the 
SAHRC was hopeful that a study of racism in the media “would heighten the sensitivity of all 
South Africans to the issue of racism and will ensure a greater respect for freedom of 
expression”.  
 The commission hoped to achieve five basic aims with this inquiry: (a) to generate 
debate and dialogue among South Africans about the meaning and incidence of racism in 
South Africa; (b) South Africans  need to be informed about racism if they are to be able to 
address it; (c) that the media will benefit from closer scrutiny  so that they can understand 
how their work is viewed by South Africans so they can sharpen their capacity to be 
responsive to the needs of the people and reflect the true nature of South African society; (d) 
that through dialogue, South Africans will learn, understand and have the facility to use race 
theory and analysis; (e) the nature of the inquiry will engage all South Africans in seeking 
common  solutions to racism and to constructing a society free of racism. 
 Interest in the inquiry was high and five media institutions responded after the draft 
terms of reference for the inquiry was published. The Institute for Media Studies in South 
Africa, Print Media South Africa, Daily Dispatch, Times Media Ltd and Naspers responded 
with concerns over the terms of reference. 
Submissions to the inquiry 
A wide spectrum of views across South Africa’s troubled racial divide were entertained at the 
inquiry which heard from 80 people – journalists, academics, human rights groups, and media 
watch groups – over eight days of testimony that touched on various concerns about 
mainstream news coverage of black people, Jews, Muslims, and Indians, as well as the way in 
which major media corporations have moved to integrate and diversify their newsrooms. The 




reflecting largely the historical racial divide between whites and blacks dating back to the 
apartheid era. In short, black journalists maintained that the pace of change was slow or 
almost non-existent. 
 It would be useful to compare some of the concerns to the submissions from black 
journalists and white journalists to show the wide gulf in the way racism or the lack of it in 
the South African media is perceived. It would also be helpful here to review some of the 
submissions to the inquiry, especially to compare this major disparity between how black 
journalists and white journalists assessed what is a major national problem. 
Submissions from black journalists 
A significant response came from a group of five black editors who submitted a joint 
statement that highlighted three basic areas where they determined a need for action within 
the media industry affirmative action, media diversity and training. The group included Mike 
Siluma, editor of the Sowetan, Charles Mogale, editor of the Sowetan Sunday World, Phil 
Molefe, editor-in-chief of SABC News, Kaizer Nyatsumba, then editor of the Daily News, 
and Cyril Madladla, editor of the Independent on Saturday. The group was also concerned at 
the slow pace of change within the media industry and complained that the power structures 
remained largely unchanged from the days of apartheid. White editors continued to have most 
of the control and it led the group to the opinion that there remained a predominance of a 
white viewpoint in the national debate. 
 The group expressed “deep concern about the generally slow pace of transformation 
in the media” and complained that six years after the country’s inaugural democratic 
elections, the media have remained largely unchanged”  with black Africans constituting a 
minority in key decision making positions. 
At the heart of that transformation agenda, which we presume every 
reasonable and fair-minded South African supports, was the need to level 
the playing fields so that none of us could, on the basis of skin colour, our 
gender or station in life, have the exclusive power to dictate the fortunes of 
others. Specifically, the establishment of a new, non-racial South Africa 
implied the dismantling of the exclusive control of our white compatriots 
over the levers of power at every level of society, including the media.30 
And breaking from their white counterparts, the joint submission of the black editors 
supported the work of the inquiry, opposed the submissions from a number of white editors 
who suggested that while there were shortcomings in the transition from an apartheid era 
media to full participation much was being done to eradicate this disparity. It was a view 




Yes, there is racism in the media, much of that racism is in a subliminal 
nature, which would explain why some of those who have protested too 
much have been so bold as to say they do not believe it is an issue 
deserving of this public scrutiny which will result from the HRC hearings. 
Quite often one has to be black and African with all the hurt and indignity 
of the past uppermost in one’s mind to recognise racism.31 
 In a separate submission Nyatsumba and Mdladla covered similar ground and 
highlighted shortcomings and difficulties they experienced as newly appointed black editors 
trying to broaden the target of a newspaper that was catering only to a specific audience. Both 
expressed a desire to use their newspapers “as vehicles for freedom of expression” 
particularly in the Letters to the Editor pages, tackle staff changes and to make changes in the 
news content of the Daily News and the Independent on Saturday.  Khulu Sibiya, editor of 
City Press, also aligned himself with the statement of the five black editors and argued for 
more “black run newspapers to tell the black story”.32 
 In a radical departure from the mainly negative comments from black journalists, 
Cyril Ramaphosa, the chairman of Times Media Ltd, focused mainly on their flagship 
newspaper the Sunday Times. Explaining that in the few years since the demise of apartheid, 
the Sunday Times increased circulation by one third and the bulk of its readers were now 
black Africans and there was a growing trend of attracting black readers. Ramaphosa 
concluded that the Sunday Times would not be attracting such a growing number of new black 
readers if it was propagating racism.  Not only were sales up, the Sunday Times had also 
increased its coverage of black people and has recruited senior black staff from whom it 
would be inconceivable to see the advancement of racist material. Ramaphosa said: 
For our part, we are quite content to stand by our record of exposing 
corruption and criminality in all sectors of the society; of assisting with the 
growth of a culture of tolerance and debate; of respect for the constitution; 
of investment in literacy and education … of portrayal of role models in 
our society. We are particularly proud of not being beholden to any 
political or social party but only to the interests of our readers, the citizens 
and the constitution.33 
 Nomavenda Mathiane, of Business Day, and Lakela Kaunda, editor of the Evening 
Post, drew attention to the hardships experienced by black women in the media, the 
difficulties of initiating change in the newsroom that was not at all democratic. Mathiane 




to develop a more patriotic journalism while combating racism at every level in the 
newsroom, saying of the Evening Post: 
We are a paper that sees itself not only as a watchdog but also as an 
instrument of social development.34 
 Phil Molefe, executive editor at the SABC, said the national broadcaster was 
conscious of its role of reflecting South African society in all its complexities and was 
meeting the challenges by introducing training programs for staff and establishing a database 
of black commentators with skills in political and economic commentary. 
 There is a similarity of views expressed by the black journalists that reflects similar 
concerns tabled to the Truth Commission. Dennis Cruywagen and Willie De Klerk accused 
senior executives of the Argus of shaping the news agenda to appease the government 
struggling to contain growing anti-apartheid protests and rioting on the Cape Flats.35 In a 
particular episode of violence where these two “coloured” journalists were at the scene where 
police shot dead three children in an incident later to become infamous as the Trojan Horse 
Affair, and the newspaper preferred to publish the sanitised police version of events rather 
than the graphic photographs of Willie de Klerk and the report of escalating police brutality 
and detentions without trial written by staffer Dennis Cruywagen.  
We thought too that our newspapers would not doubt our integrity and 
publish our accounts of what was really happening in our country. After 
all, or so we thought, the English newspapers with their liberal traditions 
and opposition to the National Party and apartheid, would be just as 
shocked as we were and even pained and angered. We thought, too, that 
these newspapers would support us. I am afraid to say we were terribly 
wrong.36 
Submissions from white journalists 
Arrie Roussouw, editor of Die Beeld, told the commission he could understand the concerns 
expressed by the group of black editors but stressed that despite its history as an Afrikaner 
newspaper there was now a firm policy on racism which was reflected in their editorial 
comment. Roussouw said Die Beeld had welcomed the historic political changes of the 90s 
and was no longer aligned to any political party or ideology. 
We only associate ourselves with the truth and the interests of our readers 
and we would endeavour to ensure freedom of the press, a multi-party 
democracy and human rights as well as economic freedom and a peaceful 




 Roussouw's comments were echoed by other executives of the Afrikaans publishing 
giant Naspers including Johann de Wet, of Rapport who said the Afrikaans newspaper was 
mindful of its racial mindset and sensitive to the pain and hurt caused by racial insensitivity. 
For this reason, De Wet said Rapport welcomed scrutiny and was striving to present the news 
“comprehensively, objectively, accurately, and reliably”. Editorial comment and opinions 
were expressed in a “fair and balanced way”.  
 Eben Domisse, editor of Die Burger, cautioned against political control of the press 
and warned of the pitfalls of "the tyranny of the majority". Domisse said Die Burger was 
committed to “the values of a multiparty democracy; a market orientated economy with social 
conscience, press freedom, and the advancement of Afrikaans and minority rights".38 
 From representatives of the English press, John Scott, editor of the Cape Times, said 
the newspaper was undertaking a number of initiatives to highlight the political and social 
changes in South Africa. Scott said the Cape Times had “only recently” become more 
conscious of racism and has had to deal with racial tension within its own newsroom. Scott 
said the Cape Times “had for many years considered itself anti-apartheid and a bastion for 
liberal values but for many years the Cape Times never had a policy of employing black 
journalists in any great numbers until the 1990s.39 
 Tim du Plessis, of the Citizen, told the commission that the newspaper which was 
established to prop up the apartheid system was now also committed to change. Peter Davies, 
of the Sunday Tribune, said his newspaper was made aware that it was not catering to its 
African readers in its news coverage. The newspaper devised a five-year plan to remedy the 
problems as well as developing policies to improve the content of the newspaper so that it 
reaches its target.  
 In a corporate submission, the Independent Group told the commission its editors are 
all issued with a Mission Statement on appointment. It requires them to “further the cause of 
racial cooperation and to pursue a balanced policy calculated to enhance the progress and 
welfare of all sections of the population in your region”. The Independent Group has an 
affirmative action policy and has developed an employment equity plan as required by law.40 
Human rights inquiry: findings and recommendations 
The South African press was not immune to the climate of racism that enveloped South 
Africa as a result of apartheid and to this end, the SAHRC report into racism in the media 
found that the media reflected a persistent pattern of racist expressions and concluded that the 




 As a means to overcome this, the commission suggested that the Institute for the 
Advancement of Journalism and the South African National Editors’ Forum develop and offer 
racism awareness training course for journalists at all levels of the industry and media schools 
and technikons offering journalism courses were urged to include course modules on racism 
in the media. Both the IAJ and SANEF took up the challenge and since publication of the 
report have introduced several training courses at various levels to improve the quality of 
journalism.  
 As an added incentive to quality journalism, a number of national awards and 
scholarships were introduced. Independent Newspapers and Johnnic also introduced training 
courses and internships for young black sub-editors. The lack of black sub-editors and the 
controlling role of sub-editors as important gatekeepers of information in national newsrooms 
was a major cause for concern. 
 Independent Newspapers went a step further and appointed executive journalist 
Elizabeth Mary Barrat, as group editorial trainer. Barrat’s brief was to train a new generation 
of young people as sub-editors. In March 2004, 22 trainee sub-editors started the 12-month 
course. They were selected from a total of 900 applicants. 
 In all, the report made 11 findings with corresponding recommendations. As agreed at 
the commencement of the hearings, there were no findings in respect of individual journalists, 
publications or titles. 
  Sloppy and bad journalism, it found, should not be confused with racist reporting. It 
found that self-regulating mechanisms in the media industry were not effective and that the 
press ombudsman did not believe racism was a concern in the press and suggested that the 
Code of Conduct of the press ombudsman needed to be tightened. 
For those who expressed fears that the outcome of the inquiry posed a threat to press 
freedom, the commission moved to allay those fears by encouraging ongoing public debate 
about the role and responsibility of the media in a democracy. 
We believe that all who have interest in human rights would recognise that 
a totally unregulated system, with weak self-regulation, would ultimately 
undermine the integrity of the media. Public scrutiny is good for the health 
of the media in a democracy.41 
 Among others, the commission urged more diverse media, called for a review of 
current codes of conduct in various news organisations, focused on language diversity in the 
print media and expressed concern about the small number of black sub-editors and women in 




  It recommended both formal and non-formal training institutions and called on media 
management to address the issue of training and recruitment of black staff, especially the 
training of black sub-editors. 
The media should strive to ensure greater representivity in the newsrooms 
through recruitment and training in accordance with the letter and spirit of 
the Employment Equity Act. The South African Human Rights 
Commission will monitor this by examining the equity plans of the media 
industry.42 
 From the start, the SAHRC stressed that the objective of its report was to raise 
awareness among media professionals and the public as a whole about the role and 
responsibility of the media to develop a non-racial human rights culture.43 
The report is not intended to label the media or portions of it as racist and 
thereby to discredit it, but rather to challenge it to be aware both of their 
power and their responsibility. The aims of this report, however, is to 
provide an opportunity for the media to evaluate itself … The media 
should, both individually and through their collective bodies, actively seek 
ways of ridding their pages, bulletins, and programs of harmful racist 
stereotypes.44 
Summary 
The focus of this chapter was on racism in the South African press, the need for a definitive 
analysis and efforts towards eliminating discrimination and prejudice in the national 
newsrooms despite the complexities of finding common ground. Against this background of 
racism, the South African Human Rights Commission turned its attention to the press. A 
chronology of the main developments leading up to the hearings conducted by the 
Commission shows it was a lengthy exercise in opening up the media to scrutiny and public 
debate. Some historic milestones include: 
1997: SAHRC chairman Barney Pityana co-writes opinion piece in South Africa's largest 
selling daily newspaper, accusing the media of practising “subliminal racism by creating a 
negative image of Africans”. 
1998: Black Lawyers Association and Association of Black Accountants of South Africa 
requests SAHRC to investigate the Mail and Guardian and the Sunday Times newspapers “for 
alleged violations of fundamental rights of black people”. SAHRC later formally resolves to 




1999: July-August: Researchers hired by SAHRC monitor more than 1,430 news articles 
over a six-week period and concludes that there are incidents of racism and stereotypical 
reporting. Braude says research “sought to go deeper than the manifest, literal message and 
the content to consider the overall symbolic coded meaning at play”. 
November: SAHRC, using research work, issues its interim report. Pityana says that media 
has been known to play a “negative role in race relations by being used as a vehicle for hate 
speech … and for hostile and racist messages”. 
2000: January: SAHRC writes to editors on specific allegations made in the interim report. 
SAHRC says the response from the media by January 10 was not satisfactory. 
February 11: SAHRC issues the first of its subpoenas, compelling news organisations and 
institutions to attend hearings into allegations of racism in the media. More than 30 subpoenas 
were issued in following days. Subpoenas demanded attendance at hearings and “to testify on 
your product's policies and guidelines on the reporting of, and commenting on, national and 
international events, which impact on racism and possible incidents of racism”. 
February 14: The ruling African National Congress government supports the SAHRC 
decision to issue the subpoenas. Opposition parties criticise the decision, saying South 
Africa's international image was under threat. 
February 18: The editor of Business Day says subpoenas “could be interpreted abroad as 
South Africa's version of the McCarthy-era witch hunt in the United States” and could 
threaten foreign investment. 
February 21: SAHRC meets South African National Editors Forum to reconsider the 
subpoenas and other issues relating to the commission’s inquiry. 
February 23: The Financial Times, in London, reports that the SAHRC has withdrawn a 
subpoena against the newspaper for its 1996 article headlined “South Africa moves on 
Moslem militants”. 
February 25: SAHRC meets group of influential national newspaper proprietors. 
February 28: SAHRC announces it will withdraw subpoenas but reserves right to reissue 
them during hearings if warranted. 
March 6: SAHRC hearings begin. 
 Chapter Six highlighted from an analysis of the submissions to the South African 
Human Rights Commission inquiry and responses to the reports and findings, how sharply 




at stake remain: Where is the starting point for change? Are the criticisms of continued white 
control and domination of the press valid? 
 However flawed the Braude report, it makes fundamental and valid observations 
about the discrepancies that continue in the South African press and the need for new 
directions. Braude also offers a number of useful options to implement the process of change.  
 De Beer also makes useful contributions to the argument and is joined by Berger and 
others who are of the opinion that the question has moved on from whether racism really 
exists in the newsrooms to what can be done to assess and address it. As De Beer [2000] 
points out, nowhere in the Braude report is there a definition of racism or an underlying 
standard by which racism is determined. Braude found that the South African media 
“reflected a persistent pattern of racist expressions and content of writing that could have been 
avoided” although the report made clear it found “no evidence of the mainstream media 
indulging in blatant advocacy of racial hatred or incitement to racial violence”. De Beer, for 
his part insists that reparations, if needed, in the national press, can only be concluded with a 
proper definition of what constitutes racism and how best to limit its influence.  
 The SAHRC inquiry was useful in that it exposed the national press to painful 
scrutiny and afforded the widest spectrum of views on the press to be put. Black editors told 
about subtle forms of racism; news reports and editorials that subconsciously portray blacks 
as corrupt and incompetent, a general suspicion by whites of black incompetence, and an 
unwillingness to listen to their opinions.  
 The editors also questioned whether previous affirmative action efforts had relegated 
blacks to the role of mere tokens and they urged stronger efforts to advance the careers of 
blacks in the industry. Several white editors acknowledged at the SAHRC hearings the 
existence of these racial stereotypes in the national press. 
 In outlining the aims of the Human Rights Commission, chairman Barney Pityana 
outlines five basic aims that can provide the framework for change in the press in post-
apartheid South Africa. But, there is no shortage of theories, plans or conceptual frameworks 
for the future of the South African media. Chapter Seven will focus on new directions and 














Notes for Chapter Six 
 
1. The topic of racism in the media is extensively examined in the literature of journalism. 
Research studies by Teun Van Dijk in the Netherlands and Charles Husband in England 
contribute substantially to the understanding of racism in the media. The following is a 
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NEW DIRECTIONS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
Introduction 
This chapter considers a new role for the press in the democratic new South Africa by 
evaluating contributions towards the transformation of the press from a variety of sources 
including the Reconstruction and Development Program, journalists, academics and political 
enterprises. 
A role for the press 
In the Western world, the role of the press is not only to inform the public and represent the 
public interest but also to scrutinise government policies and to act as public watchdog. The 
press takes on an adversarial role with an emphasis on discussing matters of controversy 
rather than fulfilling the goals or wishes of the government. 
 A Third World approach to the role of the press however, takes a different tack. It is 
directed towards issues of national development, nation building and public education. Some 
would argue that this developmental journalism concept is fraught with danger and a short 
step away from an authoritarian system of media control despite its good intentions. Chief 
among the complaints against a developmental media policy is that it can continue 
indefinitely as long as the government is assured of control of the levels of political 
discussion. Sussman describes this aspect of developmental journalism as “concentration by 
objective journalists on the news, the newness of developments in education, agriculture, 
industry, communications, and applied science, developments that leaders hope will 
eventually produce economic success and secure a sense of national unity”.1 
 Media use for developmental purposes may not yield the expected results and 
depends to a large extent on Third World journalists who are sympathetic to the concept of 
developmental journalism. Lent expands on the concept with further inter-related concepts 
and the growing swing in most of Asia to a “guided press” and developmental support 
communication.2 Asian governments continually state that because most of their societies are 
emerging democracies, they need time to develop their institutions. During this initial period 
of growth, stability and unity must be sought, criticism must be minimised and the public 
faith in governmental institutions and policies must be encouraged. Media must cooperate, 




ignoring negative societal or oppositionist characteristics and by supporting governmental 
ideologies and plans.3 
 What constitutes news in the Third World can be radically different from what 
constitutes news in the libertarian Western model. In the developing nations, there is a need 
for the national media to operate within stipulated state laws. The national press cannot be 
allowed to be the “enemy” of the state. In the developing nations there are nation-building or 
slanted news values and concepts that guide the gatekeepers of information in their selection 
and evaluation of news. Nasser suggests that to understand how Third World news concepts 
differ from or are similar to those in the West, it is advisable to first consider the Western 
news model, which he describes as “the concepts of objectivity and speedy dissemination in a 
free marketplace of ideas where journalists act as ‘watchdogs’ over the government and are 
essential to an open and democratic society in the West”.4  
 The theoretical foundation of developmental journalism is traced to the United 
Nations’ efforts to facilitate a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO) 
and was enthusiastically embraced by Third World and notably south-east Asian countries 
(see Chapter Five). 
  Eric Loo, who heads the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of 
Wollongong, agrees that in recent times development journalism has been used to muzzle the 
press: 
The principles guiding journalistic practice is national unity and social 
cohesion, nation building. I mean to outsiders these terms are just glib 
terms but in the context of Malaysian society those are real issues. So, to 
observers these principles have been abused by the state. So it is not the 
question of whether development journalism is supportive of government 
policies or whether it is another form of uncritical journalism. I think the 
question is whether that concept has been abused, misunderstood and used 
to intimidate the press to compel the press to write according to what 
government leaders or the state will define to be the proper way to report 
on national issues. 5 
 Loo’s comments mirror the writings of Merril [1970], Gunaratne [1980], Hachten 
[1987] and expand on earlier pioneering work by Siebert [1953]. The function then of 
development journalism was not merely to keep watch on government actions but to promote 





 Hemant Shah [1996] suggests that because of the negative connotations suggested by 
the term developmental journalism, a preferable descriptive term could be emancipatory 
journalism to facilitate recognising a role for journalists as participants in a process of 
progressive social change. Emancipatory journalism then “encourages journalists to abandon 
the role of neutral observer while reporting in a manner that is thorough, deeply researched 
and historically and culturally grounded, and that promotes social change in favour of the 
dispossessed”.6 
 Johan Galtung and Richard Vincent7 [1992] offer a 10-point proposal for a 
development-orientated news media: 
1. Whenever there is a reference to development, try to make it concrete in 
terms of concrete human beings. Thus they urge journalists to relate 
development to people they should report people as subjects, rather than 
objects or victims of need (pages 151-152).  
2. A development-oriented mass media should focus not only on the 
economics of development but also on military political and cultural 
aspects. The reasoning is that developmental journalism has to focus on 
more than economics because all these factors − military power, political 
power, cultural power etc. − have to do with development in one way or 
another and journalists should try to get people to reveal their inner 
agendas. (pages 154-155). 
3. Mere economic growth data will never do without accompanying dispersion 
data. Journalists must look at the income of the bottom 50 per cent or 10 per 
cent as well as the top 10 per cent or one per cent when making analysis 
(page 156). 
4. Focus on relations, not only difference; and do so not only within countries 
but between countries (page 156). 
5. A development-oriented press would do well to focus on the totality of 
concrete life situations (page 159). 
6. A development-oriented press would never forget the dimension of 
democracy. Democracy can only function when there is a free flow of 
information between people, the system and the media (page 162). 
7. There is always the possibility of reporting about development, not critically 




Success stories may contribute to a general sense of optimism that can 
generate more momentum for democracy and development (page 162). 
8. Allow the “people” to talk. To some extent community cable channels in 
the United States allows this to happen. It means giving a voice to the 
people to generate “an enormous amount of visions”. Thus people get a 
voice as experts in line with the seven preceding ideas (page2 163-164). 
9. Go one step further and let the people, to some extent, run the media. It 
means giving people some media control. Letters to the editor and op-ed 
pieces have space constraints. The next stage is to let people write and 
produce much of the material of the newspaper, thus enabling them to 
provide their own knowledge, experience and expertise. The extent to 
which this happens can become a criterion of mass media quality in a 
country (page 164). 
10. Let people run more of society, and then report on what happens. 
Developmental media should report more on what popular movements are 
doing  not only their successes but their failures too (pages 164-165). 
  Gunaratne finds it hard to disagree with Galtung and Vincent’s 10-point proposal and 
together with Shah’s thinking on emancipatory journalism, agrees it “provides a reasonable 
framework to understand the essentials of the concept of developmental journalism”.8 It is 
also a framework, according to Gunaratne, “that will enable us to compare developmental 
journalism with its new-born cousin that calls itself broadly public journalism”. 
   Somewhere between the developmental media theory and the concept of a socially 
responsible media lies the future direction of the South African print media as it emerges from 
the apartheid era. The emphasis firstly should be to reorganise the editorial structure of the 
national newsrooms. This incorporates managerial structures that include the widest spectrum 
of society and more importantly, the agenda setters  − copy tasters, sub-editors, and sectional 
heads from news editors to fashion editors, literary editors, foreign editors and others who 
have the role of copy selection that remains still mainly in white hands − need to 
accommodate a wider spectrum and a diversity of views.  And it is likely the government will 
have to offer directions in the national interest that will allow a meaningful editorial reshuffle 
of the gatekeepers of information if the national press is reluctant to speed up the 
transformation process. 
In what previously was marked by a curious mix of libertarian approach to the print 
media, especially by the English language press, there is now a need for an overhaul as the 




Managerial and editorial direction must incorporate the needs of this new and rapidly 
expanding middle class as well as shifting the balance of editorial content that appeals to a 
much broader market in a non-racial society.  
 Mainstream newspapers are trapped in a vicious cycle of balancing the needs of 
advertisers who target the financially secure readership of old and the need to provide 
editorial content that appeals to the broader non-racial audience the bulk of which is not so 
well off. This shift in editorial content runs the risk of alienating both advertisers and old 
readers, adversely affecting circulation and loss of revenue in a tight newspaper market where 
profit margins are already slim and falling. In the beginning, this shift in editorial policy could 
prove to be a financially costly exercise for newspapers. But it comes with the promise of 
long-term benefits as the press becomes more inclusive as opposed to the legacy of the past 
where the focus of the newspapers was slanted towards white readership. 
  The previous traditional conservative British approach to news content and form is 
not the direction for the future. The role and future directions of the press, both the English 
and Afrikaans language press, remains firmly on the national agenda since the historic all-race 
elections of 1994, and a wide variety of different views have emerged. 
  Some are examined here in terms of the guarantees under the new South African 
Constitution and in light of the aspirations of the Government of National Unity’s 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). 
Directions under the RDP 
Some of the lofty and sometimes vague and loosely defined aspirations for the media under 
the initiatives of the RDP in the new dispensation are:9 
•  An information  policy that guarantees active exchange of information and 
opinion among members of society, a new information policy that aims to 
facilitate exchange of information within and among communities, and 
between Government and society as a two-way process. 
•  New voices at national, regional and local levels and genuine competition 
rather than a monopoly of ideas must be encouraged.   
 The RDP is a government initiative to level the playing field and improve social and 
economic conditions for the millions of underprivileged and disadvantaged people in South 
Africa. Without the free flow of accurate and comprehensive information, the RDP concedes 
it will lack the mass input necessary for success. There are 11 official languages in South 
Africa, including English, Afrikaans, Ndebele, Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tsonga, 




Africa estimated its literacy rate (those aged 15 and over who can read and write) at 87 per 
cent for males and 86.4 per cent for females.  The figures appear to be high and many would 
dispute its accuracy and argue that it is unrealistically high. 
      Open debate and transparency in government and society are seen as crucial elements 
of the Reconstruction and Development Program and for this to occur, the government needs 
an information policy that guarantees active exchange of information and opinion among all 
members of society.   
 The RDP wants the government to “encourage and develop all three tiers of the media 
– public, community and private. New voices at national, regional and local levels, and 
genuine competition rather than a monopoly of ideas must be encouraged”.10 However, the 
infrastructure to facilitate these plans can best be described as at the planning stages at 
this time of writing. 
 Measures must also be introduced to curb monopoly control of the South African 
media, cross-media ownership of print and broadcast media must be reviewed and must be 
subject to strict limitations “determined in a public and transparent manner”. Unbundling of 
existing media monopolies must be encouraged both in the areas of publishing and 
distribution and for the implementation of these wide-ranging measures. 
 The RDP suggests the implementation of an affirmative action program to “empower 
communities and individuals from previously disadvantaged sectors of South African 
society”. Among the initiatives suggested are mechanisms to make available resources needed 
to set up broadcasting and printing enterprises at a range of levels; training and upgrading, 
and education to ensure that communities and individuals recognise and exercise their media 
rights. The RDP suggests government funds should be set aside for the training and education 
of journalists and community-based media and further, that media institutions should be 
encouraged to do the same. To ensure the free flow of information, the RDP seeks that the 
Freedom of Information Act be broadened within the parameters of the new Constitution. 
 The RDP also states that the South African Communication Service (SACS) must be 
restructured in order to undertake two important tasks; the provision of objective information 
about the activities of the State and other role players, and the facilitation of the new 
information policy. Towards this aim, the information arms of various ministries also have to 
be strengthened, especially those dealing with reconstruction and development.  
 As part of a democratic information program, the RDP also sees a role for various 
institutional mechanisms, among them the establishment of an Information Development 
Trust made up of a variety of representatives including government, journalists, media 




media enterprises. The important plank of the RDP’s new information policy: the effective 
two-way communication process between Government and citizens is in need of repair 
because it is ineffective and understaffed. 
  The national government is having difficulty getting its message out, and there is a 
belief in certain quarters that the national media is if not unsympathetic to the new 
government then certainly adversarial and critical to the point of causing damage to the needs 
and aspirations of the African National Congress and majority leaders in the new Government 
of National Unity. Much has been done to improve government communications  since the 
RDP was first launched in 1994, and by 2000, the SACS has developed into a comprehensive 
government information agency with offices in Pretoria and Cape Town, online links, 
international and national staff as well as offering media support to government missions 
abroad. 
 At a Conference of Communicators at Arniston, Western Cape, Allister Sparks 
[1995] suggested that effective two-way communication in South Africa does not exist. 
Citizens must be informed, he says, if they are to make rational choices. And citizens must be 
informed if they are to hold their public representatives accountable.  
For Sparks, these two factors constitute democracy’s bottom line and he says that the 
government, for its part, must also be aware of and responsive to public opinion if it is to 
govern effectively and in accordance with the will of the people. He says: 
At the moment that effective two-way communication does not exist, at 
least not adequately. I believe the will to have it is there. Hence the clause 
guaranteeing freedom of speech, including freedom of the media that is 
entrenched in our Interim Constitution. Hence, too, the government’s 
commitment to the Open Democracy Bill, which if enacted, will make 
South Africa one of only 14 countries in the world with such legislation 
empowering the ordinary citizen to access information about  the 
functioning of all governmental bodies.11  
 Sparks was directing his comments in response to suggestions by the Deputy 
President, Thabo Mbeki, to introduce a “Government Hour” on national television as a means 
of getting the government’s message across to the nation. Sparks says it highlights a 
deficiency in the state of communications between the government and the citizens of South 
Africa and this in turn “has serious implications for the new democracy we are trying to build, 
for an effective flow of information about the activities of government is an organic necessity 




 He blames deteriorating journalistic standards, understaffed newsrooms, inexperience 
and a downturn in economic viability of the print industry as prime factors contributing to the 
inability of the government to get its message across. 
 This is compounded by the fact that the government does not have a media 
mouthpiece of its own and must communicate through existing media channels, and this 
means that the messages are “filtered through privately-owned newspapers and independent 
broadcasting stations over which it has no control − and which may ignore those messages, or 
get them wrong, or put their own spin on them to suit their own agendas”.13  
 Sparks offers no suggestion that the black government may be facing a hostile and 
unresponsive media that is adopting a critical and damaging approach and that this 
unwelcome direction is coming from media gatekeepers that are still a legacy of the apartheid 
era. However, the question of understaffed and inexperienced newsrooms is not without 
foundation. Mathatha Tsedu [1995] the political editor of the Sowetan, conceded at a Freedom 
of Information seminar in Grahamstown that reporters in his newsroom were “a greenhorn 
squad” and that 70 per cent of them had less than two years’ experience, two staffers in 
Parliament had to cover six Constitutional Assembly theme committees, one of which had six 
sub-committees every day and furthermore, the media was being used as a recruiting ground 
for communications experts for the new civil service.14  
 Sparks offers two options available to the Government short of developing its own 
newspapers to improve or facilitate two-way communication between the citizens and the 
Government: (a.) Develop a highly organised, highly skilled government media liaison 
structure and (b.) develop a dedicated public affairs television channel that can convey 
information of national importance directly from the source to the public, along the lines of 
the United States model C-Span or Cable Satellite Public Affairs network. 
 It is a television network that operates two 24-hour channels of coverage in the US 
House of Representatives and all its congressional committee hearings and the Senate. It also 
provides interviews with key political figures involved in the debates, political analysts and 
visiting or overseas experts, authors of books on national and international affairs as well as 
reporting major speeches both inside and outside of government. 
 Guy Berger, professor of journalism and media studies at Rhodes University, finds 
common ground with Sparks in a need for improved government communications by 
improving the Government’s press liaison capacity. For Berger, though, the government 
should aim for “interactive communication with (and between) citizens rather than a purely 




 This requires, firstly, that the government does not “mess with the mass media (public 
or private), but rather boosts its public liaison capacity; secondly, that it improves direct 
communications with citizens via existing public servants and activities. (Both these strategies 
necessitate improved internal communications within government and state). Thirdly, and 
most importantly, government should create an enabling environment for many more citizens 
to become communicators in their own right. This entails limited media subsidies for 
community-based communication, as well as the rapid development of telecommunications”.15 
 Berger says that in developing a national communications policy, there is no need to 
reinvent the wheel because suitable proven models exist internationally and can be adapted to 
suit the particular needs of the South African situation. He says:  
To assess what exactly we draw from overseas has to be firmly grounded 
in our knowledge of what is happening here (in South Africa), what we 
want to do about it, and why. The starting point in the here and now is – 
crudely – that the government is trying to upgrade the quality of life of 
black South Africans, that it believes communication has an important role 
to play in this, and that it has serious problems with the country’s present 
communication set up.16 
 Against a background of cultural, education and economic diversity, Berger suggests 
it would be “a mistake to see communications simply as a means to changing South Africa” 
and he points out there are limits to what the government can achieve in working towards a 
Reconstruction and Development Program  as he puts it “that is both by communications and 
for communications”. While drawing on the Libertarian theory for the development of the 
media, as well as the theory of social responsibility, Berger finds favour in the model 
developed in Sweden where the philosophy is that there is a governmental responsibility to 
help realise the right to communicate, suggesting some type of subsidy to promote the 
expansion and development of communication at different levels of society. 
 In South Africa this would entail the Government going further than simply using 
communication (inter alia) to champion the existing Bill of Rights; to facilitating the growth 
of citizens as communicators ... it moves into a different dimension, and indeed one that 
squares with the Reconstruction and Development Program’s philosophy of democratisation 
and civil empowerment.17 But Berger points out the difficulties for the South African 
Government are many. 
  Firstly, he says, there is a coalition Cabinet and a commitment to national 




private media. Secondly, the regulation of broadcasting is independent of government, even if 
the power of the purse is still there to be wielded.  
 Thirdly, there is the government’s commitment to a mixed economy, which limits the 
extent of government involvement in private sector communications. Fourth, there is a Bill of 
Rights which also prohibits the government from interfering in freedom of expression in that 
sphere. 
So, the government could not, even if it wanted to, simply take over the existing 
communications apparatuses and point them in different directions. Nor, fifthly, can the 
government seriously set up a rival parallel system: there are scarce resources, and with the 
maxim of maximum impact at minimum cost, there is no way the government can (or should) 
afford to take on the challenge of getting into the mass media business. 
 Berger concedes the South African media is vulnerable to criticism of the quality of 
its coverage, there are frustrations with the media and this has increased  as frustrations with 
the slow pace of transformation in post-apartheid South Africa has increased as well as the 
slow pace of implementing major planks of the RDP. Government complaints about the mass 
media that government affairs are ignored, downplayed or inadequately reported has some 
validity and substance. Sparks takes this aspect even further by claiming that reporting 
standards on South African newspapers were at the lowest he had seen in his 44 years of 
journalism. South Africa’s press was demanding access to information it did not have the 
resources or skills to deal with.  
 Sparks blamed low standards, understaffed newsrooms and an exodus of senior 
journalistic talent to more lucrative jobs for what he perceives as a demise in South African 
journalism and warns there are vast areas of the country, especially the former homelands that 
are not even covered by the press. As an example, he said, court reporting had fallen out of 
favour in newsrooms.18 And he warned that reporting that was inadequate, superficial or 
simply wrong would test the patience of the regime and its commitment to press freedom. The 
press, said Sparks, was the custodian of its own freedom. He warns: 
 If the Government moves against the press and the public applauds, we’re 
done for, is the ominous warning.19  
 The criticism of the exodus of skilled journalists for higher paid jobs and improved 
prospects overseas was echoed by the editor of the Sunday Times,  Ken Owen, who said that 
people who had not worked on South African newspapers in the past decade [1985-1995] 
could not realise how difficult, brutal, and bruising an environment it had been. He recalled 




journalists and within days there were 14 resignations on his desk, all lost to Australian media 
organisations.20  
 It is against this background then that Berger proposed several developments to 
improve both the role of the media and the supply of information by the government so that 
the media can operate more efficiently in keeping the public informed. In the short term, for 
the media to play its role properly requires an investment in training to improve the standard 
of reporting generally and more attractive staff conditions, criteria which he says the media 
have been slow to recognise. 
 The government, for its part, can improve inefficient and slow press liaison to get its 
message across quickly, accurately and in this way secure better coverage. 
Government and state can also gain better coverage in the media by 
increasing access to officials. Government communication needs a policy 
definition about the level at which information can be released.... 
Maximum access may be the more advantage policy for the interests of 
both the government and the media.21  
 And as an option for future direction, although on a modest scale, Berger points the 
South African Government in the direction of the Swedish model while conceding that money 
in the form of grants and loans, and management training would be crucial for this strategy to 
succeed.22 
 The observations of Berger and Sparks highlighting understaffed newsrooms, a lack 
of skilled journalists and poor editorial standards are not in dispute. These problems have 
been similarly acknowledged by the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF), at the 
Truth Commission hearings, and editors of major national newspapers. Efforts to improve 
editorial standards with increased training facilities have been implemented by Independent 
Newspapers as well as all the other major newspaper groups.  
 The effects of these training facilities have been negligible in the 10 years since the 
fall of apartheid and the focus is usually at the junior or introductory level of journalism. 
Training needs to be offered across the board, more importantly at the senior levels where 
changes are seldom seen and is urgently required. 
 The focus needs to shift to middle management where the national press is dominated 
by white journalists from the apartheid era. This is not to say that every white journalist 
operating at the mid-managerial level has tendencies towards racism, however it does block 
the career options of promising black and coloured journalists who then turn to newly created 
public service communications jobs. This exodus of black and coloured talent from an already 




 What is needed is an honest commitment towards change by the national publishers. 
It must include opportunities for black and coloured journalists to rise above the junior levels 
where most of them languish. It requires further commitment from publishers to eliminate the 
difficulties faced by black and coloured journalists who feel undermined by the incumbents 
when they accept management offers. In practical terms, a black or coloured journalist who is 
offered a middle management or managerial position usually replaces a senior white journalist 
with many years’ experience. The displaced white executive is shunted sideways in the 
editorial reshuffle and resents this. The result is an unpleasant and hostile work environment 
that places unreasonable expectations on the replacement. 
 Coupled with a lack of managerial training and experience, black and coloured 
journalists who have been selected for such positions have faltered because they fall victim to 
an editorial office culture that resents change at the senior levels. Retrenchment of displaced 
senior white executives might be the solution to achieve the sort of non-racial mix in senior 
editorial ranks that is desirable. This could be a costly as well as a reluctant exercise but as 
matters now stand, black and coloured journalists drawn into the inner sanctum of national 
papers face a hostile reception when disgruntled, displaced white executives remain on staff 
to snipe from the sidelines. Inevitably, some of the newly anointed fail in their calling while 
others give up and quit for more lucrative jobs. And when that happens, publishers will be 
reluctant to introduce changes and it reinforces current practices to maintain the status quo. 
 Berger’s suggestion that the South African Government look in the direction of the 
Swedish model of media subsidies holds little promise. In a country where the focus is on 
improving basic human necessities like running water, electricity and community health 
services there is very little chance that the government could be persuaded to move in that 
direction. Instead, the government has opted to establish the Government Communication and 
Information System (GCIS) to foster a more positive communication environment mainly via 
its daily online news service Bua News. 
The GCIS is headed by Joel Netshitenzhe with the aim of ensuring that the 
government’s voice is heard. As a communications platform, the GCIS provides support and 
advice to the government, the media, the public and the international community. As a news 
agency delivering government spin to the media, its services are viewed with suspicion at 
worst and as unobjective at best with the result that the GCIS struggles to get the 
government’s message across to newspapers that are independently owned and operated. This 




Winds of change 
In an effort to meet the challenges facing the media in post-apartheid South Africa, The Cape 
Times was one of the first major metropolitan newspapers to appoint a “coloured” person as 
editor. Moegsien Williams saw his role as redefining the news for a newspaper that was 
considered primarily a “white newspaper” but the majority of its readers were coloureds and 
only 38 per cent of its readers were white. 
 Williams suggested The Cape Times was now a newspaper for all South Africans but 
there were serious misgivings about the direction of the newspaper. Further, some serious 
hurdles needed to be overcome before this claim could be justified because the staff 
composition did not reflect this change in direction and there were fears that significant 
editorial changes could alienate the 38 per cent of white readers. 
 For Williams, this was the challenge of the emerging role of the print media: 
There are two challenges really. The one is internal because the reality is 
that our staff do not also reflect the readership. I have a situation here 
where I am only the sixth or seventh person of colour on the staff and we 
have, genetically speaking, a 62 per cent black readership so it is totally 
out of kilter, we need to begin to reflect the demographic realities on our 
staff. The other problem we are dealing with internally is our approach to 
news. I’m speaking of drawing up an entirely new news agenda to move 
away from the pre-apartheid news coverage to a post-apartheid news 
coverage and it requires a re-education in your staff. Externally we are 
thinking of beginning to engage our different communities, I call it 
redefining the news, you know, asking people to help us to shape a 
newspaper that will serve them best.23  
 The program is in its infancy and indications are it could work. The circulation of The 
Cape Times has shown slight improvement to May 1996, over a nine-month period since the 
start of the new direction and Williams conceded that while change was needed, newspapers 
as well as South African society generally, were still in a state of transition. While there were 
many changes taking place there were also many things that have remained the same. As for 
an assessment of the current role of the print media in South Africa, Williams remained 
optimistic. 
  But the changing face of South African society, politics and the new dispensation has 





We are not doing a great job. As print media specifically ... we have 
woken up very late to the changes that have taken place and I am speaking 
of the initial reforms announced by (former President F.W.) De Klerk six  
years ago. We are pretty much grappling with issues which the politicians 
dealt with four, five years ago when they wrote the interim constitution, so 
we are way behind in a way the rest of society in transforming ourselves 
and that is really the challenge. I must say the fact that in my company 
there has been a change of ownership. It has resulted in a new ethos in the 
company. A new kind of mission statement has emerged and right at the 
top of this mission statement is the need for us to transform our 
newspapers to fit in with the new society and form an integral part of this 
new democracy ... My editorship of The Cape Times is an indication of the 
changes that are taking place. It would have been unheard of for a 
coloured person to become editor of The Cape Times or a major 
metropolitan daily. So changes are taking place and I’m pretty hopeful.24 
 [Williams was later to take up the editorship of Independent Newspapers’ afternoon 
daily in Cape Town, The Argus. The Cape Times is the morning daily. Ryland Fisher replaced 
Williams as editor at The Cape Times. Fisher’s appointment was part of the transformation 
process within Independent Newspapers.] 
 At the Sowetan, South Africa’s largest circulation daily newspaper [around 218,000 a 
day] which serves a predominantly black readership in the Johannesburg-Soweto region, the 
editor Mike Siluma defines the role of his newspaper as primarily to inform people and to 
educate them about the transformation that is occurring in South Africa. “I think the big thing 
that has changed,” Siluma says, “is that where previously the (main role) of black journalists 
was to oppose government. That was what we lived for because that was the reality then. 
Apartheid was a life and death issue and that put us in opposition to the government by 
definition. Now there is not that situation where black people are opposed and the government 
is not oppressing anybody, society is freer and therefore there is no reason for us to take an 
oppositionist position to government. Our rule is to inform people and to educate them about 
the transformation that is happening in the country.”25 
  As for the current position of the print media in South Africa, Siluma believes it is 
still torn between old loyalties on both sides of politics. He felt that there was much confusion 
about the role of the press with some people believing that the media should be oppositionist. 
Siluma said there were, for example, many black journalists who held strong political views 
and who did not agree with the ANC for instance and who felt “that the whole transformation 




Then you have the white editors who are still rooted in the old system, 
who want to take the view that the media have to distrust everything and 
anything the government does. And then you have other people who 
believe you have to support the ANC in the interest of the transformation. 
There is no universal position that the media has taken.26 
Old foes show their hands 
In the lead up to the first multiracial elections in South Africa, national attention focused on 
the need for a revised media policy. Political parties jostling for a piece of history joined a 
wide forum of opinion-makers and agenda-setters in offering diverse options on the role and 
direction of the media to guide the emerging new South Africa along the democratic path. 
  While the African National Congress started work in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1988 on 
constitutional guidelines and a blueprint for the transition to a post-apartheid South Africa, the 
focus was mainly on politics and economic matters including the more high profile policies 
on housing, education social reforms and welfare, a coherent media policy was not afforded a 
high priority. It was not until 1991 that the Department of Information and Publicity of the 
African National Congress convened a meeting of more than 300 delegates to draft a media 
policy.27 
 The National Party steered clear of launching a media policy statement but responded 
with a series of answers outlining future directions to ensure freedom of the press within free 
market parameters, and indicated opposition to state intervention or “sponsorship” of sections 
of the media to provide a more equitable degree of access to the media by all sections of the 
community. In March, 1992, the Pan African Congress of Azania released its media policy 
statement. After the South African political reforms announced in February 1991, the 
Democratic Party was the first to formulate and present its media policy, which their media 
spokesman Peter Soal developed further at a seminar at the Centre for Cultural and Media 
Studies on July 30, 1991. 
The ANC media policy 
The need for a Media Charter which sets out the principles of press freedom and one based on 
the free flow of information that promotes a culture of open debate was one of the ideals of 
the African National Congress defined in a policy statement in 1992, ahead of the historic all-
party elections in 1994. 
  The ANC viewed as important the need to transform the national media − which by 
and large is a commercial media except for the national radio and television broadcaster − so 




a preface to its proposed Media Charter, the ANC expressed the view that “elements of such a 
Charter would find expression in a Constitution and Bill of Rights; while others would be 
realised through relevant legislation. Yet others would serve as social guidelines”.28  
 By way of explaining a Media Charter, the ANC regarded it as “erroneous to 
advocate the setting up of bodies which determine what society should or should not read, 
hear or watch. Rather judicial procedures should be effected if and when otherwise ordinary 
laws of the land are violated. On the other hand media freedoms should be understood in the 
context of other citizens’ rights such as the right to privacy”.29 
ANC draft media charter 
At the heart of the ANC’s media charter is the fundamental belief that democracy cannot 
emerge and flourish without a democratic media. But there are some qualifications to this 
broad-brush approach and an admission that freedom of the press on its own is not enough. 
 There is a need for affirmative action to redress the imbalance and injustices of the 
apartheid years. There is a need for an equitable distribution of media resources, development 
programs and “a deliberate effort to engender the culture of open debate”.  
The proposed charter considers it the right of all citizens to participate in the decision-
making process and to be able to do so adequately, the citizens need to be properly informed 
by a responsible media and must have access to different options so that an informed choice 
can be made. The legacy of apartheid and South Africa’s formerly closed society and 
restrictions on the free flow of information under the National Party government plus the 
structure and ownership of the national media resources, the skills, language policy and social 
deprivation has meant that access to information for the bulk of South Africa’s citizens has 
been undermined and in its preamble to the Draft Media Charter, the ANC indicates a new 
direction to overcome these difficulties. 
 The draft media charter is comprised of six categories including democratisation of 
the media; public media, media-workers and society, education and training, promotional 
mechanisms. The thrust of the Charter is contained in the first category which deals with basic 
rights and freedoms. It states: 
1.    All the people shall have the right to freely publish, broadcast and 
otherwise disseminate information and opinion, and shall have the 
right of free access to information and opinion. 
2. All institutional and legislative measures which restrict the free 
flow of information or which impose censorship over the media and 




3. All people shall have the right of access to information held or 
collected by the State or other social institutions subject to any 
limitations provided for in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. 
 
 In addition, the Draft Charter makes the following provisions: 
•  diversity of media ownership and publishing and distribution facilities, 
•   affirmative action programs,  
•  guarantees of media access to all communities and at all levels of society,  
•  state media resources to be used to promote and strengthen democracy, 
•   provisions for a state broadcasting service independent of the ruling party and 
serving all sectors of society, 
•   guarantees on the right of reply and a guarantee of a citizen’s right to privacy, 
•   media workers to be protected from threats of intimidation and other forms of 
pressure that may inhibit their work, 
•   journalists to be protected by the law from revealing their sources, 
•   journalists will be free to form and join trade unions political parties and other 
organisations of their choice, 
•   a promise to provide facilities for the training and upgrading of media workers,  
•  training programs for disadvantaged sectors of the community to foster, 
develop and implement broadcasting and print media facilities and as part of a 
civic education program, 
•   the state and media institutions shall strive to inform citizens about their media 
rights and those of media workers. 
 The ANC’s draft media charter is an ambitious document that encompasses a vast 
range of issues that affect the functions of a dynamic and free press and it sets impressive 
goals which in practice would be difficult, if not impossible to implement. Thus, the Charter 
runs the risk of being described as little more than an idealistic wish list. In conclusion, the 
ANC resolved to amend and review government information services formerly used and 
controlled as party political information services by the previous National Party government 
and included, amongst others, the state information services such as the South African 
Communications Service, the Human Sciences Research Council, the police and defence 




 The ANC also sees a need for a national daily newspaper “published from a 
democratic perspective” and the establishment of a media development program to “increase 
the party’s ability to use the media to inform, educate, mobilise, and organise”, as well as 
conceding a need to “restructure and democratise the broadcast, film and print media and to 
develop these areas through a democratic process”.31 
PAC and the media 
In a short statement released in March 1992, the Pan African Congress questioned the role 
and independence of the mainstream South African print media, declaring that with the media 
in control of white monopolies, freedom of expression did not exist in South Africa because 
no debate was free of the control of “white capital” and the picture was one of absolute 
control over the right of free speech, freedom of the press, and guaranteed free debate. 
 The run-up to the first multiracial general elections in South Africa in 1994 appeared 
to find the Pan African Congress without a considered media policy. In a policy statement 
released in March, 1992, the PAC offers what appears no more than an ad hoc media policy 
which reflects the party’s rhetoric on a variety of matters. 
 Among its objectives, it pledges a guarantee of freedom of the press and the 
electronic media and commits itself to a Bill of Rights to enshrine freedom of expression.  
 It finds fault with the concentration of media ownership currently under white 
control, and states that this gross imbalance in ownership must first be changed before 
democratic debate can flourish. Democratic debate, the PAC states, “can only flourish where 
the gross imbalance that presently exists in the media is drastically altered in favour of the 
ordinary Azanian (the PAC’s name for South Africa is Azania) − the worker, the unemployed, 
youth and students, the rural peasant and the landless labourer”. 
 It states that informed debate and consequent informed political action is the essence 
of democracy and it cannot flourish “with false propaganda to serve class interest”. In an 
effort to reshape the media, the PAC offered the following suggestions to guarantee freedom 
of the press and electronic media: 
• Freedom of expression must be enshrined in a Bill of Rights; 
• The control of the media must be wrested from the absolute control 
of the “big four” (the four major national press groups). The PAC 
believes that there should be a limit on the number of newspapers 
owned by a single company; 
• The Constitution must make provision for the right of minority 




must afford these newspapers subsidies to ensure its survival. 
These subsidies should be awarded as a right and with agreed 
audited circulation figures. The political party in power would not 
be allowed to interfere with such subsidies and it would ensure the 
right of dissent; 
•      A Press Council must be established to ensure proper standards are 
maintained in the dissemination of the news; it would also 
safeguard the privacy of individuals against unwarranted 
interference, the council should also have the right to take action 
against any person responsible for inciting the harassment of 
journalists performing their duties. 
Press subsidies to foster diversity 
The Pan African Congress’ notion of government subsidies for certain types of newspapers as 
a means of ensuring diversity of opinion is not new. It has been tried with a degree of success 
by some developed nations of Europe and elsewhere. 
  The democratic socialist media system option proposed by Louw [1994] included a 
media subsidy system that he suggested could be designed “to overcome the skewing that a 
capitalist media system creates”. It would work with a view to ensuring that all constituencies 
were guaranteed access to the media of their choice and it would be administered by a 
statutory Media Council.32 
 Louw’s subsidy option had its foundations in similar subsidy systems that have been 
tried in Sweden, Holland and Belgium. While this theory has operated with some success in 
Europe, it is fraught with danger in South Africa where proper administration and misuse 
cannot be excluded. That is before the difficulties of sorting out the ratios of editorial material 
that will be published, the tone and content of the messages, and the practical administration 
of the project. Louw suggested the State should create a fund to pay for this media diversity 
and that the fund be created from taxes on the commercial media and advertising sectors. 
 If insufficient funds are raised from these two industries, the state should make up the 
shortfall to ensure the success of the project. Louw describes this as his Democratic Socialist 
Media System, it is an option consistent with the aims of the African National Congress’ 
Freedom Charter. Louw argues further that the incoming black government, serving as it has 
to “the present have-nots’ (the working class, peasants and unemployed) the government will 
be under considerable pressure from its constituency to change the present media system 




 Louw offered this theory in 1993, before the Government of National Unity took over 
from the National Party and his assessment of the role and direction of the media cannot be 
argued with. He is correct in his projection that the “have nots” − meaning largely the former 
oppressed blacks − will put pressure on the ANC-led government to change the present media 
system. However, six years later, it has become clear that the national media, both the English 
and Afrikaans press, do not share the confidence of the larger section of the community.  
 This is both true in terms of content and agenda setting in the national press. It is also 
true as far as the revelations at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission show a national 
media that are reluctant to accept blame for their role during the apartheid years and seeking 
rather to grab praise for its role in the demise of apartheid. In the twisted dynamics of South 
African politics and media, it is true that the press at some stages pursued a defiant and 
critical role against government excesses and intolerance but certainly, from the perspective 
of the oppressed and from the perspective of black journalists, it was quite different and the 
efforts amounted to doing too little and usually too late. 
 This dichotomy still exists. It is found in the complaints of government officials and 
leaders who still argue that the national press was continuing to operate in a way that was 
harmful and detrimental to the aspirations of the government − or even further, that the 
national press was actively working to the detriment of the new government by focusing on 
government inefficiencies and failures in a country that was struggling with economic and 
social reforms and hampered by a police force that was losing the fight against crime and 
violence. The underlying suggestion being that the white-dominated press still cannot come to 
terms with the overwhelming changes that resulted in the fall of apartheid and the installation 
a black majority government. 
 And to further complicate matters, the South African President, Nelson Mandela, 
sounded the warning bells in his opening address at the ANC national conference in Mafiking 
on December 16, 1997 when he warned that there were still a large number of whites in South 
Africa who were dissatisfied with the changes from white rule and in a blistering attack 
Mandela accused white South Africans of still wanting to profit from the apartheid era. 
 He accused sections of the white community of actively fomenting counter-
revolutionary measures to overthrow the black government. Mandela warned the party 
delegates that there was a Third Force operating to destabilise the country. The rising crime 
rate was just one of their methods to make the country ungovernable and chaotic. 
 The national press has on many occasions been accused of constant criticism of these 
problems and the president’s blistering speech was yet another indication that the national 




  The ingredients are certainly there and so are the signals from a number of speeches 
and statements on the media in the past four years of post-apartheid South Africa. Despite the 
provisions of freedom of speech in the Bill of Rights, an ANC led Government under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, the national press faces serious challenges.  
 Louw argues that instead of nationalising the commercial media, the government 
might be better off creating a parallel system for the purpose of its constituency. This parallel 
system would consist of a media subsidy system.34 In theory, Louw’s suggestion makes good 
sense but the provisions of the subsidy system would, in a practical sense, be difficult to 
implement. There would be too many interest groups, too little finance, as well as the 
potential for mismanagement.  
 On a practical level, any subsidy system has potential for abuse and fraud. Besides, 
the difficulty of collating and dividing the financial incentives and the editorial ratios, it is the 
financial management of such a scheme that can place it at risk. A lack of properly trained 
journalists is an added problem. The establishment of proper, functional newsrooms would be 
costly and outweigh the benefits in a country where subsidies may be better spent in more 
practical ways such as improving public health schemes, alleviating extreme poverty, 
extending electricity supplies or improving community housing. The need for a subsidised 
media lags far behind some extremely rugged social problems. 
 A Media Council could be established by statute to monitor and control the subsidy 
system, in addition the Media Council would be composed of persons with a diversity of 
opinion. Louw argues: 
The Media Council could also assist the State in ascertaining levels of 
taxation on the commercial media infrastructures (newspapers, magazines, 
radio, TV, advertising and PR agencies, film and video distributors, 
cinema industry etc.) Taxation of these media is one way of redistributing 
wealth away from, say the liberal commercial press sector towards other 
constituencies. Such a subsidy system would enable an ANC government, 
for example, to serve its own constituency’s needs. However, it would 
simultaneously guarantee other constituencies their own independent 
media. Under such a media system there would be no need to nationalise 
the existing English-liberal or Afrikaner-nationalist press in order to 
redress the skewing of information resources.35 
 The rationale behind Louw’s democratic socialist media system is his argument that 
the South African media needs “a position that attempts to marry the positive aspects of both 




both ie. a position between the options of (1) nationalising the media, and (2) leaving the 
current structures unchanged”. 
 Jackson also considers the prospects of a media subsidy system as he grapples with 
what he describes as the single most compelling question about the future of the South 
African press: What are its prospects for operating freely in post-apartheid South Africa? In 
1993, the quick and simple consensus among academics, journalists and editors was that 
freedom of the press would go as well as the fortunes of the country. A more considered view, 
Jackson suggests, is that “the press in South Africa is likely to end the 1990s with more 
freedom than it began the decade.”36 However, he warns that under a new political order, it is 
harder to project. Considering what happened in Rhodesia under Ian Smith and with the 
transition to Zimbabwe and the incoming government of Robert Mugabe, the Argus Group 
has had first-hand experience of a liberation black government nationalising the press.  
 It is an argument that has sparked much debate especially among editors of the Argus 
Group (now Independent Newspapers) but after three years, the ANC-led government has 
pledged a commitment to free speech and backed this up with legislation, despite some 
serious clashes with the press.  According to Jackson: 
The worst case, from the perspective of the mainstream press’s 
management, would be nationalisation of the media. All papers would then 
serve as government voices. However, there is little indication that the 
ANC and other groups that may be part of the future government would 
choose this course − or find it politically wise to do even if they wanted to. 
Far more likely is some kind of affirmative action program to address the 
economic imbalance reflected in the present ownership patterns.37 
  His suggestion is pertinent and particularly accurate and there has been no talk or 
suggestion of nationalising the press. However, black ownership, as in the case of the Times 
Media Group acquisitions, is accelerating. Yet, undoubtedly, those who were once in 
opposition and who had serious doubts about the neutrality and other aspects of the press are 
now in power. The monopolistic nature of the South African press remains a major issue, the 
editorial staff ratios and the controlling hands of mainly white editors causes further concern. 
And the ANC has repeatedly suggested there must be a mechanism for change in the media. 
The mechanism could still be nationalisation of the press, although it is an unlikely prospect 
at this stage of the transition to a full democracy. A more likely option would be the firm hand 





In reality, the option of nationalisation seems slim. Actions against the 
mainstream press would draw a firestorm of criticism, both at home from 
many whites and internationally. A politically safer and generally more 
defensible option would be to exercise the ‘affirmative action’ approach. 
The most likely way of doing this would be to devise some formula for 
arranging subsidies to papers that were less secure financially. In a 
concerted effort to increase press diversity, the government might follow 
the example of Sweden, whose subsidy system has generated considerable 
interest in South Africa. With good reason, the ANC argues that because 
blacks have for generations been deprived of credible media outlets, a 
compelling need exists for the state to help level the playing field in 
tomorrow’s press environment.38 
 It is a scenario that horrifies the traditional white editors and causes ripples of 
discontent especially in the Afrikaans press. The role of the media has constantly been on the 
national agenda in the “transitional” post-apartheid period and while there have always been 
absolute guarantees of freedom of the press from the ANC, there has also been constant and 
harsh criticism of the way in which the media is going about its business. 
 It is not too hard to read into this constant battle between press and state that the 
ingredients for some sort of action on the part of the government do not seem far away. 
Market mechanisms, monopoly control 
Louw warns that the libertarian (or free press) model in South Africa has had severe 
limitations and that this free market place of ideas was not borne out by the facts. In fact, 
Louw suggests it does not work: 
Those in the mainstream press have traditionally blamed government 
censorship for their failure to fully cover events. It is true that the state has 
placed enormous restrictions upon the media. However, a significant part 
of the problem lies in the market mechanism itself when applied to the 
media organisation.39  
 Louw points to the failure of the largely anti-government Rand Daily Mail that 
became a victim of its own success as it opposed the authoritarian controls of the National 
Party. In the complexities of the South African politics, whites regarded the Mail as radical 
and to the left while to the majority of the oppressed people, even that which the Mail offered 
was not enough. But it is in the commercially-orientated media where the advertisers play 




censorship as advertising censorship. Using the demise of the Rand Daily Mail as an example, 
Louw puts it this way: 
 It means a media de facto controlled by advertisers, and the middle-class 
interests to which they pander. Advertisers are interested to win those with 
disposable incomes; and that means the middle class. And if advertisers 
are interested in the middle class, then it is this middle class that editors of 
the commercially-driven media must attract if they are to survive. Non 
middle-class audiences are not profitable, and hence the media serving, for 
example, working-class opinion in a capitalist society will face enormous 
financial difficulties because they will have comparatively less success in 
attracting advertisers.40 
 Louw’s fears for monopoly control of the South African media and he proposes an 
alternate media subsidy system based on the “Western” Dutch model. He argues that in the 
transition to a democratic South Africa there is need for a diversity of print media voices 
because South Africa’s market-driven commercial press does not provide for such diversity. 
 It attracted serious dissent from senior executives of both the Argus Group and Times 
Media Ltd in the form of Peter Sullivan, at the time the editor of The Star, and Steve 
Mulholland, at the time the chief executive at TML. Sullivan challenged Louw’s assumption 
of a monopolistic media as a superficial argument that was easy to refute. 
 Sullivan pointed to the four major press groups operating in South Africa as well as 
the diversity of newspapers in the Johannesburg region where there are six major 
metropolitan daily newspapers to choose from every day. They are The Star, Business Day, 
Sowetan, Beeld, Transvaler, and The Citizen and on Fridays Johannesburg also produces Vrye 
Weekblad, Weekly Mail and City Press. In addition, Johannesburg citizens can also buy New 
Nation, and the Lenasia Indicator, Die Afrikaner becomes available sporadically as well as 
Die Patriot. On Sundays, Johannesburg citizens have a further choice of three newspapers, 
the Sunday Times, Rapport and the Sunday Star. In addition there are also more than 15 
community newspapers operating in the suburbs surrounding Johannesburg.41 
 Compared to the rest of the world, Sullivan says, Johannesburg has a huge luxury of 
diversity in its newspapers and he rejects outright the suggestion of Louw and questions the 
suggestion “that newspapers were editorially exclusively in favour of capitalism”. The 
assertion by Louw that the Argus opposed apartheid, primarily because of the negative 
economic implications for capitalism, rather than due to its racism, is also rejected by 




Throughout the history of Argus newspapers, Argus editors have 
challenged capitalism, have challenged mining interests, and have clashed 
with capitalists on a huge range of issues, including apartheid, corruption, 
exploitation, workers’ interests, mining rights, conservation, and virtually 
every subject affecting their readers.42 
 And in defence of the company’s policy on racial discrimination, Sullivan offers this 
assessment of the Argus Group: 
It may have had some validity in the early 1950s, but from 1960 until the 
present day, any reader of The Star, The Argus or any other Argus-owned 
daily would have read, almost ad nauseum, of the evils of apartheid,  the 
evils of all forms of racism, and often the evils of the labour practices of 
the mining houses. Apartheid was vigorously opposed through conviction 
by editors and journalists within the Argus Group far more effectively than 
through any other medium.43  
 If Sullivan’s observations, written in 1991, can be interpreted even vaguely as a fair 
reflection of Argus Company policy during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, then it does far more to 
indicate the curious dynamics and complexities of the South African press. Comparing 
Sullivan’s description of Argus company policy against the submissions to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the apology from Independent Newspapers (the new owners 
of the Argus group) for omissions during the apartheid years, then Sullivan’s observations are 
seriously at odds with the versions of those who felt the brunt of the company’s 
discriminatory practices, the black journalists.  
 It would, in fact, be fair to suggest that Sullivan’s view of Argus company policy is 
the white man’s view while those at the other end of the colour spectrum working on Argus 
company publications have a seriously different opinion. It is this difference that leads to the 
theory that serious and far-reaching changes are undoubtedly needed in the South African 
media for it to function effectively. 
 While Sullivan offers little in the way of constructive change for new direction in the 
South African print media, he suggests that it is “the integrity of Argus newspapers and their 
commitment to absolute standards of ethics in journalism is what made them great. Seeking 
conspiracy is futile. Seeking to emulate them would be a far more profitable exercise − not in 
capitalist terms but in an intellectual profit to all people who value truth, and the attempts of 
journalists to provide that truth to readers”. 
 These are noble sentiments with little to complain about but when considered in 




discrimination. Black and coloured journalists were only employed on the newspapers 
directly pitched at blacks and coloureds – newspapers including the World, Sunday World, 
Post, and Cape Herald. The Argus, one of the major newspapers in the group, only employed 
two coloured journalists out of a staff of more than 100 during the 1970s and mid-1980s and 
this was also the case at the company’s flagship newspaper, the Star in Johannesburg. These 
issues were comprehensively dealt with during the TRC inquiry into the media as well as the 
South African Human Rights Commission’s inquiry into the media and John Patten’s 
submission on behalf of Independent Newspapers.  
 In reply to Sullivan’s attack, Louw defends his view of an economic-driven media, 
discounting Sullivan’s view of a conspiracy theory. Louw suggests: 
Further, ‘editorial independence’ within a market media system is 
prescribed because the market automatically imposes limitations upon the 
editors. No conspiracy is implied. In simple terms no editor running a 
profit-driven medium can afford to alienate those with disposable income 
... To alienate this minority would be to lose the advertising life-line. This 
inherently skews the world-view presented by the market-driven media. 
The bottom line is profit, and the ‘integrity and truth’ Peter Sullivan talks 
of (I am tempted to ask whose truth?) has to fit this mould.44 
  Louw defends the allegation of media monopoly as a pedantic argument over the 
definition of “monopoly” but stresses the fact that “we no longer have a free-market 
libertarian press in South Africa. Further, our press industry has clearly not escaped the 
impact of expanding monopoly capitalistic relations of production ... what is clear to me are 
that we have an unhealthy concentration of ownership of the country’s important newspaper 
titles, and especially in the newspaper distribution centre.” 
  Louw further rejects Sullivan’s example of healthy media diversity and proof of a 
healthy press by pointing to six major metropolitan daily newspapers operating in the 
Johannesburg region as a spurious argument, the level of diversity which resembles the 
operations of the South African Parliament − a place where the like-minded get together to 
thrash out similarities.  Louw says: 
Just as our existing Parliament has not served democracy well, neither has 
the Argus ... In both cases the full range of interests in our society has not 
been represented ... Similarly, the argument that we have a free press 
because there is competition between the Argus and Times Media Ltd is 
ludicrous. This is a competition over who gets the profits, not over 




narrow sectional interests in society  Furthermore, the news practices of 
both these organisations reduce information to profit and both promote the 
liberal free-enterprise which so neatly services the needs of mining-
finance capital. Consequently, from the point of view of news content, it is 
irrelevant who wins this battle. Whoever wins, we as readers will get much 
more of the same. If we are to reform our press (or media) system so that it 
caters for all interests in our society then let us start by abandoning the 
absurd assumption that a liberal press can speak for everyone in society.45 
Options from the National Party 
Following a long and close association with the Afrikaans press, the National Party in 1990 
offered an overview of future media policy in South Africa but also maintained that, strictly, 
the Party did not have a specific media policy. 
 Media affairs were left to government decisions. However, the National Party’s 
director of information, Sheila Camerer, offered some insights into National Party thinking in 
an interview with Professor Arrie de Beer in January, 1992 at the Free, Fair and Open Media 
conference at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town. 
 Insisting that the National Party does not have a media policy but rather a basic 
approach to the media, Ms Camerer says the National Party was committed to ensuring the 
free flow of information, a free press and also a free, independent and impartial national 
broadcaster. She concedes that previously the National Party had been in a position where it 
could leave it to the government to have a policy on the media and over the years that has 
been reflected in various laws and statements on the media. In the “new South Africa”, the 
National Party’s view is clear: 
We would ideally like to see the media, like the elections, free, fair and 
open. And we are prepared to admit that our attitude has changed from a 
more restrictive approach to a much more open attitude.46 
 On the question of equal access to the media, the National Party feels that the print 
media should be left to its own free-enterprise devices and that market forces should operate. 
While agreeing that the media should be open and accessible to all South Africans, the 
National Party baulks at state intervention and clearly opposes any plans which the 
government may have to subsidise various publications to facilitate a more open access. 
Camerer states:  
People should be free to invest in a newspaper because they feel they want 




readership or constituency for whatever reason. In the end that would be 
the best leveller. Put in a different way − the state should not supply 
centralised access to the media with state funded newspapers. Newspapers 
should be sold for what they are worth on the open market, and people will 
buy them and read them if they are viable. It is up to the market forces to 
determine that.47 
 Roelf Meyer, the National Party’s Minister of Constitutional Development and 
Communications in 1992 had the job of advising the government on its relationship with the 
media. Meyer says: “We must ensure that in the new South Africa more than lip service is 
paid to the freedom of the media. This might sound ironic coming from a representative of a 
government which does not have the happiest of records in this regard. I believe, however, 
that this places us in a particularly strong position to warn of the dangers − and counter-
productivity − of any media restrictions.48 He warns that the maintenance of a vigorous and 
unrestricted media will be a key success factor for the “new” South Africa and suggests that 
in the years ahead the media in South Africa will have to play a particularly important role in 
the following areas: 
(a) They must inform the public openly and effectively on the issues of the 
day. They must present their audiences with information on the 
constitutional processes which are underway and on the constitutional 
and economic options that are available to them. 
(b) They must continue to act as a watchdog. They must expose 
unacceptable behaviour, whatever the source from which it emanates. 
(c) They must encourage open and vigorous debate.49 
 Under this set of guidelines, Roelf Meyer believes it is unreasonable to expect 
newspapers to be objective and his reasoning is that “certain newspapers should forthrightly 
espouse differing positions and set up their respective stalls in the marketplace of ideas. The 
important thing is that the marketplace should be open to the purveyors of all ideas and that 
the public should have the right to browse and buy as they please”.  
 There is a proviso, though, that while newspapers need not conform to basic rules of 
objectivity, Meyer argues that it should be demanded of newspapers that they apply their own 
codes of journalistic ethics strictly. In the end, Meyer states that the freedom of the press 
depends on whether or not the media has the support of the public. In order to retain that 
support, Meyer says newspapers have to be worthy of it and he concludes media is a 




possible.50 Meyer concludes that the best guarantee of media freedom in South Africa may be 
to ensure that the media are as decentralised as possible. 
 Group political editor for Independent Newspapers, Zubeida Jaffer made a different 
appeal for change in the media when she delivered the World Press Freedom Day public 
lecture at Rhodes University’s journalism and media studies department in May 1997. Jaffer 
paid tribute the small number of women who made inroads in to the South African media and 
urged a transformation in the media “which for so long has been a male preserve”. Jaffer says:  
Our newspapers and media institutions have been shaped during a dark 
period of authoritarianism. Now that we have won the constitutional 
guarantees of a free press, the challenge is how to make the institution 
representative of the entire South African population so that the 
sensitivities of different perspectives can be captured. Women constitute 
more than half the population. The press is less than free if their voices are 
not heard.51 
  But she adds that “as journalists we have to find a way to look and listen beyond 
colour and political party. Only then will we be serving the public as we should be”.52 
 While the political institutions have been transformed to represent all South Africans, 
Jaffer says the press as an institution lags far behind and there are no simple solutions to this 
problem. 
 The difficulty facing the profession is how to move beyond bombarding the public 
with just short snippets of spicy negative news. We are great at raising people’s anxieties but 
we do not leave them with much sense of hope or remedy ... There has to be a return to high 
standards of journalism which could provide the public with all the information needed to 
make educated decisions. The public must know that the journalists will ensure that society is 
open and not shrouded in secrecy.53 
  As for future options for the media, Jaffer points out that the time has now come 
when journalists can be journalists with a proper role to play in order to make the country a 
better place. 
 We in the media have now to build our profession as a vibrant and 
meaningful part of the young democracy we struggled for. To do this we 
must acknowledge that we as professionals in the industry at this point 
come from completely different backgrounds with the most diverse life 
experiences. The media was polarised as the country was. And if we begin 
to talk about freedom of the press, we need first to understand where we 




constructed. Let us not sweep differences under the table and pretend they 
do not exist. If we are honest with one another, we will be able to heal the 
wounds of the past.54 
Summary 
The legacy of discrimination in the South African press parallels the legacy of apartheid in 
South African politics. Discrimination was a part of South African life even before the 
separate development legislations were passed after the National Party came to power in 
1949. This legacy of discrimination left its mark on the press. Later authoritarian controls, 
banning orders and censorship further complicated the role of the press. So it comes as no real 
surprise that the transformation to a democratic new South Africa signalled the opportunity to 
reshape the role and future directions of the press. Reshaping the national press remains the 
focus of constant speculation and debate. Chapter Seven has reviewed some of the post-
apartheid proposed models. 
 This chapter shows that there are no shortage of opinions, with many observers 
offering extremely insightful and workable models about the way the South African media 
should transform to play a meaningful role in the country’s future − whether that be a 
combative effort that scrutinises and criticises government or whether it will be a media that 
pursues a socially responsible role in nation building or even whether the government will 
adopt a benevolent authoritarian approach. 
 But one thing is clear. There remains universal agreement that the national media 
needs serious overhaul and that the national press can adapt to the consequences. It is clear 
that if newspapers do not respond quickly enough to the challenges set by the government, it 
becomes increasingly more obvious that the government could feel obliged to step in and 
force a speedy transformation of the press. But there lies the danger not only for the press but 
also for the government. It is an option not ignored by senior government members and with a 
Constitution in place that guarantees a free press, the chances of an authoritarian clampdown 
on the media is remote but there is a troubled road ahead.  
 Chapter Eight will conclude with signposts on a troubled road for the South African 
press. Already, the need for integration in the newsroom has been recognised and guidelines 
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CHANGING OF THE GUARD 
Main findings 
My examination of the South African press finds that transformation in the post-apartheid era 
has undergone dramatic positive developments but remains hindered by deep mistrust as 
documented in earlier observations and media representative submissions to the South 
African Human Rights Commission, the Independent Newspapers submission, and the Braude 
Report. The legacy of apartheid and discrimination still cuts deep in South African media 
culture despite several black and coloured journalists being appointed as editors on major 
metropolitan newspapers. It is at the middle to senior levels where transformation has become 
bogged down by hollow promises. 
 My examination, which includes interviews with working journalists and editors, 
indicates that journalism remains a difficult career option for blacks and coloureds with the 
majority of senior decision-making and gate-keeping roles still in the hands of whites who 
held the reins during the apartheid years. This remains a destabilising, unresolved aspect that 
gives rise to public perceptions of bias, control, and covert racism in the media. 
 The race card still cuts deep into South African journalism. It remains a black and 
white, us-and-them issue. However, to relegate this dilemma simply to a legacy of the 
apartheid era would be incorrect. South African journalism is struggling for credibility and 
respect. Its image is further eroded by the lack of career prospects and low wages. Senior 
journalists earning from R90,000-150,000 a year are being lured by the private sector and 
government to work as public relations or media spokespersons for double this amount. By 
way of example, a ministerial media spokesperson with journalism training and experience 
can expect up to R475,000 a year plus a housing subsidy. 
  Unattractive work conditions fail to attract the brightest candidates who are drawn to 
more lucrative career options in commerce, law or medicine and in government and industry 
after receiving their initial training and experience from the major publishers. 
  The friction between the government and the press that developed shortly after the 
transition to a new South Africa and intensified in the ensuing years to the point where fears 




  The English-language press has moved cautiously to promote black people to senior 
staff positions and increased training facilities for staff from a disadvantaged background. The 
complaint from black journalists remain that these efforts are too slow. As a way of speeding 
up the process of integration in the newsrooms and to facilitate a speedier transformation, it 
seems reasonable that employment hiring guidelines for the national press be posted. 
 National newspapers must reflect the diversity of the new democracy from within 
before they can start to do the job properly. That is not to say that because newspapers in 
South Africa are staffed mainly by the former ruling class, that every white person working 
on a newspaper is racist or antagonistic towards the new black government. Editorial change 
will not be brought about by simply changing the racial balance of editorial staff. Research in 
the United States has shown that while newsroom diversity is necessary, it will not be 
sufficient to bring about changes in the way blacks are represented in the news.  
 It goes beyond structural change. It needs to embrace changes in attitudes and 
professional culture. Primarily, the dominant news values operate, and journalists (whether 
they are black or white) tend to define news according to this framework. In time, journalists 
will recognise/appreciate their functions in post-apartheid South Africa, that they have a 
significant role in moving the country through the transition where blacks, whites, and 
coloureds are treated equally in the eyes of the law. 
    However, a more racially balanced newspaper is an important pre-requisite for 
meaningful change. A more racially mixed newspaper in South Africa will be better prepared 
to reflect the life experiences and diversity of the society that they will serve. It must be 
remembered that during the apartheid years, racial groups were kept firmly apart and it will be 
a learning experience for all concerned as well as bringing a wider perspective to the debate. 
 As matters now stand, the media still remains under the control and direction of 
whites who have little knowledge of the diverse new target audience. In South Africa, with a 
population of around 40 million people and fewer than four million whites, it is obvious 
where the new target audience will be and it makes not only economic sense, it is also shrewd 
political judgment for the media to move in a different direction, considering growing 
criticism from the government that the media appears chained to the ways of the past. The 
government is eager to see transformation at every level of society. The national press stands 
accused of stalling efforts to change. This accusation by the government remains a serious 
threat to the press and whether the perception of bias is fair or not, it is expedient for the press 
to move quickly to redress the situation. 
 A more racially balanced newsroom will go some way to correcting claims of bias. 




argument from the government remains that the national press has, by default, threatened the 
freedom of the press and so has compromised its right to it; the press did not subscribe to the 
constitutional provisions because the press is not free to all sectors of the nation. 
Limitations of analysis and further research 
In an environment clouded by extreme differences of opinion and accusations of racism, it is 
imperative to state where you are aligned because it could be seen to influence your 
objectivity. Black journalists have a decidedly different view to white journalists on the role 
of the press during the apartheid years. 
  Significantly, the status quo remains. Both sides remain distrustful of each other. 
Black journalists are still struggling to gain a place in the national mainstream press other 
than at the lowest levels. As a black journalist working in South Africa in the mid 1970s at the 
height of the apartheid era, the future was ominous for black and coloured journalists. It was a 
hazardous profession offering few prospects. I fit into this category and share many of the 
views held by black South African journalists. In 1980, I left South Africa to pursue a 
journalism career in Australia because of the constant harassment, racism and lack of career 
opportunities. In this thesis, I have at all times tried to be objective and fair in my analysis. 
 This thesis has taken an historical perspective of the development of the South 
African press. The methodology is largely descriptive and empirical. It relies on interviews 
with working journalists. While it does not delve into a theoretical analysis of what could 
comprise a new media system in South Africa, it highlights the complex problems within the 
press that needs to be resolved to reflect the social and cultural diversity of South Africa. This 
is a challenge that not only faces the South African media but in many other countries and 
forms a major platform of the International Federation of Journalists’ Bilbao Declaration at 
the IFJ World Conference in 1997.  
 My thesis has built on previous examinations of the South African press and provides 
a framework for further research into a new media order for South Africa, the career 
development prospects and educational opportunities for black journalists, the impact of staff 
poaching by related industries and the low esteem in which journalism is held as a career 
option in South Africa.   
This study has also gained from my experiences as a coloured journalist at the height of 
the apartheid era, a first-hand account of harassment and discrimination at the hands of over-
zealous police and timid publishers. 
 This study incorporated the work of leading media scholars and academics who set the 




academics. Academic input by blacks and coloureds is lacking. This is a legacy of apartheid, 
Bantu education, and the lack of journalism education opportunities for blacks and coloureds.   
Towards a new era 
Ten years after the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the political transformation has gone 
full circle. Major social transformation has occurred but transformation in the national press 
remains elusive. Much has been done to integrate the national press but expectations remain 
that so much more needs to be done by the media to reflect the society which it serves and in 
which it operates. 
Many of the criticisms of the media’s racist inclinations in 1994 and shortly thereafter 
have been resolved. For instance, there is a determined approach by the major media 
corporations towards a more racially balanced staff although the lack of senior black 
journalists   remains a hindrance. Some news organisations have moved towards correcting 
the imbalance by offering opportunities to new graduates to train as sub-editors in the field of 
economics journalism. For instance, Johnnic Publishing whose operations include the 
Financial Mail, Business Day, Sunday Times, Eastern Province Herald, and the Daily 
Dispatch, launched the Johnnic Pearson Graduate Training Program in February 2003, which 
lasted six months. Independent Newspapers launched a similar training program for sub-
editors. 
  Press ombudsman Ed Linington has been appointed to monitor complaints in the 
media. Justice Mervyn King was appointed chairman of the Ombudsman Appeal Board. 
Two-way communication between the government and the press has been improved 
with the revamp of the old South African Communications Service (SACS) and the formation 
of the Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS) with Joel Netshitenzhe 
as chief executive officer and chief information officer. The objective of the GCIS is to 
promote access to information. GCIS describes its objectives as: ensuring that the voice of 
government is heard; fostering a more positive communications environment; having a clear 
understanding of the public information needs and government’s information needs; and 
setting a high standard for government communication.1 
The development and prosperity of the national press in South Africa is hindered by 
distrust and hostility at many levels. The press is suspicious of the government harbouring 
plans that could regulate the media and curb its investigative role. The government remains 
deeply mistrustful of sections of the national media and accuses it of undermining 




accused of being manipulated by their editors and encouraged to pursue a malicious 
confrontation with the government.  
The general public appears split between concerns for the future of the national press, 
mistrustful of its role in a non-racial society, while others sympathise with a press regarded as 
being under siege from government threats. This potentially damaging state of affairs was 
influenced by two main factors: 
Firstly, the legacy of apartheid and authoritarian controls imposed on the press to help 
prop up the political system and a willingness on the part of many newspapers to comply. 
Against a background of authoritarian government controls and extremely hazardous 
conditions for journalists during the apartheid era, it was always a difficult task for the South 
African print media to operate effectively as the ruling National Party continually assaulted  
the free flow of information from 1949 until the Party’s stagnation and fall in 1993.  
The national press can take some comfort and deserves commendation for its role, 
especially the English-language press, for taking on the mantle of de facto opposition against 
the apartheid policies of the National Party. But it would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
the press played a major role in the eventual downfall of apartheid. This was always a white 
owned and controlled press aimed at whites. They were the supporters of the controversial 
rebel sports tours, campaigns against the “terrorists”, and in their own way, practised a form 
of jobs reservation, and petty discrimination. It was a press hostile to black and coloured 
people, benefiting from the spoils of apartheid and reluctant to give up those benefits.  
Pippa Green [1998] states that during apartheid, black journalists at many mainstream 
newspapers felt humiliated and saw themselves as being at the mercy of white editors, many 
of whom unwittingly collaborated with the regime. She recalls an insight into the workings of 
the Argus news desk:  
As a labour reporter in 1982 on a Cape Town English-language daily, the 
Argus, my first story made the front page. It was about striking milk 
delivery workers, African migrants in the then hostile Western Cape. The 
next story about a steel strike was placed inside, heavily edited. “Ah,” 
explained the news editor, “when white readers don’t get their milk 
delivered, that’s a big story, but they aren’t interested in other strikes.” 
This brought home to me the realisation that the reference point for most 
English newspapers was how whites were affected by what we were 
reporting; black reporters understood this too, but for them, it was an even 




In the new dispensation, it is this same national press – both English and Afrikaans 
language newspapers – that find themselves the target of community and government 
backlash. The people that they ignored are now in a position to dictate terms. With the press 
being reluctant to change, the government is growing restless and accusing the media of 
working towards its demise. The signs are clear. If the media refuse to move in keeping with 
the national post-apartheid transformation process, there is every chance that the government 
will step in to redefine the role and responsibility of the press. 
 As my thesis argues, there are signs to suggest that it is the view of some influential 
elements within the government that this white-controlled press needs to be brought into line 
as calls grow for a socially responsible press. But what is meant by a socially responsible 
press? Indeed, the South African press is a highly developed Western libertarian model. It is 
driven by libertarian ideals and friction between government and press in this case is not 
unusual.  
Terje Skjerdal [2001] suggests the government is more likely than the press to favour a 
social responsibility model but warns that the government views social responsibility more as 
a euphemism for a nationalistic model that censures critical reporting. His study indicates that 
the distinction between “critical” reporting and “negative” reporting is blurred.3   
 However, there is no suggestion that the press should move from being a  public 
watchdog to a government lapdog. Provisions in the Constitution guarantee freedom of the 
press. From the government there are calls to implement a new media order to level the 
playing field and to foster a newspaper industry that is more in keeping with the politico-
economic imperatives of a developing nation. It stems from a long history of oppression and 
persecution by the mainstream white press exemplified in Arrie De Beer’s statements to the 
Truth Commission during its special hearings on the media − “our history was not only one of 
pain, but also of ignorance” and what Green [1998] recalls: 
Generally, the rule during the state of emergency imposed by the 
government in the 1980s and internalised by many newspapers was that “if 
the police didn’t confirm it, it didn’t really happen.” In part, this rule 
worked because enforcers of it had embedded themselves in various media 
outlets.4 
Black and coloured journalists still recall how their news stories that were critical of the 
government were heavily censored, cut or simply ignored. I can recall how Security Police 
would visit the Argus building and were handed photographs taken by white staff 
photographers during the race riots in the late 1970s. In this way, the police could identify 




exchange, white reporters and photographers from both the Argus group and the Afrikaans 
press were allowed to travel with the military and police into areas of unrest and photograph 
the activities without risk. On one occasion in 1977, as a reporter on The Cape Herald 
newspaper, I was arrested by police while covering a riot in the coloured suburb of Athlone 
where several people had been killed and many injured. As I was led into the back of this 
military van, among the heavily armed troops were several white photographers 
photographing me unaware that I was a fellow journalist − including two who worked for the 
same organisation where I was employed. It was in incidents like these, where the distrust 
between black and white journalists originated. It has not faded with time and it is against this 
background of treachery and mistrust that the government complains it does not and cannot 
receive fair treatment from a national press that remains basically white. The complaints 
extend beyond the expected parameters of friction when a Western libertarian press working 
outside of governmental controls strives to keep governments accountable. This prompts calls 
for a media that more broadly reflects the complex South African society in which it operates. 
Ryland Fisher [2000] takes issue with the increasing demands for transformation of the 
press. As one of a few high-profile coloured editors of a mainstream English-language 
newspaper, Fisher struggled to lead The Cape Times from being the white liberal Cape Town 
morning daily and during his brief tenure at the helm tried to increase the number of senior 
black journalists on staff. He says of his efforts: 
I believe that we have all become so concerned about getting the 
demographics right that we have overlooked the need for real 
transformation in the media industry. And that need is reflected in the way 
our newspapers continue to report from mainly a white, privileged 
paradigm. Most South African newspapers, even those with black editors, 
continue to perpetuate this white paradigm of the news and news values.5 
      Simply restructuring or changing the make-up of national newsrooms is hardly a 
guarantee of a more equitable distribution of news resources nor does it guarantee that the 
government would receive favoured or sympathetic treatment from sycophantic black 
journalists. It would be demeaning to suggest that black journalists would be uncritical of 
government excess. So what would a transformation of the national press ultimately mean 
other than achieving some semblance of social balance, equal work opportunities and the 
results of an affirmative action program?  Fisher favours a “a mindset change that involves a 
new approach to journalism, a new approach to covering our very diverse society”.6 
I do not think that transformation simply means the replacement of white 




represent the demographics of the province or the country that they serve. 
This is important for the Western Cape, for instance, where the majority of 
the population can be classified coloureds. In this province, would it be 
advisable to have the majority of a newspaper’s staff being [black] 
African? 7 
This rather simplistic approach fails to recognise that South African newspapers, as 
newspapers anywhere in the world, are driven by economic constraints and newspapers are in 
the business of being profitable.  This further complicates the road to transformation. The 
Western Cape may well have a larger coloured population, but this does not necessarily 
translate into newspaper sales. However, transformation is a major component of change. It 
will never be the panacea to fix the hurdles faced by the South African press but it will lay the 
foundations of equity in the media that will ultimately lead to major newspapers reflecting the 
diversity of the communities in which they operate. Broad acceptance of the need for 
transformation signals an important commitment to reshaping the media. 
The South African press profited under the apartheid system which it tacitly supported 
for a long period. It was a colonial type of media rather than the libertarian press that it 
pretended to be. While operating under free market principles of a Western libertarian press, it 
failed by omission in that it was always a segmented press that served the interests of the 
ruling classes ie. the Afrikaners and the English-speaking whites. At times it was more of a 
disobedient child, at all times it was part of the family. Legislation kept the wayward 
newspapers in check while others knew their place in the apartheid machinery. 
 The threat to freedom of the press in the new South Africa now comes from the press 
itself, from the way it has evolved in the post-apartheid era and the reluctance of its major 
players to embrace change. The new black government maintains that the national press has 
yet to shake off the shackles of the apartheid era, and, under the guise of freedom of the press, 
was working against the national interest. There is a growing rift, not in the traditional way 
that the Western press and government has an uneasy and often troubled relationship, but in a 
way which leads to suggestions that the national press, which remains dominated mainly by 
white conservatives, cannot accept that a black government can be competent.  
 On the other hand, the press maintains that the new government is intolerant of 
criticism and unable to make the transition from leaders of the liberation to leaders of the 
government. After a cosy period of induction, it is the government that has to come to terms 
with the role of a vibrant and critical press. 
There are government fears that the very fabric of society in the emerging democracy in 




problems. There are fears that the socio-economic problems facing the Government of 
National Unity could ultimately undermine the fragile democracy as the ruling African 
National Congress fails to deliver on its promises of a better life for the millions of its 
supporters. There are also fears expressed by Nelson Mandela, who established a commission 
of inquiry in March, 1998, to investigate media leaks that the African National Congress-led 
government faces possible revolt and that unnamed sources are plotting to destabilise and 
eventually overthrow the government. This, however, was later proved to be untrue. 
 Apart from the lack of proper housing around the country, millions of people living in 
squalid squatter camps without any electricity and sanitation services, in extreme poverty and 
with poor health facilities, a very high national unemployment rate that is suggested to be 
around 40 per cent and impossible to determine because of the influx of illegal citizens from 
other African countries, and a variety of basic problems such as illiteracy and a growing 
impatience with the Reconstruction and Development Program, it further complicates the 
transition to a country that offers a better future for all its citizens. Above all else, the national 
crime rate is a major problem. It is a problem that threatens the future of democracy in South 
Africa. And it impacts directly on the role of the media.8 
 There are serious fears that the socio-economic problems that grip South Africa are 
exacerbated by the way in which the national press reports on these events, and in a more 
sinister way, there are suggestions that the national press is embarking on a campaign to 
actively undermine the work of the government by its constant negative and harmful focus, 
ultimately giving the impression of a government unable to cope and in disarray. 
 At a news conference in Johannesburg in July, 1997, Mbeki said it was “quite clear 
that if corruption in the police, the judicial system, the prisons services, and the Department of 
Home Affairs is not stopped, you could have a collapse of the entire democratic system”.9 He 
warned that crime was halting investor confidence and damaging the economy. Arrests that 
take place within the police service were indicative of the extent of corruption within the 
criminal justice system and he suggests it is not a problem that arises from mere greed but 
from a lack of commitment to a democratic South Africa and that major crime syndicates 
included security force members from the apartheid era. 
  Mbeki paints a chilling picture of a struggling democracy in crisis and almost on its 
knees. This is a major problem not only for the Government, but it also has serious 
ramifications for the role of the national media in a time of crisis. The media is independently 
owned, guards its independence jealously and pursues a vigorous watch on government. For 
the new black government, it is an approach that is too vigorous. Under normal 




approach of the Western media in developed democracies, but in the prevailing circumstances 
it certainly can be argued that it may not be the correct approach in the short term. In major 
democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and a number of 
European countries with a healthy tradition and history of freedom of the press, it works well. 
These countries are a long way down the road of democracy, social-economic problems 
are not on the scale and intensity as is the case in the developing South Africa, and the bonds 
of society are not threatened by complicated problems that will take many years to resolve. 
Barriers to change 
The South African Government accused the national media of pursuing a hidden agenda and 
conducting a campaign which aims at undermining the new government. President Mandela 
accused the media of being run by conservative whites living in the past and who are not 
prepared to embrace the far-reaching transformation that is occurring across South Africa 
since the National Party conceded apartheid was a failure. The plea is obviously for some sort 
of developmental media system but without the onerous burden of censorship or government 
restraint, perhaps something along the lines of the Indonesian pancasila press of President 
Suharto that was expected to pursue an agenda that upholds the national interests. 
  But it is not hard to find fault with the Indonesian model that has now completely 
fallen from favour. Under the pancasila philosophy and the notion of a new order, guided 
democracy, political and economic turmoil continued unabated. Cronyism and corruption 
flourished, government indiscretions and excesses went unreported because it was deemed 
harmful to the national interests and racism flourished. The predominantly Muslim country 
overwhelmed its Christian minority in the provinces in much the same way that Indonesia’s 
ethnic Chinese business people were the victims of vicious racial assaults by indigenous 
Indonesians, especially in Java. There were many important issues that the Indonesian press 
was either reluctant or unable to pursue with vigour because of the developmental media 
policy and the restrictions imposed by the terms of the Press Act of Indonesia. [See Appendix 
E for an ASEAN model of the press.]  
 In the end, the developmental media became more of an uncritical extension of 
government than the watchdog it ought to be. In short, there are as many problems with 
adopting a developmental media framework that aims to work towards some loosely defined 
national interest as there is pursuing a vigorous Western libertarian media approach. 
 There is also another subtle yet sinister hurdle that erodes the functionality of the 
national press. It stems from hypocritical, influential members of the ANC government who 
pay lip service to press freedom and do not desire the close scrutiny of the press for fear of 




and blacks. These crimes against humanity included acts of terrorism, kidnappings, poisoning, 
torture and even murder. Innocent people were caught in the crossfire as the South African 
army battled the “terrorists” and it is not an unrealistic suggestion that there are senior 
government officials concealing misdeeds from a gruesome past. The black liberation fighters 
of Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) the armed wing of the ANC, have been well 
rewarded for their efforts and now occupy senior roles in public office. Some of these office 
bearers publicly declare a commitment to press freedom, but privately they have no 
enthusiasm for the close scrutiny brought on by a vigorous, investigative free press. 
 The controversial ANC Women's League president, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, is 
one example of a freedom fighter with a chequered history. To millions of the poor black 
masses from Soweto, Madikizela-Mandela remains a respected leader of the fight against 
apartheid. To these mostly semi-literate blacks she remains the Mother of the Nation. There 
are others who simply see her as a villain tainted by scandal, corruption, township violence 
and linked to the murder of Stompie Sepei.10  
 Madikizela-Mandela accuses the South African print press of needing “urgent 
introspection and a radical surgical transformation" to enhance democracy. She has endured a 
mauling at the hands of the press for her excesses but espouses the same tired complaints that 
the old media order must change, yielding place to new. However, Madikizela-Mandela does 
not really want a vigorous press because she resents the close scrutiny that her affairs have 
attracted. In much the same way, there are others who are now senior public office holders 
and in government who also have much to hide from their days as freedom fighters. To them, 
media criticism of the government is regarded as an attack on the black government, and 
criticism of the government by black journalists is viewed as a betrayal of the sacrifices made 
in the cause of the liberation struggle. 
 Addressing the Johannesburg Press Club in Braamfontein, Madikizela-Mandela 
accused the media of being wedded to the old order of “Western racist supremacy, and out of 
kilter with the new social order”.11 And she argued that the dilemma was to strike a balance 
between two major cultures: a “dying fossilised European conservative liberalism and an 
assertive emerging African renaissance”.  
They [the media] use the conventions and values of a small section of our 
society to define what constitutes a standard free press. They use their 





Madikizela-Mandela said politicians were being accused of wanting to manipulate the 
press when they complained of sensational and partisan reporting, yet they were merely 
asking for a free, fair and responsible press that understood the sensitivities of the majority. 
By remaining wedded to Eurocentricism, the media has become a major 
obstacle to the inception of our African renaissance.13 
 The media, according to Madikizela-Mandela, would continue to be perceived to be 
loaded with the agenda of “racism and white superiority as long as editors remain loyal to 
parties' political ideologies and are controlled by a business sector that is aligned to (those 
parties') paradigms”. 
 Madikizela-Mandela has an unlikely ally in Gwen Ansell, the executive director of 
the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism based in Johannesburg. Ansell laments the 
deplorable standards of journalism in South Africa. 
Writing propaganda infected all the parties to struggle. Its legacy is still 
with us. Alongside this was Eurocentrism, which took not only the style 
but also, quite uncritically, the news values of the West as the news values 
of South Africa. The opportunity to develop an appropriate voice and set 
of values for a developing, culturally rich African nation was ignored.14 
 Madikizela-Mandela’s reputation was forever sullied in the nine days that she 
attended the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in Johannesburg in December 
1997. The deputy chairperson of the TRC Alex Boraine [2000] was scathing in his criticism 
of Madikizela-Mandela who denied involvement in all of her alleged crimes despite the 
evidence and blaming it on lies and exaggeration by the media. Boraine states: 
For me, as someone who sat through the entire hearing, who read carefully 
the account of  the in-camera hearing, and who has now read over 3,000 
pages of the transcript of the hearing, I can only conclude that anyone who 
participated in that hearing, who listened to the many witnesses and 
Madikizela-Mandela’s responses, would have to be naïve or blindly 
committed to the point of worship if they believed that she (Madikizela-
Mandela) had not been aware of what was going on in her own home and 
had not been party to what took place.15 
         In its final report tabled in 1998, the TRC was particularly harsh on Madikizela-
Mandela and the Mandela United Football Club, a group of gangsters who spread their reign 
of terror in suburbs of Soweto at the command of Madikizela-Mandela. The Commission said 
she was “central to the establishment and formation of the gang which later developed into a 




The Commission also found that the football club was involved in a number of 
criminal activities including killings, torture, assaults and arson. It states further: 
 
The Commission finds that those who opposed Ms Madikizela-Mandela 
and the Mandela United Football Club, or dissented from them, were 
branded as informers and killed … The Commission finds that Ms 
Madikizela-Mandela failed to account to community and political 
structures. Further, she is accountable, politically and morally, for the 
gross human rights violations of the Mandela United Football Club. The 
Commission finds further that Ms Madikizela-Mandela herself was 
responsible for committing such gross violations of human rights.17 
 On that same day, The Star’s internet edition also reported Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki raised similar complaints. Although Mbeki has a decidedly different agenda to that of 
Madikizela-Mandela, the basic principle remains to be domination and control of the 
message.18 Addressing a meeting in Johannesburg of the International Advisory Board of 
Independent Newspapers, Mbeki said the South African media was doing a bad job of 
covering the positive aspects of South Africa's changing society. As an example, he said one 
of the stories the media had until recently not reported was the fact that crime had been 
dropping steadily since 1994. 
 Mbeki said the reason this development was ignored for so long was that there was a 
“pessimistic mindset” that said crime was out of control. He added that this same mindset 
contributed to a belief that good doctors came only out of places like the University of the 
Witwatersrand and not the University of Transkei. He said positive aspects such as the fact 
that the amount of steel sold in the first half of 1997 had equalled two-thirds of the steel sold 
in the whole of 1996 was not fully understood or reported by the South African media. And 
he pointed out that coverage of President Mandela's speech at the ANC's Mafikeng 
conference in December, 1997 had demonstrated the deficiencies in South African 
journalism.  
 He said 83 per cent of the information in Mandela's speech was not passed on to 
readers. “How do we change the society if we don't even know about it?” he asked and he 
also called for more transformation of the press so that different types of voices could be 
heard. 
 Former Cape Herald news editor and Argus company employee for more than 16 
years, Warren Ludski suggests the reluctance of the South African media to embrace change 




the newspapers for as long as possible.19 Ludski, a “coloured” journalist now working in 
Australia, says change in the service provided by the media is inevitable but that change could 
see a sharp fall in advertising revenue as the market changes and as the newspapers have to 
adapt and make themselves accessible to a wider audience, indeed a poorer audience, a less 
sophisticated audience, an audience that is less attractive to advertisers. 
 The results may be that editorial standards will shift and could even decline as the 
focus of the news would shift to accommodate this changing readership which is both 
financially and educationally disadvantaged and which is unlikely to share the political 
dimensions and aspirations of the conservative white owners and operators. This shift, in turn, 
will have a dramatic effect on advertisers and in turn this will have a deteriorating effect on 
the profitability of the media. 
Ultimately, newspaper editors are responsible to both the publishers and the 
shareholders and profitability is crucial to the survival of the business. Ludski suggests that 
for this reason, Independent Newspapers and the majority of the South African media are 
reluctant to introduce sweeping changes to shift the policy of their newspapers to 
accommodate a wider audience that better reflects the multiracially diverse South African 
society and why they are slow to reshape the composition of editorial staffing which remains 
conservatively white.  
 The editor at The Argus, in Cape Town, Moegsien Williams rejects the assumption 
that his newspaper was reluctant to embrace widespread changes both at editorial policy level 
and in staffing because it feared alienation or a backlash from advertisers. Williams points out 
that The Argus has shifted to accommodate the variety of news, especially the rising crime on 
the Cape Flats, while the group’s morning paper, The Cape Times, has shifted to become 
more analytical. 
 In this way, the two Independent Newspapers publications can share the load and so 
dominate the English-language newspaper market in the Western Cape. Williams also rejects 
the calls from both Mbeki and Madikizela-Mandela that the media should be more compliant 
or more supportive, preferring instead a vigorous exchange between the media and the 
Government as a way of keeping both the government honest and fulfilling his obligations to 
his readers by keeping them informed.20 
 The confrontation between government and the press in South Africa is not an 
unusual situation. Newspapers the world over are always facing government pressure. In 
practice, the national press is accused of hijacking the guarantees of free speech and 
exercising the guarantees to freedom of the press to undermine government inadequacies and 




it is the victim of some collaborative plot from a delinquent media bent on its demise. It is a 
charge fiercely denied on all sides by the national media. On both sides of the argument there 
is urgent need for rationalisation to find some middle ground. 
 It is a volatile combination of clashing ideologies in which there can be no winners 
and little space to move between the extremity of authoritarian controls on the one hand and 
leaving matters as they stand and wait, as Milton would have, for the matter to resolve itself 
in the free marketplace of ideas. Whether a defiant government will wait for this long-term 
transition or pursue the food-before-freedom argument remains to be seen. Whether the 
government decides to change course and follow what is now the familiar and much despised 
interventionist model typical in African countries where authoritarian governments control the 
press is a more frightening although remote prospect. 
 For the South African government to move down this interventionist path will be 
detrimental. To artificially correct this perceived imbalance or bias in media coverage by the 
national press will be to resort no less to government interference and censorship. That is the 
basic issue − whether to intervene or not. In many ways, the argument represents a microcosm 
of the difficulties faced by developing Third World nations.   
 In the case of South Africa, the need to level the playing field to represent the 
diversity of the new society in the national media could be used as a poor excuse to impose 
some temporary restraint on the press. But it is fraught with danger. What will be the time 
span of such an intrusive system? Who will decide and what will be the sanctions for the 
transgressors? There are too many obstacles in such a retrogressive move. And there is an 
immediate paradox within the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the constitutional 
guarantees of a free press. 
 Perhaps what is needed is an appeal to the conscience. Just as the South African 
Constitution guarantees freedom of the press under a Bill of Rights and just as the 
government commits itself strenuously to a guarantee of freedom of information and a desire 
for a vigorous and independent press, so too it needs a socially responsible press that will not 
sink the ship during a stormy period.   
  The predominantly white-controlled media is perceived to be conservative and 
historically biased against black majority rule and at the very least, to be unsupportive of the 
new Government. There are constant calls from diverse quarters that the face of the media 
should change to reflect the diversity of South African society. It is easier said than done for a 
variety of reasons, the main one being economic. 
 Just as strong as the temptation by sections of the government to tamper with the 




Western societies to realise that expectations of a true libertarian press, a Western model of 
the press, at the present stage of South Africa’s national development would be premature.  
 On the one hand, authoritarian controls on the exchange and free flow of information, 
or the method of press control so familiar in Africa, the developmental media theory so 
popular with military and authoritarian governments, both have serious limitations. 
Authoritarian media policies, and by extension developmental journalism, brings with it the 
problems of self-censorship and inefficient government hiding behind a cloak of 
developmental media secrecy – it is not in the national interest to criticise government failings 
and excesses. 
 The future of the media’s role in post-apartheid South Africa represents a challenge to 
liberal conscience. A delicate balance of freedom and control that will guarantee that the press 
is free to criticise the government and to maintain the important social role of keeping society 
suitably informed about the work of government is required. At the same time there is need 
for a socially responsible media that will not threaten nor harm the national good. That is not 
to suggest a media that is subservient and weak, dictated to by government policy and driven 
by government ideology or controlled by some Minister in a far off office. The media needs 
to take up the challenge of keeping the government honest and it needs to participate in the 
transition from apartheid to democracy.    
 The national media cannot be expected to be a mouthpiece for government 
propaganda and it is not the expectation of government that it should be so. At the heart of the 
problem is whether a vigorous and independently owned national press can be an adversarial 
press and simultaneously a developmental press working towards what is commonly 
determined as being in the national interest.   
 In the final analysis, freedom of the press is a political decision. The type of press 
which will develop in post-apartheid South Africa depends as much on political directive as 
well as how the national press meets its challenge and its obligations to reflect the needs of 
society. There is no denying the need for a socially responsible press but the issue at stake is 
who is to determine this responsibility: Will it be self-determined, socially-determined or 
politically determined? 
  While newspapers stand with one foot in the till, they have another important function 
and that is to grease the wheels of democracy. Newspapers are not disinterested observers 
offering comment, advice and reports on the political spectrum. They are active participants, 
role players and shapers or destroyers of government policy while simultaneously acting as 




 We cannot seek a purely developmental model for the South African media for what 
is already a technologically advanced and libertarian functioning media. That will mean 
turning back the clock. The difficulty facing the Government is that it does not control nor 
own its own newspaper as is the case in many developing countries. The South African media 
is independently owned, spans a narrow base of concentrated ownership and generates a 
confrontational approach between the government and the press.  
 This is no different to the way the media operates for example in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand or many developed nations of Europe where 
there is a strong history of democracy. Any tampering with the freedom of the press would be 
a devastating blow to a country that already is in the process of dismantling authoritarian 
controls and a free press is the lifeblood of a free society. But if freedom of the press means 
freedom from supervision and freedom from controls, then there is also a corresponding 
obligation of social responsibility on the part of the press. 
 If it is then the case that newspapers should not only keep their readers informed but 
also reflect the views of its readers, then it would be logical to ask who are these readers 
whose views are reflected in an agenda that apparently seeks to undermine the efforts of the 
government or at the very least appear negative towards the efforts of nation building and 
reconstruction. The ruling African National Congress holds 62 per cent of the national vote 
and a merger with the Inkatha Freedom Party will lift the total to nearly 75 per cent of the 
national vote. In these very broad terms, it would appear that on this assumption, it is curious 
that the newspapers are claiming to be reflecting the views of its readers. 
 However, under the authoritarian controls of the Nationalists during the apartheid era, 
the South African press has suffered so much oppression and harassment and it would be 
wrong to replace one sort of oppression with a different version no matter how noble the aims 
or intentions. Albie Sachs [1990] sees the problem as one that provides to reconcile the need 
for openness and the right to speak one’s mind with the necessity for healing the wounds 
created by racism. Conceding that huge obstacles exist to temper the free flow of information 
in South Africa, Sachs says: 
We must remember that the objective is to open doors that are at present 
closed, not to create more blockages to the free circulation of ideas and 
information. We would have gained little if we were to replace the present 
media controls with new ones that simply switch the propaganda and 
biases around if one realm of banality takes over from another. Truth has 
always favoured the democratic cause, and our people are tired of forever 




 In the emerging democracy, there are enormous expectations on the government to 
deliver on a variety of matters that restricted the lives of oppressed people, not least among 
them the need for improved access to the media. Addressing the issue before the adoption of 
the new Constitution, Sachs says there are many questions which bear indirectly but 
significantly on the question of free speech and in turn a free press.  
At present, the press in South Africa is anything but open and anything but 
non-racial. The Rand Daily Mail, the most informative and widely 
respected daily newspaper of the 1960s and 70s, was closed not on 
journalistic grounds, but because its circulation was too high among blacks 
who had no money and too low among whites who had money. In absolute 
market terms, nothing should be free, not even speech. English-language 
and Afrikaans-language monopolies control virtually the whole of the 
commercial press, and not only the press itself but most of printing and 
distribution. Similarly, broadcasting is almost entirely in the hands of the 
state. What the commercial and state monopolies have in common is that 
they are completely white-dominated, locked into the apartheid structures. 
This affects not only the appointment of journalists, but the very 
determination of what is front-page news.22 
As an equitable resolution, Sachs offers two possible options: firstly the new 
government can either shut people up and decide on their behalf what to do with the limited 
resources, or else involve people themselves in making informed choices.  
Clearly the latter requires the maximum circulation of information and 
ideas. Freedom of expression and accountability thus become inseparable 
... We look to our articulate, technically experienced, and battle-scarred 
media people to lead the way in proposing solutions.23 
 To facilitate change in the South African press, it is my view that it would be prudent 
as well as pragmatic at this stage of national development for the government to implement an 
uncomplicated policy to foster a new media order that can clearly spell out obligations and 
expectations for all parties concerned, the levels of freedom of the press within the legislative 
boundaries and a media mission statement. 
  The role and aim for the media must be clearly spelled out and the limitations or 
direction of the national press must be clearly signposted. It is not a desirable situation but it 
is a simple way of levelling the playing field and speeding up the changes that are sought of 
the press. This basic philosophy of the relationship between media and government must be 




public interest. It must be a statement that can be readily understood by the bulk of the 
population and if newspapers contravene it, it must be clear to the bulk of the population that 
there was a determined breach of the policy. There must be sanctions in place to dissuade the 
offenders and to ensure that the policy is workable. Not by the traditional methods of the 
National Party such as banning orders or closures, harassment, or a variety of complicated 
laws, but by imposing punitive measures on the offending newspapers. The offenders could 
be fined an amount that will indicate the seriousness of the transgression. Newspapers must 
always be free to publish, but that freedom will then come at a price, with the risk of a fine. 
However, the option for imposing a fine must be imposed by an independent party such as a 
press tribunal.  
 Options for the implementation of the new media order can include an instalment 
plan which can be reviewed and amended after a set number of years. The framework of the 
new media order must remain within the provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
It can operate much in the way that South African law still restricts detailed reporting of 
divorce cases in court.24 
Reshaping the landscape to facilitate a New Media Order  
The route of authoritarian controls holds little promise because it will reflect the methods of 
the past. It will be more pragmatic to seek these changes with the cooperation of the press 
rather than to charge ahead in a confrontational way and force changes upon a reluctant target. 
If ever there was a window of opportunity to initiate a new media system, then it would 
have been in 1993 or the months earlier when the Constitutional talks were underway. It was 
a period of immense optimism in South Africa.  There is no chance of a systematic change in 
the way that the media operates in South Africa. 
What is urgently needed is an attitudinal change that will speed up the process of 
integration in the national newsrooms. Instead of looking to artificial mechanisms, the South 
African press must refocus its efforts and concentrate on improving the quality of journalism. 
There is ample opportunity to improve newspaper standards. Some of the areas that need 
attention include top-quality investigative journalism, gender issues, health and social 
welfare, the effects of AIDS-related deaths, poverty and the effects of high unemployment. 
Finance journalism is also neglected in most of the major newspapers and there is a need to 
boost the standard of analytical reporting in business and finance. 
  Elements of a developmental media model with aspects of the public journalism 





 Berger [1995] says that in developing a national communications policy, there is no 
need to reinvent the wheel because suitable proven models exist internationally and can be 
adapted to suit the particular needs of the South African situation.25 Jackson [1993] also 
signals the need for change and considers a liberal democratic model although he concedes 
that it might be an ideal that is unattainable and out of favour with many Afrikaans or 
alternative journalists. 
Yet, even if this were so, the press ought to set its sights on no less a target 
because of the protection that a liberal democratic view of the press 
provides… Although the benefits of liberal democracy will not soon be 
realized, if ever, in South Africa its journalists ought to demand nothing 
less than the generous protections that such an approach assures them. Nor 
should the press settle for less than offering its society the high quality of 
journalism needed for liberal democratic societies to function optimally.26 
 The development of the South African press has moved on steadily since 1993 and 
while Jackson’s suggestion is but one of several that has validity and merit, some additional 
options could include: 
1.   The development of a national media charter and time-frame development plan to 
assist the speedy transformation of the national press. As outlined above, this option 
will only flow from a positive decision by the national press to reorganise towards a 
type of media more in keeping with the transformation that has occurred since the 
demise of the apartheid system. 
This will be an undeniably difficult adjustment for the media to make because there is 
already in place the press of a developed nation. However, the reason why this is so is 
because it catered almost exclusively to the white middle-class markets and was driven 
by white middle-class advertising, political agendas aside. The emerging market is 
decidedly different and less attractive, and whether the decision to meet the 
transformation demands is political or not, the economics of the situation make it an 
unattractive proposition. 
  So, it seems logical then, that to push for the changes that are so desperately required of 
the press to have a hand in nation building, there will have to be either some incentive 
or some directive from the government. Gavin Stewart [1990] also raises the options 
for a national press charter within the framework of a Bill of Rights, a Freedom of 
Information Act and  “above all a sincere conviction in the hearts of our citizens that 
open government and free speech are the lifeblood of democracy  this will be the most 




At the same conference, Alison Gillwald warned that a vibrant and dynamic press run 
by ethical journalists will not simply rise out of the embers of apartheid, nor through a 
media framework imposed from above whoever is above.  
One of the major sources of media power in free societies is normative. It 
is the norms and values of society that determine the acceptance or 
rejection of media practices and content far more than state legislation or 
media councils. The media in South Africa are particularly vulnerable 
because they cannot find refuge in the public’s indignation or rage when 
their freedom is curbed.28 
2.   Incentives such as subsidies to protect struggling newspapers and to provide a wider 
cross-section of views to the community is one option but in a country where money 
is better directed towards alleviating poverty and sickness, it would seem clear that 
some sort of limited directive could be feasible. Instead of the subsidised 
newspapers being confrontational, it could be skewed to focus more on matters of 
national interest and development. It is to be anticipated that this suggestion would 
find extreme distaste among libertarians and it is expected that the press will put up 
obstinate protests and fight against any suggestion that they be told in which way to 
act. 
 But were one to focus more specifically on how most newsrooms operate then it will 
become clear that individual journalists on just about any newspaper, while 
delivering whatever reports they do, have very limited input into the news selection 
process, the direction and agenda of the newspaper, even the placement of 
individual reports. Newspapers operate on a pyramid structure and the vast number 
of journalists that combine to produce the product are by and large unaware most 
times of what others are doing unless it impacts upon their tasks. It is inevitably left 
to the editors and their trusted assistants to select copy, formulate policy and 
direction − to set the agenda that is ultimately the cause for so much concern by the 
government. The power is concentrated in the hands of a trusted few faceless media 
executives. 
  The suggestion of subsidies is not unique, and media commentators Eric Louw and 
Gavin Stewart amongst many have supported the subsidy plan. It is a concept that in 
South Africa, no less than anywhere else, has serious organisational disadvantages 
as well as being susceptible to abuse and mismanagement. 
3.  Options for a vernacular media pose some challenges for the national media.  With 




deprived of any aspect of the media to keep them informed, or those people in many 
parts of the country who speak a vernacular language, usually poorly educated 
people who speak a mixture of English and Afrikaans, there is a need to provide 
some basic form of news medium in keeping with the reconstruction and 
development plan. However, it is a task that could be too expensive for the media 
groups to consider, and with very little prospect of any sort of returns.  
 This could be an option for some statutory bodies such as local councils to step in to 
produce some form of basic information sheets that will keep the poor equally 
informed on matters of importance and perhaps even include government plans such 
as community health schemes, sewerage improvements in the squatter camps, plans 
for electricity supplies or even extra taps, and so on. 
 If these sorts of publications are taken on by local councils or even community 
groups, it is an area where perhaps the government could offset the costs by 
providing printing and other associated facilities and subsidising these sorts of basic 
information sheets on a small scale rather than moving into the costly business of 
newspaper subsidies. 
4.  Increased commitment to journalism training and education. There is a strong need 
to educate the public in the role and their expectations of the media in an effort to 
prevent the type of harassment of journalists that leads to censorship through fear. 
High school pupils should be introduced to media studies from the first year of high 
school − as is the case in Australia and many other countries, with major strands 
offered in the final two years of high school. In the same way, there is a serious need 
to improve training facilities for South African journalists. Some media 
organisations have already developed strategies for staff improvement but much 
more needs to be done to improve both content and quality of the press. A skills 
audit by the South African Newspaper Editors’ Forum in 2000 found major 
shortfalls among journalists including: poor reporting skills, a lack of concern with 
accuracy, poor writing skills, a lack of life skills, low levels of commitment, weak 
interviewing skills, weak legal knowledge, lack of sensitivity, weak knowledge of 
ethics, poor historical and contextual knowledge of journalism and a low level of 
training.29 
 Steven Wrottesley [2002] the editorial chief of staff at Independent Newspapers 
Cape, traces this basic lack of journalism skills to around 1977, a high point of the 
apartheid era when many senior journalists either quit the profession or left the 




production journalists were lured away to join overseas corporations introducing the 
new computerised printing systems. South African newsrooms were the pioneers of 
“cold type” digital setting with most metro newspapers adopting the Atex computer 
editing and reporting system in the 1970s and trained computer production 
journalists were snapped up by news organisations in Australia, Canada and the UK 
as they came online.  
 Eight years after the first democratic election in South Africa, journalism 
is no longer seen as “sexy”. Many who would have gone into the media 
now seek the greater rewards of other professions or in top government 
jobs. It is accepted that these reasons, and probably a plethora of other 
ones, have led to serious skills shortages for South African journalism.30 
5.   Pay, conditions and lack of career options need to be improved dramatically, 
especially in the case of black and coloured journalists who work at the lower levels 
of the profession. By raising the standards and conditions for younger journalists, 
the profession will be much better positioned to keep their staff. And by lifting the 
rewards and conditions, incrementally they will hopefully also raise the profile of 
journalism as a desirable and worthy vocation. 
6.   Changing the gatekeepers of information: more black and coloured sub-editors must 
be trained as an urgent measure. Some news corporations have fast tracked this 
initiative but much more needs to be done. Already, the South African Newspaper 
Editors’ Forum and media executives have committed themselves to increased 
training facilities at the major media publishers, more cooperation between 
publishers on the provision of journalism training, and increased interaction with 
journalism training institutions such as universities and technikons. 
 Among the plans agreed to by editors, senior journalists and educators were: 
a. To have trained coaches in newsrooms to work with reporters. Training 
institutions will develop and run courses to train coaches. 
b. To put punitive measures in place in news rooms and training institutions to 
combat inaccuracies in reporting. 
c. To train journalism experts in media houses as content assessors and to ensure 
media houses take part in the consultation process on journalism unit standards 
(part of South Africa’s outcomes-based education). Both measures would establish 




d. To develop a closer relationship between tertiary and other training institutions 
and the media throughout the country by holding regional and national meetings to 
establish the highest standards of journalism. 
e. The group will also put in place methods to improve historical, contextual and 
legal knowledge of journalists and to promote a reading culture.31 
 In the final analysis, even if nothing is done to facilitate structural change in the South 
African media, and the preferred option is to await a metamorphosis, the press can swiftly 
benefit by: 
•  Improving the credibility of newspapers by improving the quality of the product 
and lifting the image of journalism as a worthy profession and desirable career 
option; 
•  Improving career structures and staff training options for reporters, sub-editors and 
managers; 
•  Improving conditions and pay structures for journalists, particularly at the lower 
levels where promising talent is being lured away by the public service as well as 
the private sector. 
 This thesis has considered the inherent difficulties associated with the transformation 
of the South African press and identified options for change in the emerging democracy. 
Further research can build on this body of work by considering the effects of racial bias in the 
newsroom, media bias and discrimination in the post-apartheid press. There is also 
opportunity for further research into the merits of a uniquely South African media model that 
incorporates aspects of public journalism, the developmental model, and the Western 
libertarian model to achieve that delicate balance between the role of the press and what the 
government expects of the national press in terms of the national interest. 
 The bulk of the research for this thesis is limited to the 1990s when Nelson Mandela 
was still president. There are signs that the rift between the government and the press is no 
longer an unbridged chasm and indications are that a metamorphosis is underway that will 
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Main Newspapers of South Africa:  their approximate circulations and base cities 
National 
Sunday Times weekly 505 500 
Rapport weekly 390 500 
City Press weekly 267 500 
Sowetan daily 208 250 
Bloemfontein 
Volksblad daily 27 750 
 
Cape Town 
Argus daily 89 000 
Cape Times daily 55 000 
Die Burger daily 95 000 
Weekend Argus weekly 120 000 
 
Durban 
Daily News daily 81 000 
Natal Mercury daily 50 000 
Sunday Tribune weekly 115 000 
 
East London 




Indaba weekly 37 000 





Star daily 182 000 
Citizen daily 145 000 
Beeld daily 116 500 
Business Day daily 35 000 
          
          Port Elizabeth 
EP Herald daily 31 250 
Evening Post daily 17 500 
Die Burger daily 15 500 
Weekend Post weekly 36 250 
 
Pietermaritzburg 
Natal Witness daily 27 500 
 
Pretoria 
Pretoria News daily 24 000 














South African National Editors’ Forum, Mission statement declaration of intent, 
organisation and program of action. October 18-20, 1996, Cape Town. 
A. Preamble. 
We, South Africa’s most senior print and broadcast editors and journalism educators 
and trainers, gathered at the Breakwater Lodge in Cape Town for the history unity conference 
of the Black Editors’ Forum and the Conference of Editors from October 18 to 20, 1996, to 
launch the South African National Editors’ Forum. 
Recognising past injustices in the media, we commit ourselves to a program of action 
to overcome these injustices and to defend and promote media freedom and independence. 
Belief. It is our belief and understanding that: 
1. Public and media scrutiny of the exercise of political and economic power is 
essential; 
2. The law related to the operation of media should be consistent with South 
Africa’s Bill of Rights in its protection of freedom of expression; 
3. Journalists and media owners have a duty to work to the highest professional 
standards and ethics; 
4. Journalists and journalism teachers should embrace a learning culture by 
committing themselves to on-going education and training. 




1. To nurture and deepen media freedom as a democratic value in all our 
communities and at all levels of our society; 
2. To foster solidarity among journalists and to promote co-operation in all matters 
of common concern;  
3. To address and redress inappropriate racial and gender imbalances prevalent in 
journalism and news organisations and encourage corrective action and a 
transformation of culture within the industry; 
4. To promote media diversity in the interests of fostering maximum expression of 
opinion; 
5. To promote the process of media education and to help aspirant and practising 
journalists acquire or develop skills; 
6. To promote professional freedom and independence in broadcast media and all 
media funded by public authorities; 
7. To encourage government to ensure transparency and openness in administration 
and to pass laws ensuring maximum freedom of information;  
8. To use all available institutions to defend media freedom. 
Organisation: To give effect to the above intent, we commit ourselves to establishing an 
organisation with the following structure: 
1. Structure 
1.1 The organisation is called the South African National Editors’ Forum. 
1.2 The executive body is called the Editors’ Council. It is made up of 20 members. 
The interim agreement for one year is that the 20 members consist of five BEF, 
five COE, five broadcast editors and five representatives of magazines, interest 
groups and journalism educators. After the interim period, the Council would be 
elected from the general membership. The Editors’ Council shall have a 
chairperson and a  
            deputy chairperson. They shall be voted into position by the Editors’ 
Council. This Council should endeavour to meet at least four times a year.  
Programme of Action 
This conference instructs the Editors’ Council to: 





2. Prepare an annual report on corrective action in the industry and actively lobby 
media employers for the implementation thereof. 
3. Draft a charter to protect editorial independence and seek the endorsement of 
stakeholders including Government, political parties and media owners. Such 
charter will include a code of journalistic ethics and conduct.  
4. Promote and defend media freedom by: establishing channels of communication 
with Government, judiciary and relevant statutory bodies using all available 
institutions to defend media freedom including the Constitutional Court, 
parliamentary bodies and the Public Protector. This should include the repeal of 
all restrictive legislation, promoting a culture of a freedom of expression in the 
community by means of a public education programme. 
5. Together with other bodies such as the Print Media Association, Independent 
Media Diversity Trust and major media owners investigate means of promoting 
media diversity to further the free flow of information and give support to news 
organisations owned and controlled by people from disadvantaged communities. 
6. Together with other relevant training bodies, investigate the promotion of media 
education and training.  





















[Additional aspects of the Independent Newspapers submission the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.] 
Spies in the newsrooms 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, investigating abuses of the apartheid era, invited 
all the major news organisations to participate in a week-long special hearing into the role of 




Independent Newspapers and the Times Media group accepted the invitation to appear 
at the hearings but the Afrikaner press proprietors refused to attend. Nationale Pers rejected 
outright the efforts of the TRC to investigate the actions of the Press and the Afrikaans 
newspaper Beeld threatened its editorial staff with dismissal if they chose to give submissions 
to the TRC. Truth commissioner Dumisa Ntsebeza told the hearing that if the threats were 
correct, then it was a great pity. 
Arri de Beer, a former Afrikaner journalist and now media lecturer and researcher at 
Potchefstroom University, testified in his personal capacity. He said few things had made 
such a dramatic impact on his life and consciousness as testimony to the Truth Commission 
about atrocities at Vlakplaas, headquarters of the security police “death squads” and he had 
been sickened and horrified by revelations of human-rights abuses by Vlakplaas operatives, 
which had made clear the evils of apartheid. Professor De Beer told the Truth Commission 
that in his work as a journalist he had at times kept quiet when he should have spoken out 
volubly. He said the absence of the Afrikaans media from the hearings would be seen as a 
violation of history. 
 Afrikaans media and their intellectuals had operated inside a “mielie driehoek” (maize 
triangle) mentality which was only found between Potchefstroom, Bloemfontein and Pretoria, 
and the Afrikaans media had played an important part in building and maintaining the evil 
which was apartheid. He did not believe it was possible for former National Party cabinet 
ministers to claim they did not know about human-rights abuses. Now the chance was being 
offered via the commission to heal past transgressions, but it was not being taken up by 
Afrikaners. “If you look at this particular commission and its work, and one has to write about 
it in years to come, one of the main issues which will come to the fore is that Afrikaans 
people like myself did not know.” This was one of the main failings of the Afrikaans media 
that it did not properly inform its readers about the evils being perpetrated in the country. 
At the hearings, the South African newspaper industry also came under fierce criticism 
from black journalists who accused the national press of largely colluding with the apartheid 
government and for practising petty apartheid in newsrooms. The journalists also accused the 
mainstream newspaper companies of denying them the same training and promotional 
opportunities as their white counterparts, and some charged that discriminatory practices were 
continuing in spite of recent changes in newspaper ownership. Members of the Forum of 
Black Journalists, a media pressure group with the main aim of enhancing training and 
professional advancement for black journalists, said in its official submission, by Mondli 
Makhanya and Abbey Makoe, that the forum accused the English and Afrikaans press, and 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation of colluding with successive National Party 




This they did by actively enforcing discriminatory laws in their own institutions, using 
terminology and language that was ideologically in keeping with the National Party 
governments, and in conflict with the forces fighting for the eradication of apartheid. “They 
failed to inform the populace about the evil that was going on around them and victimised 
those in their employ who were actively opposing apartheid,” the Forum delegates told the 
TRC. 
Sowetan night editor Mike Tissong, who started work in newspapers in the 80s, 
outlined the cost of ignoring the voice of black journalists at that time. He started his career as 
a cadet reporter at the Star, in Johannesburg. Tissong described how a young white journalist 
who was given the opportunity to sit on the newsdesk to check copy “acted as she felt against 
staff who were not white”. Tissong said although his stories were used as he had written them, 
his byline was removed. “And there was no recourse for the black staffer who was subjected 
to this offensive treatment,” Tissong said. He said there was also a tendency among senior 
white journalists to disbelieve stories filed by black staff. He cited as an example the incident 
in Duduza, on the East Rand, when a number of young activists blew themselves up after 
trying to use hand-grenades that were booby-trapped. “Rich Mkhondo (a reporter on the Star) 
and I received calls one morning that several youngsters in Duduza township had died in 
explosions. Rich set off for the township while I stayed in the office to pull the story together. 
Our contacts were adamant that a security policeman had infiltrated the group and given them 
grenades which were set to explode as soon as the pins were pulled. He convinced the group 
that he was a trained Umkhonto we Sizwe [the ANC’s armed wing] guerrilla who needed them 
to carry out a mission.” 
Tissong said some of the youths were killed and others maimed when they tried to 
attack homes of councillors. Tissong told the Truth Commission that when he filed the story 
for The Star, he was met with disbelief at the angle he had taken, and a white reporter was 
asked to get the official police version of what had happened. “The whole story was made 
into a watered down version of what happened that night,” he said. Despite this, Tissong said, 
police laid charges over the report. “I went to court alone to face charges in terms of an Act in 
which it was an offence to tell lies about the police. After several trips to court, my attorney 
and I were informed that the police were dropping the case.” About 10 years later Vlakplaas 
police operative Joe Mamasela boasted on television that he had set up the operation to have 
youngsters killed and maimed. 
In separate hearings, Jon Qwelane, who is now editor-in-chief of Mafube Publishing, 
and Thami Mazwai, a director at the same company, said the mainstream media in the country 
were well placed to challenge the injustices of apartheid. Instead they chose to do otherwise. 




now-defunct Rand Daily Mail, of using apartheid legislation against black journalists who 
fought the system. Qwelane lambasted the editors for concluding a pact with former state 
president P. W. Botha in agreeing that the country was in danger of a total communist 
onslaught in the 1980s. Shortly afterwards P.W. Botha declared a state of emergency which 
resulted in gross violations of human rights. Qwelane told the TRC:  
I want to charge all the mainstream newspapers English and Afrikaans with collusion 
with apartheid and having a hand, directly or indirectly, in the subsequent murder of tens of 
thousands of black people by the apartheid army and police. I’m not off my rocker. 
He told the commission that by deciding not to publish stories that highlighted the 
political problem and black people’s struggle against apartheid, the mainstream newspapers 
denied the public a basic human right, the right to be informed. 
Qwelane said the editors “often waxed eloquent in stinging editorials, condemning the 
apartheid system” but failed to match their words with action. The newspapers, he said, also 
practised apartheid in the workplace. “Black journalists were not given any training at all. 
Indeed everything that I know about journalism has been learned by trial and error,” Qwelane 
said. “In very many cases the lack of training was often used as a convenient excuse to deny 
black journalists promotion on the newspapers on which they worked. It often depended on 
the goodwill of the particular editor to correct what was evidently wrong in denying blacks 
promotion.” Qwelane said black journalists were also paid less than their white counterparts.  
Both Qwelane and Thami Mazwai cited cases in which editors hid behind the state 
apparatus to punish black journalists for defying apartheid. Mazwai said that while working at 
the Rand Daily Mail, he was once made to forfeit his leave for the two days he had spent in 
police detention after taking part in a march in 1978. Qwelane said the Star refused to pay 
him for three months after he had refused to register at the pass office, as required of black 
workers. The collusion with apartheid went even further because facilities at these 
newspapers were also separated along racial lines, Qwelane said. Blacks could not share 
canteens and toilets with their white colleagues. Black facilities left much to be desired, 
Qwelane said. “Were these not human-rights violations?” he asked. He acknowledged, 
however, that there were “periodic flashes of courage and brilliance [by mainstream 
newspapers] by exposing the gross injustices under which we lived, to the rest of the world”. 
Qwelane related another incident to the Commission which he said still remained with 
him. On a Friday on the beat, he remembered, a black man had committed suicide, leaving 
seven children destitute. On the same day, a truck with sheep had overturned on the highway. 




mother just squeezed on to the news pages of the Africa edition, the edition that was directed 
at black readers. 
John Horak, journalist and spy 
A former journalist at the Rand Daily Mail, John Horak described his life as a professional 
police agent caught between the murderous intentions of his handlers and the media 
establishment. He told the Truth Commission hearings that his former handlers tried to 
assassinate him after he was finally forced out in 1985. His life was also threatened several 
times by his handlers while he was working for them. This had forced him to flee the country 
with the assistance of the ANC after he was driven out of the security forces. He was 
subsequently instrumental in drawing up guidelines for the new South Africa’s intelligence 
community. 
Horak said journalists who acted as informers under apartheid were “two-a-penny” in 
those days. He said half the newspapers’ newsrooms were made up of journalists who were 
sympathetic to the apartheid state and others who were lumped together as communists. He 
claimed many senior editors knew of his work, but they did not take any action against him at 
the time. He singled out the former Sunday Times editor Tertius Myburgh as one of the 
editors who had knowingly co-operated with him. He said former Sunday Express editor Ken 
Owen had also allowed police spy Craig Williamson to write a column under an assumed 
name in his newspaper. Horak said he was also often approached by journalists seeking 
favours from him because they knew he was a police spy. Many, including an assistant 
Sunday Times editor, whom he did not name, had approached him, seeking his assistance in 
getting into contact with the security forces so that they could work for them.  
He said informers were divided into three main categories: agents who were 
professional policemen doing a job; informers who gave information freely or for money on a 
regular basis; and “sleepers”, who would give information when it suited them. He expressed 
sympathy for journalists who believed in what they were doing because the small pool of 
newspapers in South Africa meant there were few alternative employment opportunities. 
Horak’s testimony contained many gaps because TRC regulations prevented him from 
naming individuals who were still alive and working in the media, but he revealed that he had 
spent more than 30 hours being “debriefed” by the commission. 
Don Mattera, victim of a spy campaign 
Don Mattera worked as a journalist for many years at the Star’s Johannesburg offices and he 
was also a member of the Forum of Black Journalists. Mattera told the Truth Commission’s 




and he said the state of journalism cannot be divorced from the rotten state of South Africa as 
it pertained. 
Mattera, who was banned and subjected to repeated raids on his home by security 
police, was particularly scathing about his former news room colleague John Horak, who 
testified about his role as a police spy on newspapers. Accusing Horak of “whispering 
campaigns” against several journalists, including himself, Mr Mattera said that had it not been 
for President Mandela and his campaign for reconciliation, “John Horak would have been 
dead by my hand”. There had to be a “total catharsis and purge” of South African society and 
the media had to be “reformed” until it represented the country’s demography, he said. 
Independent Newspapers and the TRC 
Independent Newspapers chief executive officer, Ivan Fallon, conceded at the TRC that there 
were shortcomings in the activities of the former Argus company from the 1960s until the 
early 1990s and that it was “deeply regretted”. 
“We make no bones about these ... We regret them deeply,” he said. “But the company 
has changed dramatically, and I reject very strongly [the claim] that an apartheid mindset 
exists in this company today.” Rory Wilson, the managing-director of Independent 
Newspapers Cape, said the Argus had been “a rather staid, cautious and slow-moving 
newspaper company”. It had been so strongly driven by commercial motives that it “often 
blunted its cutting edge  in exposing the wrongs of apartheid and human rights violations”. 
Also, it had made insufficient effort to overcome obstacles to the free access of news, 
imposed by apartheid laws. However, the Argus had also operated in a hostile legal and 
political context, he said. “Journalists were constantly harassed, threatened, abused and 
intimidated for doing their duty as they sought simultaneously to serve the interests of a 




Wilson told the Truth Commission that the new leadership of Independent Newspapers 
had devoted much time and effort to ensuring that the imbalances of the past were redressed 
and that the shortcomings of the old Argus company did not persist and that a great deal was 
being done at all levels in terms of training, education and upgrading of staff from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Ivan Fallon rejected a statement made earlier during the hearing 
by Thami Mazwai, head of Mafube Publishing and a former Argus employee, that the 




old Argus Newspapers, Dr Tony O’Reilly and Independent Newspapers [which bought the 
company in 1993] have been from the outset significant friends of the new South Africa,” 
Fallon told the Truth Commission.  
Wilson detailed the company’s shortcomings and said although many editors and 
journalists had taken a courageous stance in opposing apartheid, more should have been done. 
“Our company made insufficient efforts to overcome the obstacles of apartheid. Our staffs 
were generally too white, and blacks were only introduced on any major scale during the 
1970s. We made insufficient attempts to generate news from disadvantaged communities, and 
this led to a distortion. The alternative press showed up our company for having lost touch 
with the oppressed masses.” 
Times Media Group and the TRC 
Cyril Ramaphosa, chief executive at Times Media Limited, told the Truth Commission that 
the TML group was committed to transforming itself. Mr Ramaphosa, who led TML’s 
submission to the TRC hearing on the role of the media during apartheid, said the English 
newspapers in South Africa had played “in the main” a courageous role in unearthing the 
evils of apartheid, but more had to be done. 
He said criticisms of the way TML’s newspapers had produced news were true, 
particularly coverage of news relating to black people. This, and people’s mindsets, had to 
change. He gave the assurance that issues raised in the hearings had not “gone in one ear and 
out the other”. His editors were attending the hearings and were paying particular attention to 
the criticisms and were “internalising” them, he said. Ramaphosa also gave the assurance that 
black empowerment at boardroom level would be accompanied by empowerment in  the 
company’s newsrooms. “It’s early days yet, but major steps are going to be taken to transform 
institutions and fortunately we have taken it up as a strategic objective to ensure we have a 
fair, true representation of the country’s demographics in the make-up of our company.”  
TML chief operating officer Lawrence Clarke denied that the 1985 closure of the Rand 
Daily Mail had been politically motivated. Although he was not party to the decision, he said 
he had spoken to directors who were involved and they were adamant the decision was a 
commercial one because not enough advertising revenue was coming in. But a former editor, 
Raymond Louw, later said he believed the closure was politically motivated. He said the 
Mail’s advertising executives had made only perfunctory attempts to get advertising this was 
told to him by a senior advertising source. 
Clarke said Times Media’s predecessor, South African Associated Newspapers, had 
been in dire financial straits in 1985 and he was convinced that the group would have 




editors than any other group, but they had always been replaced by editors who believed in 
the same ideals as their predecessors. He was unable to explain how a person like John Horak, 
who was widely suspected of being a police spy, and who admitted such to the Truth 
Commission, could have been promoted to a position where he was able to easily monitor, via 
the company’s computers, the output of any journalist. Clarke acknowledged the concept was 
“horrifying”. 
Horak had earlier told the hearing that he had been a police spy and he claimed many 
senior editors knew of his work but did not take any action against him during the apartheid 
era. He singled out former Sunday Times editor Tertius Myburgh as one of the editors who 
had knowingly co-operated with him as an informer. But, Raymond Louw said he had been 
suspicious of Horak but without evidence he could not do anything. Louw said the Mail had 
been concerned about bugging, especially after a 1965 expose of inhumane treatment in South 
African  prisons, and he had often resorted to having important conversations in passage-ways 
or writing notes to his staff. His successor Allister Sparks, who heads the SA Broadcasting 
Corporation’s television news department, had discovered after the Muldergate scandal that 
his secretary was a police spy.  
Louw said he had not attempted a spy-hunt in the news room as it would have 
demoralised his staff. Instead he only discussed sensitive stories with a few trusted staff. 
Lawrence Clarke also claimed a proud record for the former SAAN group in opposing 
apartheid and for encouraging dialogue. 
Both the Independent Newspapers group and the Times Media group    said they had 
not interfered in the work of their editors but that their editors had always been mindful of 
“their fiduciary duties to their shareholders” which meant they did not risk pushing the 
borders of press freedom that the alternative newspapers later showed off to great effect. 
Security Police spies 
A former security policeman, Vic McPherson, told the commission’s special hearing on the 
media that there had been more than 40 informers working for the old intelligence services in 
the newsrooms of South African newspapers in the late 1980s. He said their role had been to 
spy, to manipulate news and to ensure positive coverage of the police and military. 
The state president at the time, Mr F. W. de Klerk had been fully briefed about these 
clandestine “strategic communications”, Mr McPherson told the commission. McPherson was 
in charge of the security police’s Stratcom unit in 1989 and 1990. He said he had personally 
established a network of about 40 “contacts” in the media, including undercover police 
officers, paid informers, well-disposed journalists and unwitting sources. The media had been 




revolutionary strategies. One of the undercover police officers had been Craig Kotze, a police 
captain who worked at the Star for six years. He later became a spokesman for Law and Order 
Minister Adriaan Vlok, and subsequently communications adviser to Commissioner George 
Fivaz. Another had been John Horak, who worked at several newspapers and the SABC for 
27 years. McPherson said his own network had also included eight paid informers and about 
30 other “contacts”. These agents had been based at more than a dozen news organisations 
including the Sunday Times, The Pretoria News, the Star, Rapport, the SABC, Beeld, the 
Citizen, South African Press Association, Reuters, the magazines Huisgenoot, Insig, 
Republikeinse Pers, Rooi Rose and the BBC’s South African office. 
The aim of media infiltration had been to wage “psychological warfare” against 
liberation movements. All Stratcom projects had been approved by the Minister of Police and, 
in principle, by the president. Many of the projects had been intended to discredit leaders of 
the Mass Democratic Movement through the publication of prominent reports embarrassing 
them. The budget for media-related Stratcom projects had been R50 000, out of a total 
Stratcom budget of R4.5 million, McPherson said. The money had been used to pay 
informants, for travel expenses and to entertain journalists. McPherson said he had personally 
“run” six projects in various newspapers during 1989 and 1990. 
Craig Kotze, news room spy 
National Police Commissioner George Fivaz’s communications adviser Craig Kotze chose the 
TRC hearings to come clean and “reveal” one of South Africa’s worst-kept secrets: that he 
had been a security branch  agent while he worked at The Star.  From his testimony to the 
Truth Commission, he came across as neither an able spy nor a capable journalist. 
I was expected to operate like any other journalist and I was in fact often scooped by 
opposition media on some big stories [like] the Winnie Mandela, Stompie Seipei and Olivia 




[Full text of Guy Berger comment piece published in the Mail & Guardian March 7, 
1997.] 
Nearly nobody noticed when F.W. de Klerk told the Truth Commission in 1996 that 




violations to occur. This surprise admission stands in contrast to the way the press is 
analysing its role during apartheid. 
There has been some focus on those worst-case journalists who spied and lied on behalf 
of the system. The dirt is coming out on how weak or pro-apartheid editors in the “liberal” 
press spiked and censored stories that should have been published. There has been criticism 
that conservatives in the “mainstream” media under PW Botha agreed to “keep their house in 
order”, leaving it to the alternative weeklies to go it alone in exposing the worst abuses.  
But there has been very little assessment of how even the liberal press performed day-
to-day legitimation of racial domination − even if some papers criticised the corruption and 
crimes that flowed so logically from this system. The Sunday Times recently recanted some of 
its most brazen records, such as when it celebrated a murderous South African Defence Force 
raid on Botswana with the headline: “The Guns of Gaborone”.  
Then [the] Independent Newspapers drew up a dossier setting out historical 
“shortcomings” in the way its papers − under the Argus Company − had accepted press 
restrictions. In hot response, four retired editors of Independent papers have now defended 
their personal records as campaigners against apartheid’s gross violations of human rights.  
Harvey Tyson, former editor of the Star, declared he would never apologise for what he 
had done as a journalist. Evidently, he has forgotten the regret expressed in his book Editors 
Under Fire. In it, he admits to having fallen for security police manipulation in publicising 
allegations that “KGB colonel” Joe Slovo had blown up his wife, Ruth First. Missing in this 
entire flurry, however, is any scrutiny of how everyday, routine reporting reflected − and 
contributed to a climate where black lives were cheap and human rights went unrecognised.  
Unlike government supporters like the late former Sunday Times editor, Tertius 
Myburgh, Harvey Tyson was a liberal editor. Yet like most whites, Tyson probably believed 
the Slovo story to be plausible at the time. He viewed his role as a watchdog—but failed to 
see any difference between the legitimate property owners and the real thieves. The liberal 
press was, of course, not the same as the SABC which never seriously claimed to be anything 
other than propaganda for apartheid.  
But it was not as different as people like Tyson would like to think. It reflected 
establishment assumptions where white newsmakers and white audiences counted. Blacks did 
not. Only a few brave, white English-speaking journalists saw the role of black resistance 
beyond their papers’ liberal − and limited − opposition.  
Attacks by Nationalists added to the illusion harboured by many white liberal 
journalists that the key actors were themselves and the government. Not black South Africans. 




when victimised by a bullying government, and enduring court cases and ever tighter 
legislative controls.  
Liberal journalists may be forgiven for evaluating their role in relation to such 
pressures. But this logic does fail to locate them in the broader sweep of things. The liberal 
press operated in, and took its cues from, the prevailing white landscape.  
A handful of white editors rose above the conventional wisdom of the day. They 
“opened an account” and they paid a price: exile for Donald Woods, loss of their jobs in the 
cases of Raymond Louw, Allister Sparks and Tony Heard. 
White journalists like these, who tried to lead the white readership market, rather than 
follow its prejudices and its interests, also ran into falling circulations. The decline was not 
compensated for by black readers who failed to attract advertising revenue.  
If it wasn’t such context that constrained the role of the liberal press, it was the 
confined outlook of most white journalists. Many of these journalists did campaign against 
“petty” apartheid. But macro-apartheid − especially after Bantustan independence − got less 
critical attention. Coverage sometimes pilloried the pass laws; it routinely neglected the 
wages paid to migrant workers. The problem with the liberal press is not only that its 
opposition did not go far enough. Nor even that its champions like Tyson did not realise that 
there was a lot further to go. What was worse was the day-to-day reflection of what South 
Africa was about. Black people were invisible in most newspapers. 
If you were Desmond Tutu, you got coverage − usually negative − in The Star. If you 
were a golf caddie featured in a Daily Dispatch picture, you’d be lucky to have even been 
photographed in the rain standing next to white men enjoying the shelter of an umbrella, with 
your name captioned as “Jackson”. 
The record of black journalistic advancement is similarly pitiful. In 30 years, no white 
editor matched the record of Drum editor, Anthony Sampson, who empowered an historic 
generation of top quality black reporters, writers and investigators.  
To understand all this context is not to justify the role of the liberal press. It is to 
explain it. The press today is unlikely to repeat its general complicity with the day-to-day, 
humdrum mechanics of racial domination. But liberal journalists − of whatever colour − may 
continue to overlook their role in legitimating other kinds of domination. This is the way that 
the media represents how men dominate women, adults abuse children, urban people scorn 




F. W. De Klerk has acknowledged that the way that realities are reflected can 

























Final report of the Consultation on Press Systems in ASEAN Jakarta, Indonesia, 23-26 
August, 1968. 
Preamble: 
ASEAN is a relatively young region, both in terms of independent history as well as the 
level of development. But with relative stability and wealth of natural resources, it promises 




ASEAN is geographically, ethnically, culturally, historically, and economically diverse. 
The extent of diversity has given rise to the development of unique national press. 
The national press systems in ASEAN countries are, in turn, influenced by this 
diversity. The wealth of publications in so many languages in the ASEAN countries is a 
reflection of this unique situation. 
It is clear that the ASEAN national press systems will continue to be influenced by the 
domestic situation in each ASEAN country although the region itself is becoming more open 
to outside influences. 
The promotion and preservation of political stability, rapid economic growth, social 
justice and greater regional cohesion should and will be the main priority of the ASEAN 
press. 
The degree of freedom among ASEAN national press varies according to the peculiar 
geographical, racial, cultural, political and economic circumstances of each country. 
Philosophical and legal bases of ASEAN press systems 
The philosophy of ASEAN national press systems is based on a common understanding 
of the nature of man: 
of holistic man, both rational and emotional, and 
of man in his cultural context, rooted in his understanding of community, authority, and 
religion or spiritual belief. 
This philosophy: 
includes universal human values, as defined and filtered through each society’s cultural 
and historical experience, and 
influence the thrust of each society, and determines the direction and process of its 
search for fulfilment. 
This philosophy integrates the thinking of those components of society concerned with 
the press system, including government, media, and the public, in their efforts to realise the 
national aspirations. 
The philosophy of ASEAN national press systems is operationalised through: 
the Constitution, the laws, and administrative measures; 
the electoral process and other mechanisms of participatory democracy; and 
the media’s articulation of the philosophy as well as the actions arising from it. 




1. That efforts be made to eliminate possible dissonance arising from differences in 
perception between the participating elements in the ASEAN press systems: the 
government, the media, and the public. 
2. That the media be actively involved in defining their character and role in each 
society through mechanisms existing in the respective ASEAN nations. 
3. That the press be considered a partner in development, with the responsibility of: 
(a) professionalising its ethics and practice; and 
(b) helping society progress in development and nation-building. 
4. That both press and government always recognise the cultural context within 
which ASEAN societies develop, with a view to utilising the culture both as 
background for understanding, and as base for change. 
5. That ASEAN nations consider each other’s range of experience as basis for 
learning in such matters as: press ownership, press councils, embodying the 
relationship of press and government in legislation, and other aspects of press 
systems. 
The above recommendations would contribute to the translation of philosophy to 
practice in the ASEAN press systems. 
Role and responsibility of the ASEAN press 
Principles and recommendations, premised on the importance of working in an 
atmosphere of freedom 
1. The primary functions of the ASEAN press are: 
(a) to support efforts at nation-building and to be a partner in national 
development; 
(b) to promote and enhance relations between ASEAN member countries; 
(c) to help mould a national identity; 
(d) to promote social harmony; 
(e) to help explain public issues and policies to facilitate their implementation; 
(f) to inform and educate; 
(g) to exercise self-restraint and good sense so as not to cause misunderstanding 




2. To discharge these functions effectively and fully, it is vital that the media be 
given adequate access to information, which is essential to the development 
process. 
3. In promoting relations between ASEAN member states, the media have to be 
mindful about certain reporting which could adversely affect, or even harm, 
relations. Good sense and sound editorial judgement must at all times prevail. 
4. To promote ASEAN understanding, it is important that journalists of all ASEAN 
member countries cultivate each other and maintain close links. This could 
facilitate the verification of certain kinds of reports which may appear inaccurate 
or slanted. 
Freedom and responsibility of the ASEAN press 
Objectives 
1. Since the ASEAN press is generally free in its day-to-day business, its objectives 
should be to use that freedom in the most productive manner, taking into account 
the many interest groups the ASEAN news media must serve. 
2. The press in the ASEAN region has a vital role in national development. Hence 
development journalism should be encouraged. 
3. The press should make fair comments on all institutions that combine to make up 
society as part of its freedom and responsibility. 
4. The national press of ASEAN countries carry heavy responsibility in exercising 
freedom as they have to consider the element of loyalty to their countries as well. 
5. The national press in each ASEAN country should endeavour to look at problems 
and issues in each member state from the ASEAN perspective. 
 
Recommendations 
1. ASEAN journalists, journalistic institutions, publishers and those concerned with 
press freedom in the ASEAN region should endeavour to encourage the adoption 
of the objectives mentioned above. 
2. ASEAN governments should help promote a free, responsible and credible 
national press with adequate access to information for the national press. 
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